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Since the war on terror was launched by US President George Bush in 2001, Islam 
and Muslims have rarely been out of the news headlines.  This intense media 
exposure has been accompanied by a plethora of studies analysing press coverage 
in order to understand the relationship between Islam in the UK and the press.  
These studies provide a useful understanding of how Islam and Muslims in the UK 
are represented in the national media and how media narratives are framed within a 
primarily political, rather than religious context.  Within this literature explanations of 
why critical media coverage of Islam recurs focus on broader cultural notions such 
as Islamophobia rather than demonstrating a clear understanding of the social and 
professional processes through which the media operate.  This limits the critiques 
offered by this work, as it fails to demonstrate an understanding of structures and 
processes that would need to be successfully negotiated for press coverage to be 
changed. 
 
This doctoral thesis explores the relationship between politics, Islam and the news 
media in the UK.  Using the theory of mediatisation as a framework for 
understanding media power, it argues that the relationship between politics and the 
media cannot be fully appreciated without a consideration of the role of public 
relations practice within it.  Drawing on Bourdieusian field theory, it utilises textual 
analysis and 31 semi-structured interviews with public relations practitioners, 
representatives of Muslim organisations and others with professional experience of 
Islam and the media to establish whether public relations can be understood as a 
distinct field, how it mediates between the political and journalistic fields and what 
the implications of this might be for Muslim organisations seeking to shape news 
media content.  It argues that public relations practitioners do operate within a 
defined professional field with its own particular forms of social and cultural capital, 
although this can be obscured by the ways in which they identify primarily with their 
employing organisation and attempts to mystify the distinctive capital through which 
their work is possible.  In particular, public relations practice is prevalent within the 
political field, where it is used to enable politicians to communicate with citizens via 
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the news media.  PR practice is more likely to be used by those nearer to the centre 
of the political field and, in turn, it serves to enhance the power and relative 
positions of those who utilise it within the political field   The research concludes that 
Muslim groups in the UK are not strongly enough positioned within the political field 
to utilise public relations practice effectively in order to challenge or change 






‘MUSLIMS TELL BRITISH: GO TO HELL!’ (Daily Express, 4 November 2010, page 1, 
their capitalisation), ‘MUSLIM THUGS BURN POPPIES  Sickening scenes on British 
streets’ (Daily Star, 12 November 2010, page 1, their capitalisation), ‘Hot cross buns 
banned for fear of offence’ (The Times, 17 March 2003.  The article is about hot 
cross buns supposedly causing offence to Muslims). 
 
Newspaper headlines in capital letters or bold type, shouting out from the front 
pages, grab public attention and sell newspapers.  Headlines are intended to draw 
the reader into the story while at the same time providing a compelling summary of 
the main perspective of the news report (Bleich et al 2013).  A plethora of studies on 
Islam and media since the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 
2001, and on London on 7 July 2005, suggest that headlines such as those 
reproduced above have become common currency in the UK press in the last two 
decades.  These evaluations of press coverage have in the majority, although not 
universally, reached a common conclusion – that there is an overwhelmingly 
negative narrative about Islam which predominates in the UK news media. The 
significance of this is not underestimated in these analyses, with concerns expressed 
about Muslim participation in public life (O’Toole et al 2013), Muslim exclusion from 
society (Poole 2002, 2008, 2010; Field 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens-
Mazer 2010) and even suggestions that negative media coverage may result in 
physical attacks on Muslims (Allen and Nielsen 2002).   
 
This research aims to contribute to the current understanding of the relationship 
between Islam and Muslims in the UK and the news media.  To do so, it does not 
seek to replicate the many existing studies which evaluate and critique current 
media reporting. Nor does it seek to examine the impact that different narratives 
about Islam may have on Muslims in the UK or on society more widely.  Instead, this 
research seeks to achieve a fresh perspective in understanding how Islam and the 
media interact. Unlike many other approaches, it does not do this by analysing 
media coverage of Islam.  Rather, it moves away from a journalistic or media studies 
 7 
 
perspective to explore the relationships between Islam, media and the UK political 
sphere. In doing so, it seeks to understand the nature and flow of media power and 
how that power can be interrupted, challenged and changed for the benefit of other 
groups within society.  The research posits that this process of interruption or 
interference can take place through public relations (PR) practice - the activities of 
an agent representing the views, policies or activity of a sponsor organisation to 
journalists in the expectation of influencing media reporting.   
   
This study contends that media coverage about Islam in the UK is primarily political, 
rather than religious in its identity.  As such, it is through a political, as well as a 
religious or social lens that media coverage about Islam and Muslims should be 
viewed.  This can be achieved through a better understanding of the 
interrelationships between politics and the news media and how Islam is positioned 
in relation to both. The media and the political fields are engaged in a continuing 
process where power is exchanged between sides.  There are, however, many 
players involved in the process and a binary view of the interactions between politics 
and media misrepresents the complexity at stake.  This thesis argues that it is not 
possible to achieve a full understanding of the relationship between the political field 
and the news media without acknowledging the role of public relations practice 
within it. Anyone seeking greater insight into the depiction of Islam and Muslims 
within the UK press needs to consider the role that public relations practitioners 
might play in shaping media narratives. 
 
The theory of mediatisation provides the bedrock on which this research is based.  
Mediatisation offers a framework for understanding the power of the media and in 
particular its effect on other institutions within society.  While approaches to 
discerning how mediatisation works may differ, the common understanding is that it 
is a process by which social change is affected as a result of the impact that the 
media can wield (Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; Krotz 2009; Hepp 2009).  Crucially, 
mediatisation provides a theoretical route in to deconstructing the processes by 
which the media operates to enable an understanding of media power.  Beyond this, 
the theory of mediatisation also allows an examination of the opportunities for other 
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institutions to respond to the media’s dominance.  It is the potential for public 
relations practice to respond to and work alongside the process of mediatisation, and 
the consequences that this carries for Islam and Muslims in the UK, that is at the 
heart of this thesis. 
 
The approach taken by this thesis opens up several potential gaps in current 
scholarship, three of which are explored further in this research.  Of these, the first 
is a theoretical gap relating to how the theory of mediatisation works and is put into 
practice.  The second is an empirical gap about how public relations practice is used, 
and to what purpose, within the political field.  Within this understanding, the 
research makes its third contribution to existing scholarship, by focusing on the 
activity of one specific set of agents within the political field – those undertaking 
public relations activity on behalf of Muslim organisations in the UK. The fieldwork 
outlined in subsequent chapters seeks to broaden the current insight and 
understanding of how public relations practice works and it also provides empirical 
evidence which contributes to a greater understanding of the dynamics of power and 
change which this type of practice operationalises.  In doing so, it focuses on the 
current use and future potential for public relations to be used as both a filter and 
trajectory for messages about Islam and Muslims which appear in the UK public 
sphere.   
 
The implications of this research are significant for a more stratified understanding 
of the relationship between the UK news media and Muslims and, potentially, other 
minority groups.  While more nuanced approaches are beginning to emerge in 
scholarship (e.g. Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010) the overwhelming majority of studies 
still rely on an approach which looks at the press in isolation when considering 
media narratives. Yet the construction of particular narratives by the UK news media 
does not take place as a result of journalistic bias or editorial whim. Instead, the 
dynamics of media and political power come into play as Islam becomes politicised 
by association.  By approaching the discussion from the perspective of the media, 
politics and Islam as social fields and the interaction between them, the research 
highlights the resources and conditions needed within those fields in order to 
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challenge or more readily accommodate media power.  Most of all, the research 
offers the potential of a new perspective on Islam and the news media which 
suggests that agents other than journalists can be instrumental in the way Islam is 
represented.   
 
This is not a study of the media.  The literature review in Chapter 1 considers 
existing approaches to Islam and media, but this study does not include any original 
research in this regard.  The nature or slant of media coverage about Islam in the 
UK press is, to a large degree, irrelevant to the theoretical basis or methodology for 
this study which seeks to understand more about some of the processes by which 
press coverage is influenced and shaped.  This research addresses the question of 
Muslim engagement with politics and public relations and, through this practice, with 
the media.  It does not pursue an understanding of the motivation of media or 
individual journalists for the coverage they produce, but rather begins to understand 
the relationship between Islam and media through a sociological perspective, 
exploring relationships and issues of power and looking at these within a social field.  
In this, it does not examine the direct relationship between Muslim groups and 
journalists, but explores the use of public relations practice as an intervention which 
has the potential to affect media reporting. 
 
To do this, it recasts a perspective on Islam from a religious, or media studies 
perspective to a political one, exploring the engagement of Muslim groups with the 
UK political field, and suggesting that it is in these engagements that a way forward 
might be found.  In doing so, it does not offer a rationale for why reporting about 
Islam may or may not be negative, but it does offer a rationale for why reporting 
about Islam is not changing or being challenged.  The study does not seek to take a 
position on whether particular types of media coverage are justified, or make 
recommendations for change.  Instead, it suggests that a new perspective on how 
media narrative is constructed, which includes the role of public relations, might 




Chapter 2 reflects on the relationship between media and society more widely, 
exploring the role of the media as a means of communication between citizens and 
the state.  The mechanisms by which this role is played out are discussed, including 
theories of the public sphere, civil society and new institutionalism.  The chapter 
goes on to discuss the theory of mediatisation and the concept of media logic; the 
media’s way of seeing and interpreting affairs (Altheide and Snow 1979); and the 
onus placed on other institutions to conform with this.  The concept of PR logic is 
also introduced, suggesting that in order to enable other institutions to conform to 
media logic, public relations practitioners impose a logic of their own, which has 
consequences both for the news media and for the practitioner’s sponsor 
organisation. This public relations logic is what enables organisations to 
accommodate, challenge or work alongside media logic and exert a reciprocal power 
over the press. 
 
Chapter 3 sets out the methodology for the study’s examination of the 
interrelationship between Islam, politics and media, through the lens of public 
relations practice.  The research questions outlined in this chapter aim to build a 
broad understanding of how public relations works and the resources that PR 
practitioners can access.  The questions then focus further in on public relations in 
the political field, the experience of representatives of Muslim groups operating in 
the political field and the extent to which they engage with PR practice.  Field theory 
is set out as the means by which the research questions are answered.  Adopting 
field theory enables the researcher to determine the role of individual agents, rather 
than institutional structures.  The position of agents within a social field can be 
established along with the dominant characteristics of that field and the agents’ level 
of comfort in adapting to this.  This approach reveals the situation of public relations 
practitioners and agents representing Muslim groups within the UK political field and 
the access that they respectively have to different types of power within the field. 
 
Public relations practice is at the heart of understanding the interplay of power 
between the media and politics.  The fieldwork conducted for this research and 
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 attempts to understand how public relations practice 
 11 
 
works, both within the political field and among the Muslim groups operating there.  
Interviews with practitioners ascertain their relative positions within the field and the 
attributes and characteristics which enable them to succeed within it.  The results of 
the fieldwork suggest a stark divergence of public relations practice among different 
agents which can help to explain how media power with regards to narratives about 
Islam appears to go largely unchallenged. 
 
Fieldwork among public relations practitioners outlined in Chapter 4 reveals their 
high levels of social and cultural capital and their reliance on this to perform 
effectively in their roles.  What also emerges is a mystification of PR practice which 
is integral to practitioners’ perceived standing in the field.  This mystification 
enhances the power that PR practitioners hold, and helps protect them from 
challenge or competition by those within their sponsor organisation and also 
externally.  The mask that this mystification creates is absent from the fieldwork 
with representatives of Muslim groups discussed in Chapter 5.  While these agents 
demonstrate significant experience of the political field, their lack of understanding 
of public relations practice suggest that they are not ‘playing the game’.  The 
existence of such a game is evident within the political field and is highlighted in 
Chapter 5 through a discussion of the public relations activity that took place to 
launch the coalition government’s current Prevent strategy.  
 
The word ‘media’ which is used throughout this document carries multiple meanings 
and connotations. The theories under discussion – including mediatisation and field 
theory - both have concepts of media power at their heart, and different definitions 
of media could apply.  Throughout this thesis the term ‘media’ is used to refer to the 
UK national newspapers, both broadsheet and tabloid. Although production 
processes mean that the content of newspaper websites changes more frequently 
than the content of the printed newspapers, this study has not differentiated 
between the two.  In similar vein, the thesis identifies the challenges of talking 
about Islam or Muslims in the UK, particularly in the context of news reporting.  
There are many diverse communities of Muslims in the UK, and a similar multiplicity 
of expressions of Islam as a religion.  For the sake of brevity, the words ‘Islam’ and 
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‘Muslims’ have been used throughout as shorthand for Muslim communities and the 
faith they practise.  
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Chapter 1: Islam, media and contemporary society in Britain 
 
As little as twenty years ago, a study of the depiction of Islam in the news media 
would have been viewed as irrelevant to the current trends in media studies as it 
would have been to domestic politics.  The uninformed reader of such a study might 
reasonably have expected it to focus on foreign affairs reporting, or to be a study of 
reporting by journalists during the first Gulf War (1990-1991).  Yet within two 
decades the context for this study has been transformed.  Islam and different 
communities of Muslims in the UK have been constantly in the news throughout the 
period of this research.  Headlines relating to Islam and Muslims appear in national 
newspapers – both tabloid and broadsheet - nearly every day1. This notable increase 
in media reporting has been mirrored in the academic literature, and in the years 
following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005 a new urgency 
has entered the debate about media coverage of Islam.  Analyses of media reporting 
about Islam in the UK, the US and elsewhere abound, together with 
recommendations about how to change existing media narratives.   
 
Much of the literature in this area which has emerged in the last two decades is 
focussed on the political consequences of particular events involving or affecting 
Muslims, from the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (Ruthven 1990; 
Fowler 2000; Pipes 2003; Poole 2010), to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 
2001 and London in 2005.  Other studies follow the controversial publication of 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Jyllands-Posten, Denmark’s best- 
selling newspaper, in 2006 (Hussain 2007; Berkowitz and Eko 2007; Keane 2008; 
Meer and Mouritsen 2009). Strong and sensational headlines about Islam and 
Muslims are now familiar currency; coverage of Islam in the UK news media has 
increased substantially over the last two decades and particularly post 11 September 
2001.  In the UK press, there has been a notable shift from reporting on 
                                            
1
 A search of UK national newspaper coverage using the Nexis online database revealed over 1950 national 




international stories about Islam as a religion to reports about Muslims as individuals 
and references to the ‘Muslim community’ - a phrase which can be used to mean a 
specific geographic community of Muslims or Muslims in the UK more generally 
(Poole 2000, 2010; Poole and Richardson 2006; Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008; 
Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013; Bleich, Stonebraker, Nishar and Abdelhamid 
2013). 
  
In the last two decades there has been more coverage of religion overall in the UK 
news media and reports about Islam have been the single most significant 
determining factor in this increase2.  A study of almost every newspaper article 
published in the UK national press that referred to Islam from 1998 to 2009 (Baker 
et al 2013) reveals that numbers of articles published were at their lowest in the 
year 2000 – with an average of 50 articles appearing per month3.   A year later, in 
2001, the number of articles had increased nearly seven times over, to an average 
of almost 350 articles per month4.  This concurs with quantitative research 
conducted by Poole (2002), who concludes that Muslims were what she describes as 
‘low visibility’ in the British media prior to 2001, particularly in the tabloid 
newspapers. She suggests that in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 
2001, between 12 September and 25 October, The Times and The Guardian each 
carried the equivalent of that paper’s previous annual coverage (Poole 2002:5). 
Baker et al (2013) identify a second peak in newspaper coverage in 2005, with an 
average of over 300 newspaper reports per month5 and, eight years after the event 
which triggered the increased coverage, in 2009 there were still three times the 
amount of newspaper articles about Islam and Muslims, averaging at over 150 per 
month.  Separately, Bleich et al (2013) considered nearly twelve thousand headlines 
                                            
2
 Coverage of British Muslims in the British press increased year on year from 352 articles in 2000 to 2,185 
articles a year later.  Coverage reached a peak of 4,196 articles in 2006.  By 2008, coverage had reduced to 
3,466 articles (Moore, Mason, & Lewis, 2008). 
3
 Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) include a health warning with regards to their statistics for the year 
2000.  The researchers used media database Lexis Nexis as a source for newspaper articles, and this may not 
be complete for the year 2000. 
4
 This number takes account of the fact that the main trigger for news stories – the attacks of 11 September 2001 
– happened three quarters of the way through the year.   
5
 This follows the attacks on London of 7 July 2005 
 15 
 
about five major world religions - Islam, Christianity6, Judaism, Hinduism and 
Sikhism - which appeared in the UK press between 2001 and 2012.  Of these, nearly 
half of the headlines (46%) are about Islam – a disproportionate pattern of 
exposure7.   
 
Aside from the volume of articles, another indicator of increased media interest in 
Islam comes from research conducted by Field (2007) which explores changing 
British attitudes towards Islam and Muslims on the basis of opinion polls.  Field 
explains that many of the opinion polls covering attitudes to Islam which were 
conducted between 1988 and 2006 were commissioned by the news media8, while 
others received wide press coverage.  By this count, there were 104 opinion polls 
conducted during these 18 years, of which over 86% (90 polls) were commissioned 
in the five years following the attacks of 11 September 2001.  Field warns that 
because the primary purpose of most of the polls is to create news they lack 
academic rigour in question formulation and analysis.  One obvious manifestation of 
this has been a tendency for polls to regard British Muslims as an homogenous 
entity, without distinguishing between them or different communities of Muslims. As 
a result, the lack of sophistication in the questions asked means that the polls do not 
lend themselves to a nuanced view of Muslims.   
 
This growing pool of newspaper reports provides a rich seam of material for 
academic analysis.  Alongside the news headlines, there is an increasing volume of 
scholarly literature exploring Islam and the news (for example, see Said 1995, 1997; 
Poole 2000, 2008, 2011; Hafez 2000; Richardson 2004; Poole and Richardson 2006; 
Field 2007; Saaed 2007; Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008; Farouqui 2009; Ismael and 
Rippin 2010; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013). 
While there was some literature exploring the relationship between Islam and the 
press before the attacks of 11 September 2001 – most notably Said (1995, 1997; 
                                            
6
 In their research, headlines about Christianity are divided into two categories – headlines about Catholicism and 
those about Anglicanism. 
7
 In contrast to Bleich et al’s findings (2013), the 2011 census shows that 59.3% of the population in England and 
Wales identified as Christian, compared with just 4.8% who identified as Muslim (Statistics, 2012). 
8
 Field (2007) does not make a distinction between those polls commissioned for the printed press and those 
commissioned by broadcast media. 
 16 
 
Poole 2000 and Hafez 2000) – more academic interest follows media coverage 
appearing after the attacks on the USA and the subsequent attacks in London on 7 
July 2005. 
 
Despite the now sizeable canon of literature focusing on Islam and media, it remains 
an emerging area of study (Aydin and Hammer 2010; Jaspal and Cinirella 2010; 
Poole 2011).  To date, much of the interest in Islam, Muslims and the press has 
come from researchers primarily working within journalism or media studies.  It is 
only more recent analyses which have begun to address specific quantitative or 
qualitative questions about different aspects of the representation of Muslims, or 
their religion, in the UK news media.  These more recent analyses include a focus on 
the relationship between opinion polls, media reporting and Islamophobia (Field, 
2007), a discussion of Muslim participation in media debates (Spielhaus, 2010) and a 
study of Muslim participation in contemporary governance (O'Toole, Nisson 
DeHanas, Modood, Meer, & Jones, 2013).  While some of these discussions diverge 
from a media studies perspective, the focus remains overwhelmingly on 
representation of Islam, with the associated challenges that this brings9.  The 
diversity of the Muslim community in the UK is not always fully recognised within 
such studies (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010) which categorise Muslims as ‘the other’ or 
identify Muslims primarily through an assumed religious identity, rather than as 
individual citizens with different characteristics, lifestyles and preferences10.   
 
As the literature around Islam and media develops, the theoretical and 
methodological approaches used are broadening, taking account of emerging media 
theory11.  This chapter reviews some of the most prevalent and recent approaches 
to discussing Islam and the UK news media and highlights how this research will 
                                            
9
 Both Silverstone (1999) and Stuart Hall (1997) address the theme of how society represents people and places 
that are significantly different to the majority, arguing that representation is a practice which produces culture.  
Hall argues that people who are in any way different to the majority – ‘the other’ - are frequently exposed, and 
often through the media, to a binary form of representation, often using sharply opposed, polarised and over-
simplified themes, such as good and bad, civilised and primitive, ugliness and beauty. 
10
 For a discussion of the implications of media representation for Muslim identity, see Jaspal and Cinnirella 
(2010). 
11
 This broadening of the academic focus on Islam and media includes literature on societal attitudes to Islam, 
representation and inclusion in digital and social media, political engagement and community integration (e.g. 
Hafez 2000, 2007 and 2009; Field 2007; Spielhaus 2010; Uitermark and Gielen 2010; O’Toole et al 2013). 
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complement, contribute to and extend the current literature.  The reaction to the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 includes studies of Islam and media which are taking 
place worldwide (for example Quayle and Sonn (n.d); Hafez 2000; Angeles 2010; 
Spielhaus 2010; Uitermark and Gielen 2010; Smith 2013), but in keeping with the 
focus of this research, this chapter is primarily restricted to literature that examines 
the relationship between Islam and media in the UK press.   
 
The tendency to explore the relationships between Islam and media from a 
journalistic or media studies perspective means that some form of content analysis is 
a popular starting point, with such studies drawing similar conclusions about 
negative misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims in the UK media (Poole 2002, 
2008; Billig 2006; Poole and Richardson 2006; GLA 2007; Moore, Mason and Lewis 
2008; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013; Bleich, Stonebraker, Nishar and 
Abdelhamid 2013).  Content analysis is conducted through an examination of a 
series of news reports published over a defined period of time with a critique of the 
overall depiction or representation of Islam that the copy, headline and 
accompanying images convey. The way in which the journalist has framed the news 
article may be categorised by the researcher in positive, negative or neutral terms, 
sometimes using discourse analysis to associate Islam or Muslims with particular key 
words or phrases (Richardson 2004; Bleich et al 2013; Baker et al 2013; Yusof et al 
2013).  Poole (2008) cites what she calls ‘significant’ or ‘prominent’ topics featuring 
in news items about British Muslims, while Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008) identify 
what they call the ‘news hook’ for stories about Islam and Muslims12.  Using this 
method, Moore, Mason and Lewis conclude that just over one third (36%) of stories 
in the British press about British Muslims overall are about terrorism while two thirds 
of articles present Islam as a problem for or threat to British society.  Even coverage 
not specifically linked to an event such as a terrorist attack, or act of conflict 
nevertheless depicts Islam as a problem and in conflict with British society. This is 
illustrated by front page headlines such as ‘Muslims force [swimming] pool cover up’ 
(Daily Express 26 July 2010), ‘Britain has 85 Sharia Courts’ (Daily Mail 29 June 2009, 
their underlining) or ‘Christmas is banned: it offends Muslims’ (Daily Express 2 
                                            
12
 The ‘news hook’ is the predominant theme of the story, or the event which characterises the news report. 
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November 2005) – all of which imply that Islam is overwhelming British society or in 
conflict with British traditions and values.  Poole’s conclusions (2008) broadly concur, 
with themes identified in press coverage including Muslims’ threat to British security, 
Muslims’ threat to mainstream British values and the cultural differences between 
Muslims and the rest of society. 
 
In one of the most extensive studies of media reporting of Islam and Muslims in the 
UK, Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery  (2013) use critical discourse analysis13 to 
understand who benefits from such media texts, and in particular to gain insight into 
the dynamics of power at play in reporting.  Using keyword analysis they studied the 
recurrence of words located in close proximity to the words ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ in the 
UK newspapers over a 12 year period (1988 – 2009).  Their conclusions are that the 
presentation of Islam and Muslims during this period is overwhelmingly one of 
conflict and threat.  The religion and its followers are frequently portrayed as a 
problem or a cause for concern and even discussions of aspects of doctrine and 
religious practice are often embedded in a context of conflict.  These links occur 
twice as often in the tabloid and midmarket newspapers as in the broadsheets.  In 
the red tops, the Daily Mail and The Daily Express typical words used alongside the 
words ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ include ‘terror’, ‘veil’, ‘extremists’, ‘immigration’, ‘asylum’, 
‘sharia’ and ‘evil’.   The tabloids also frequently include the words ‘fanatic’ and 
‘extremist’ in stories about Islam and Muslims.  In contrast, the broadsheet 
newspapers are more likely to use words such as ‘radical’, ‘hardline’, ‘fundamentalist’ 
or ‘separatist’14.   
 
Although used with regularity, these are not the most frequently employed words 
co-located with the word ‘Muslim’.  The most common keywords identified by the 
study are nouns such as ‘community’, ‘world’, ‘women’ and ‘leaders’.  This is because  
                                            
13 Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery describe critical discourse analysis as: ‘an approach to the analysis of 
discourse that holds that language is a social practice and examines how ideologies and power relations are 
expressed in language. Critical discourse analysis involves the close examination of language in texts, as, for 
example, in showing how particular linguistic phenomena (word choice, sentence structure, metaphor, 
implicature, argumentation strategy, etc.) can be used to represent a particular stance’ (2013:20). 
14
 Bleich et al ascribe some of the attitudes taken towards Muslims and Islam to the political leaning of the 




Muslims are frequently referred to via collective nouns, such as ‘the Muslim 
community’ or ‘the Muslim world’ which tend to present a picture of a monolithic 
religion, closely linked to extremism, indistinguishable from within and different from 
those outside it.  Baker et al (2013) observe that the phrase ‘Muslim community’ 
(which suggests a single, homogenous community where all Muslims are the same, 
rather than an array of different Muslim communities) tends to be used as a 
simplistic catch-all to refer either to all Muslims in a particular town or city, to a 
single community that spans the whole of the UK or even to the international, global 
or worldwide Muslim community.  The Muslim community and their representative 
leaders are viewed as hostile, easily angered and offended.   Muslim leaders are also 
characterised as undeserving of their status within the community, especially by the 
right-leaning tabloids.  Such casual and ambiguous phrasing about Muslims and 
Islam lends itself to emphasizing the difference between Muslim communities and 
the rest of the United Kingdom. 
 
The dominance of certain words changes over time. While conversion to Islam is 
linked through key word analysis to a range of problems including alcoholism, 
vagrancy, drug dealing and mental illness, from 2004 onwards the British press as a 
whole is more concerned about prejudice towards Muslims.  In 2006 and the years 
following, words relating to intolerance become more frequent.  Following the 
attacks in London of 7 July 2005 counterterrorism also becomes a keyword. In their 
study, Baker et al conclude:  ‘What seems to be in operation is, on the one hand, 
the drawing of overgeneralisations from the attitudes and actions of a minority 
among Muslims, which is then applied to Islam and Muslims in general, and, on the 
other, attempts to counter the image of Islam and Muslims as sources of conflict’ 
(2013:65).  This latter observation suggests some sort of awareness among the 
press about the cumulative impact of its own power and potentially efforts to 
counter this.  However, it also implies a failure to delineate properly between 
different types of Muslims and expression of faith.  The news media’s perspective on 





Although prevalent in much of the literature immediately following 11 September 
2001, content analysis can rely too heavily on a subjective analysis of reporting, 
dependent on the researcher’s interpretation and categorisation of news stories as 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’15.  This can create a simplistic classification of news reports 
which risks overlooking the complexities of the issues being reported. (For example, 
see the report commissioned for the Mayor of London (GLA 2007) which classifies 
news reports about Muslims as ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’.  This report 
concludes that an ‘overwhelming’ number of articles had negative associations about 
Islam or Muslims.) In a more recent study which aims to test the hypothesis that the 
representation of Islam in the British media is a negative one, Bleich et al (2013) 
measure positive and negative associations in headlines about Muslims in four UK 
newspapers between 2001 and 2012. To achieve this, they categorise the way the 
headlines depict Islam under five different headings: Victim, Beneficial, Problem, 
Other and Ambiguous.  While initially revealing that the biggest number of headlines 
sit under the ‘Problem’ category and present an overall negative impression of Islam, 
the researchers decide that headlines categorised as ‘Beneficial’ and ‘Victim’ depict a 
positive association of Islam, which are likely to elicit sympathy or ‘warm feelings’ 
about Muslims (2013:18).  This decision appears to rest on an overarching 
assumption that newspaper readers would view Muslims victims in a positive and 
sympathetic light; an assumption which the researchers do not substantiate.  
Nevertheless, by combining the categories of ‘Beneficial’ and ‘Victim’ headlines, 
Bleich et al deduce that in some years, press coverage about Islam and Muslims is 
more positive than negative.  According to their conclusions, there were five years 
where negative portrayals of Muslims outweighed positive portrayals in British 
newspaper headlines, while there were seven years where the tone of headline 
coverage was ‘net positive’ (2013:28).  Their findings suggest that British media 
headlines do not consistently portray Muslims and Islam negatively, but neither do 
they portray them broadly positively.  Patterns of coverage are complex, they vary 
year by year and on the whole, British media headlines are relatively evenly 
balanced between framing Muslims in a positive and negative light.  
                                            
15
 In their study of ‘news hooks’, Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008) explicitly avoid such categorisation, because of 
the pitfalls of interpretation it can lead to. 
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While this study provides a quantitative approach to analysing media headlines 
about Islam and Muslims its methodology falls down because of its broad brush and 
subjective method of categorisation.  To summarise headlines as ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’ seems too naive; not least because headlines - often crafted by sub-
editors rather than the journalist whose byline sits alongside the accompanying 
article – may not accurately represent the tone or content of the news article.16  In 
similar vein, a study by Yusof et al (2013) analyses 109 news articles about Islam 
from Time and The Economist magazines in the two months following the death of 
Osama bin Laden in 2011.  The study aims to examine how these media link Islam 
and terrorism in their reports.  The results reveal that of all the articles only 13% of 
the news was positive towards Islam, with framing of news stories predominantly 
associating Islam with violence, terrorism and weak or poor leadership in Muslim 
countries. Most of the news categorised as positive pertained to stories about efforts 
for peace and reconciliation.  However, although the study is clearly focused on 
media reporting following bin Laden’s death, not every article explicitly mentions the 
words Islam or Muslims.  For example, the news reports studied included stories 
about the future of Al Qaeda which did not make reference to either word: this 
connection was made by the researchers, rather than the journalist.  Here, the 
researchers risk the same pitfalls that they associate with news reporting: an 
automatic association of Islam with acts of terror, or the perpetrators of such acts.  
Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) sound their own warning about the risks of 
researcher interpretation in content analysis, observing that as consumers of media 
their views have been shaped over time by the very newspapers they study.  The 
cumulative influence of the media means that researchers’ interpretations of what 
they read cannot be anything other than subjective, and this influence is discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
This type of content analysis provides an understanding of the overall depiction of 
Islam in the press and may be a useful starting point for discussion, but it is a blunt 
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 For example, a headline referring to a Muslim as a ‘victim’ may be referring to Muslim victims of attacks by 




tool with which to analyse the nuance and construction of news articles17.  
Categorising stories by their news hook as Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008) do, does 
not take account of any points of dissenting argument or balance included in the 
article, or of any groups or individuals that are cited as experts in the piece or the 
language used in the reporting. Furthermore, their study does not provide any 
further insight into how or why such coverage appears. While it is easy to find 
scholarship and other analysis which puts the responsibility for coverage firmly at 
the door of the collective news media, or an individual journalist, it is less 
straightforward to find convincing insight or reasoning about which factors influence 
different types of news reporting.   
 
Alongside cautions of analytical subjectivity such as those articulated by Baker et al 
(2013), content analysis focuses in too quickly on the detail of the final published 
copy, without taking into account the processes by which the text appears.  These 
processes can impact on the type of coverage, including its size and positioning in 
the newspaper and even the content of the story.  Often working to tight deadlines, 
journalists are subject to pressures of time and may struggle to source reliable and 
accurate information, particularly when working on breaking news18.  Those working 
on printed publications may also be constrained by space, with sub-editors 
responsible for editing copy and writing headlines – production processes which 
could fundamentally alter the perspective of the piece19.  The readiness and 
availability of sources to provide explanation, background or confirmation of news 
may also turn a story in a particular direction.  As a result, the news story may be 
shaped as much by factors outside the journalist’s direct control, with the overall 
representation of Islam being a consequence, rather than a motivation, for the 
piece.  The angle taken by media coverage is not always the result of biased and 
distorted reporting.   
                                            
17 By describing the existing of a ‘news hook’ the researchers are suggesting that coverage of Islam is 
associated with an item which makes news, but they do not explain in detail what a news hook consists of. 
18 The Guardian’s foreign affairs correspondent Brian Whitaker expressed the view that problems with negative 
or inaccurate depictions of Islam occur less often with ordinary news reporters than with feature writers and 
columnists who tend to be strong on opinions but pay less attention to the facts.  See Muslim Council of Britain 
2002:55. 
19 The Daily Express Home Affairs correspondent Rachel Baird was described by a colleague as ‘in turmoil’ 
because of the wild headlines accompanying stories about Muslims and asylum she was repeatedly asked to 




Through his study of opinion polls exploring public attitudes towards Islam and 
Muslims, Field (2007) observes that public knowledge about Islam has increased 
over the years, and that much of this knowledge has been gleaned from the 
media20.  Poole (2002; 2008; 2010) also identifies this as a theme emerging from 
media coverage.  Prior to 11 September 2001 she describes ‘cultures of ignorance’ 
among media audiences but observes that Muslims are increasingly making their 
presence felt in the public sphere (2002:84).  As we have seen, knowledge derived 
from media reporting is likely to conflate an association of Islam with threat, terror 
and conflict.  Baker et al (2013) go so far as to suggest that there is a deliberate 
intent on the part of newspaper editors or proprietors to exert (often successfully) 
agenda setting social and political influence.  For example, they describe an article in 
the Daily Star which claimed that the BBC had been overrun with Muslims 
accompanied by a photograph of a woman wearing hijab sticking her middle finger 
up to the camera in a gesture of insult as: ‘fanning the flames of conflict between 
mostly white, nominally Christian majority in the UK and minority Muslim residents’ 
(2013:1).  There are conflicting outcomes here: while media coverage contributes to 
an increasing recognition and knowledge of Islam, the media’s cumulative message 
influences individuals’ actions and responses to Muslims, not necessarily in a positive 
way21.  Allen and Nielsen (2002) suggest a tangible impact, arguing that the media’s 
definition of what Muslims look like has led to acts of aggression or physical violence 
towards Muslims. 
 
The Runnymede Trust (1997) coined the phrase ‘Islamophobia’ to describe the 
impact that this type of negative media narrative might have on the way Muslims 
and their faith are perceived more widely.  The Trust identifies what it describes as 
‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam within the media and public discourse more widely 
                                            
20
 A press release by the Islamic Society of Britain claimed that 65% of people got their information about Islam 
from the media or television (Islamic Society of Britain, 2003). 
21 Focus groups on religion and the media carried out by Taira, Poole and Knott (2010) indicated that viewers 
and readers were aware of Islamophobic representations and the fact that Islamic extremists were written 
about a great deal, but people found it difficult not to be influenced by such stories because there were so few 
positive ones that offered a different perspective. However, they also recognised that bad news stories tended to 
be viewed as having a higher news value than good news stories.  
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(1997:5).  An open view sees Islam as diverse and dynamic with internal debates, 
interdependent with the West, different but equal.  In contrast, a closed perspective 
is hostile, seeing Islam as monolithic, static and authoritarian, inferior and 
aggressive or as the enemy.  As the content analyses outlined above suggest, the 
news media frequently presents a closed view of Islam, while positive news 
coverage is less likely to fit into the ‘open’ category. The Runnymede Trust’s report 
observes that closed views of Islam are routinely reflected and perpetuated in both 
tabloid and broadsheet newspapers (1997:20).   In November 2010 the term 
Islamophobia was given further credence when an All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Islamophobia was set up to investigate the forms, manifestations and extent of 
prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in the UK today.  Part of the group’s 
terms of reference is to ‘investigate and review the role of the media in fostering 
mutual respect and tolerance and guarding against misrepresentations of Islam and 
intolerance towards Muslims’ (All Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, 
2013)22.   
 
The Trust’s suggestion of a link between media coverage of Islam and 
Islamophobia23 has been widely discussed (Halliday 1999; Allen and Nielson 2002; 
Field 2007; Oborne and Jones 2008; Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2010; Allen 2010; 
Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010; Saaed 2010, Petley and Richardson 2011).  Field (2007) 
traces Islamophobia back to the 1988 publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel, The 
Satanic Verses, which angered some Muslims who considered that the book 
contained blasphemous references.  He identifies an emerging Islamophobia in 
opinion polls dating from this time, observing that the impact of the Rushdie affair 
was to unify the British Muslim community and radicalize many young British-born 
Muslims who developed links with proponents of radical Islam overseas.  This 
created a strong backlash against Muslims in some sections of the British media 
                                            
22 Two years later in 2012 the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) set up an ‘Anti-
Muslim Hate Crime’ working group made up of government officials, community representatives and academics.  
The aim of the group is to consider and take forward proposals to tackle anti-Muslim hatred.  The group’s first 
report (CPS 2013) referenced community engagement with Muslim communities in response to high profile 
media stories (2013:14). 
23 This study is not a discussion of Islamophobia; which is a contested term.  For example, Islamophobia can be 
used to refer to a spectrum of activity ranging from religious hate crime to drawings of the Prophet Muhammad to 
the use of stereotypes or the use/misuse of particular language such as  ‘Islamism or Islamist’.  These terms 
themselves are disputed and used differently by different Muslim groups. 
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(2007:448).  Field suggests that in the years following the Rushdie affair a 
stereotypical picture of British Muslims in the eyes of the majority population has 
emerged; of Muslims being seen as slow to integrate into mainstream society, 
feeling only a qualified sense of patriotism, and prone to espouse anti-Western 
values that lead many to condone so-called Islamic terrorism. 
 
Oborne and Jones (2008) take a more prosaic approach to identifying causes of 
Islamophobia in the British media.  One trigger, they suggest, was a column written 
by Home Secretary Jack Straw for the newspaper local to his constituency, The 
Lancashire Telegraph, which was reproduced widely in the national newspapers, 
including in The Guardian.  In the piece, Jack Straw described how he asked a 
Muslim constituent to lift her veil during a conversation in his surgery.  He wrote that 
he told the woman:  ‘in particular about my concern that wearing the full veil was 
bound to make better, positive relations between the two communities more 
difficult. It was such a visible statement of separation and of difference’ (Straw 
2006).  Although the piece went on to say that the woman lifted her veil without 
demur and a constructive conversation was had, the concerns expressed within it 
triggered a series of aggressive and outraged headlines about Muslims24 which 
appeared under the aegis of reflecting the country’s mood with regards to the 
presence of Muslim communities.  In a study commissioned by the Mayor of London, 
researchers found that, following Jack Straw’s comments, a woman wearing a full-
face veil became a symbol in the media for Islam generally, and even at one stage 
for all people from ethnic minority backgrounds (GLA 2007:12).  The subsequent 
coverage, they suggest, presented the veil variously as a battleground, a symbol of 
separatism and even a shroud25. 
 
Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) take a socio-psychological to their discussion of Islam 
and media, by which they seek to identify the repercussions in terms of behavior 
and identity for non-Muslims of particular representations of Muslims in the news 
                                            
24
 For example, a headline in The Daily Star claimed: ‘Muslims kidnap Madeleine McCann’ (Daily Star 28 April 
2008). 
25
 Suzanne Moore, writing in the Observer on 8 October 2006 said: ‘These garments are shrouds.  They stop the 
wearer from living a full life.  That goes for Lancashire as much as Kabul’ (cited in GLA 2007: 14). 
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media (2010:290)   Echoing the concerns expressed by The Runnymede Trust 
(1997) and Allen and Nielsen (2002), they suggest that the frequency and 
consistency of media representations will determine their eventual transformation 
into social representations.  This is because the more frequently negative 
representations or associations are reproduced in the media, the more firmly they 
become ingrained in the social and psychological context.  In particular, they refer to 
the concept of Muslims depicted as ‘the Other’ within society as fuel for 
Islamophobia, suggesting that such suggestions of difference in the media can 
induce feelings of fear, insecurity and hostility among the readership26.  A group 
depicted as ‘the Other’ is separate from, and in opposition to, society, identified 
purely by its difference to the mainstream. Poole (2011) also identifies what she 
calls a process of ‘Othering’ in the media, whereby a potential perpetrator or terrorist 
is identified as an individual (thus divorcing him from the wider Muslim community 
and appeasing the media from accusations of racism), and then linked to radicals 
outside the UK who have manipulated or radicalised him through their extremist 
religious ideology.  Muslim ideology is identified as the driving force for acts of 
terror, but it is ‘Othered’ because it is located outside the UK (2011:56). 
 
Discussions in academic literature about Islamophobia in the press readily cite pages 
of headlines, columns and articles which misrepresent or stereotype Muslims27 but 
fail to explain satisfactorily the causes of such apparent reporting.  Islamophobia per 
se is not a subject for this study, but this research does seek to understand more 
about the engagement between Muslim groups in the UK and the media.  While 
negative and stereotypical reporting of Islam and Muslims within the UK press - and 
particularly the tabloid press – is now well evidenced, the causal factors for this need 
to be explored more deeply.  It is not enough to cite Islamophobia as both cause 
and effect of a negative attitude towards Islam in the press.  As Halliday’s 
consideration of Islamophobia (1999) argues, the challenge is one of presentation 
and interpretation of Islam and an academic approach which is less general and less 
                                            
26
 This perception of Muslims as ‘the Other’ in society is also reflected in Quayle and Sonn (n,d) and Said (1995, 
1997). 
27
 Oborne and Jones (2008) point out that this occurs in the broadsheets as well as the tabloids, citing an article 
by Polly Toynbee in the Independent newspaper on 23 October 1997 in which she says ‘I am an Islamophobe 
and proud of it’ and another piece by broadsheet columnist Rod Liddle who states: ‘Islamophobia?  Count me in.’ 
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absolute in its interpretation of Islam than now required28.  This study does not 
provide an answer to the question of causal factors for negative representation of 
Islam and Muslims but generates more complex understanding of the processes 
through which representation occurs that causal explanations need to take account 
of. 
 
Hafez (2000) issues a warning about falling too easily into general conclusions about 
Islamophobia or negative reporting of Islam. Newspapers report what happens in 
society – statements of fact often backed up by photographic evidence or 
corroborated by eyewitness accounts.  Terrorism and conflict do exist, as do those 
people and groups whose actions are motivated by extremist ideologies. The results 
of their actions are very real: devastating and fatal attacks have occurred across the 
world.  These acts will always have the attention of the media - cases in which 
Muslims have been involved in terrorism or wars are high in terms of ‘news value’ 
(Baker et al 2013).  Thus, while content analysis may provide compelling evidence 
for the association between Islam and conflict in news coverage, events such as the 
Gulf Wars of 1990 and 2003 provide an obvious explanation for the type and volume 
of coverage.  These conflicts – and in particular the latter war which lasted for eight 
years - generated headlines day after day with many of the accompanying stories 
referring to Islam both at home and abroad.  As such, the wars became a 
continuous ‘news hook’ on which to hang continuous coverage of the religion and its 
followers.   
 
While the scope of the military action is primarily defined by geography, and 
politicians and religious leaders were at pains to stress that this was not a war 
against Islam29, religion was an ever-present theme in the way it was reported.  In 
the British press, the run up to the war was dominated by stories about Muslims on 
benefits and Muslims seeking asylum in the UK (Poole 2006, 2011).  Sometimes, 
                                            
28
 Halliday (1999) challenges The Runnymede Trust’s analysis of Islamophobia, suggesting that their report runs 
the risk of overstating the case.  While there may be distortions of Islam in the national press, there is less so in 
the regional and local British media. 
29
 The Times quoted Ashraf Salah, imam at the Regents Park Mosque in London saying: ‘It is not a religious war, 
it is not a war against religion’  (The Times, March 21
st
 2003, p.9), while The Independent, among other papers, 
reported that Christian, Jewish and Muslim leaders had issued a joint statement rejecting attempts to portray the 
conflict as one between religions (The Independent, March 22
nd
 2003, p.24). 
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these stories went so far as to promote the notion of the ‘enemy within’, with asylum 
seekers from the Middle East and Afghanistan singled out for particular coverage.  
Three weeks before the second Gulf war began, the Daily Express announced on its 
front page ‘Asylum up 20%’30, claiming that the number of refugees reaching the UK 
in 2002 had exceeded the size of the British Army.  This benchmark reinforces the 
perception of asylum seekers as the ‘enemy within’ and a threat to the UK and asks 
the implicit question of readers about how the UK can defend itself if the army is 
outnumbered. 
 
Once the 2003 Gulf War began, at times it was presented as a conflict between 
religious extremes, with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and US President George 
Bush both reported to be turning to religion to sustain them in the weeks leading up 
to the conflict31.  Headlines in the tabloids referred to the Iraqi army as ‘Allah’s 
Army’32 and Iraqi soldiers were pictured in a mosque at prayer before entering into 
battle33.  In contrast, the identification of the Allied Forces with Christianity was so 
strong that a Muslim fighting in the British army was novel and newsworthy enough 
to feature as a story in the Daily Mail34.  The paper claimed that the unnamed solider 
had reflected deeply on the ‘apparent paradox’ of going to war against a tyrant who 
employed Islamic rhetoric. 
 
The two Gulf Wars, along with the military conflict in Afghanistan also provide 
established frameworks for exploring the relationship between Islam and the media 
both from a journalistic and academic perspective (Brittain 1991; Fialka 1991; 
MacArthur B 1991; Kay 1992; MacArthur J.R 1992; Kelsay 1993; Bennett and Paletz 
1994; Chrisco 1995; Arnett 1997; Allen and Jean 1999; Collins and Glover 2002; 
Gunter, Russell, Withey and Nicholas 2003). While the sheer size and scale of the 
news operation creates much comment, the focus of the literature also includes 
                                            
30
 Daily Express, March 1
st
 2003, front page. 
31
 Writing in The Times, Tim Reid reported that the US President was at peace with himself as war began, 
perceiving destruction of Saddam as both a moral and religious duty.  Such was the level of religiosity in the 
White House, Reid reported, that staff who did not attend Bible classes were frowned upon (The Times 21 March 
2003 page 5). 
32
 The Daily Mirror, March 18
th
 2003 p.14. 
33
 Daily Telegraph, March 15
th
 2003 p.10. 
34
 Daily Mail, March 19
th




examinations of the implications of embedding journalists with troops on the front 
line (Collins and Glover 2002; Gunter, Russell, Withey and Nicholas 2003) and 
discussions of Allied media relations as ‘propaganda’, both at home and in the Middle 
East (MacArthur 1991; Bennett and Paletz 1994; Collins and Glover 2002). Within 
the countries represented by the Allies, the discussion of such events focuses 
predominantly on coverage in the US, and to a lesser extent, the UK media, with 
little understanding or examination of the war and the media from an Iraqi 
perspective.  This is likely to be as much down to practical constraints as anything 
else, and increasingly scholars are exploring responses from audiences and media 
elsewhere with the Middle East (Hafez 2000; Karim 2002).  Couldry’s warning (2004) 
that too often the study of Islam and the media is focused around extra-ordinary 
events, such as war or acts of terrorism, is pertinent here.  The framing of coverage 
around global acts of war or terror means that the ordinary, mundane and routine 
elements of Islam, or what it means to be a Muslim, are rarely considered.  
  
Two explanations for media narratives about Islam and Muslims can be found in the 
works of Huntington (1993) and Said (1995, 1997).  Huntington’s theory of a ‘clash 
of civilisations’ and Said’s theory of ‘orientalism’ are identified as dominant motifs 
within the media and are prevalent in the existing literature about Islam and media 
as a framework around which media coverage is constructed.  The suggestion of a 
‘clash of civilisations’ first appeared in a journal article published in the journal, 
Foreign Affairs, (Huntington 1993).  Huntington argues that in future the 
fundamental source of conflict in the world would not be primarily ideological or 
economic, but cultural.  The article predicts a forthcoming clash of civilisations – with 
civilisations defined by common objective elements such as language, history, self-
identity and, most importantly, religion.  Huntington identifies two major civilisations 
- the West, including Europe and North America, and Islam, including Arab, Turkic 
and Malay subdivisions.  He claims that the concept of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ will apply to 
people of different ethnicities and religion and will increasingly be used by 
governments and groups who will attempt to appeal to religious and civilisation 




The use of Huntington’s theory by the media to establish a conflict between Western 
civilisation and Islam was widely discussed both before and after the events of 11 
September 2001. (Senghass 1998; Halliday 1999; Russett, ONeal, Cox 2000; 
Robinson 2002; Abrahamian 2003; Aksoy 2004; Van der Veer 2005; Amir 2007; 
Ismael and Rippin 2010).  While Russett, ONeal and Cox (2000) tested the theory’s 
viability for accounting for wars between 1950 – 1992, the later literature shows 
how the mainstream US media, and to a lesser but still evident extent the UK 
media35 automatically, implicitly and unanimously adopted Huntington’s paradigm to 
explain the reasons for the attacks on the World Trade Centre and other US targets.  
After 11 September 2001 events became framed in the predictable defensive 
rhetoric of us against them, where ‘us’ meant civilisation and ‘them’ meant 
something primitive or uncivilised (for a broader discussion of journalism in the UK 
and US after 11 September 2001 see Chomsky 2001; Allen and Zelizer 2002; Open 
University 2003; Munshi 2004).   
 
Huntington’s broad brush approach provides an easily understood explanation for 
the attacks without demanding knowledge or analysis of the complex historical 
context to the events.  It has been criticized for its failure to distinguish between 
Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism and Islam itself (Senghass 1998).  In particular, 
the theory of the clash of civilisations provides a framework in which to re-rehearse 
the artificial, but mainstream, perception of a dualism based on religion or race and 
in which to situate reporting which is based on ‘us and them’.  A study sponsored by 
the Quilliam Foundation (Readings, Brandon and Phelps n.d.), suggests that 
language used by politicians and journalists - including nouns such as extremist, 
Islamist, militant or adjectives  such as radical, fanatical, fundamentalist - can fuel 
negative coverage by supporting the notion of a conflict between the West and the 
‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ world.    
 
                                            
35
 Van der Veer (2005) claims that the clash of civilisations theory was less evident in the British media, but Asu 
Aksoy’s analysis of the reactions of British Muslims to media coverage after 11 September 2001 suggests that 
such views were still prevalent, with established broadsheet commentators questioning whether all citizens of 
migrant stock in Britain, particularly Muslims, actually wanted to be full members of the society in which they lived 




Peter van der Veer (2004) argues that an over-reliance on the theme of the clash of 
civilisations, in the rhetoric and reporting surrounding the war on terror, means that 
Western audiences have not been well informed by their media about terrorism and 
the geopolitical context in which it occurs.  Rational political debate in the public 
sphere has much less to do with the weighty decision to wage war than war 
propaganda and the manufacturing of public consent.  The framing of conflict as ‘us 
and them’ or through a process of ‘Othering’ (Poole 2011) creates a politics of fear 
and difference, which fuels a sense of exclusion and self-protection. 
 
Abrahamian (2003), critiques Huntington for his ability to analyse international 
politics without discussing real politics, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Describing the clash of civilisations as international relations with politics taken out, 
Abrahamian observes that any mention of Palestine or Arab nationalism was 
significantly absent in the media coverage in the days and weeks following 11 
September 2001.  Instead, he suggests, the US administration successfully used 
much of the American media to convey the message that the US had been attacked 
not because of what it had done, but because of what it was.  The open and free US 
media, he suggests, had implicitly drawn a taboo line on what could and could not 
be said.  Middle East specialists who did not explain the crisis in the context of Islam 
were sidelined, while the media turned to experts on terrorism, religious extremism 
and Islamic fundamentalism. The clash of civilisations’ scenario was also echoed in 
the rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden. His ‘Declaration of the World Islamic Front for 
Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders’ stated: ‘For over seven years now the 
United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the 
Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, 
terrorising its neighbours and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead 
through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples’ (The Daily Telegraph 
2003:11).  Bin Laden’s use of ‘Othering’ points to persecution and suffering at the 
hands of the United States and is intended to act as a call to arms. 
 
The clash of civilisations motif continued to be prevalent in the media in the years 
after September 11, 2001, most notably in coverage of the Danish cartoons of the 
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Prophet Muhammad36 (Naim 2006; Hussain 2007; Berkowitz and Eko 2007; Keane 
2008; Meer and Mouritsen 2009).  Hussain (2007) argues that the furore was a 
result of long standing misconceptions between the Muslim and Western worlds and 
that the resulting media coverage was overwhelmingly framed as a clash between 
Western freedom of speech and Muslim religious sensitivities.  The cartoons, he 
suggests, were the latest in a long line of misrepresentations of the Prophet 
Muhammad as being the ‘enemy’ of the West. As the worldwide media coverage 
developed the meaning of the cartoon images changed.  From being simplistic 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, they came to signify either freedom of 
speech, secular humanism and the virtues of Western democracy, or blasphemy, 
Islamophobia, religious and ethnic intolerance, insensitivity and the evils of Western 
democracy and secularism37. In the subsequent international debate, the crux of the 
issue was described as between competing rights: on the one hand, freedom of 
expression; on the other, the expectation of tolerance and respect for religious 
sensibilities.  Both positions were placed in a context of a confrontation between the 
secular West and religious Muslims.   
 
In their study of press coverage of the cartoons’ affair in the French newspaper Le 
Monde and The New York Times, Berkowitz and Eko (2007) suggest that the affair 
was perceived in the West as a challenge to journalism and free speech, with the 
media seeing themselves as protagonists in the fight, not merely reporters of the 
conflict. The New York Times actually described the affair as a clash of civilisations 
(New York Times 2 February A12, cited in Berkowitz and Eko 2007).  Berkowitz and 
Eko observe that Le Monde in particular reported the controversy as an affair in 
which it had a stake, triangulating an ideological boundary between the West and 
                                            
36
 In response to complaints by a Danish children’s writer that he could not find anyone to illustrate his children’s 
book on Muhmmad, Jyllands Posten, the highest circulation newspaper in Denmark asked 40 illustrators to depict 
the Prophet.  The 12 cartoons submitted, some of which associated the Prophet with violence, were published in 
September 2005.  They were reproduced in 143 newspapers in 56 countries, leading to widespread unrest and 
rioting.   
37
 Hussain suggests that media reporting was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of reactions to the 
cartoons.  It was not just the fact of the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad in the cartoons which caused 
offence, but the ‘vile and discriminatory’ nature of the way Muhammad was portrayed.  Other satirical or 
insensitive depictions of the Prophet – such as in the cartoon series South Park - had not caused uproar; this, he 
suggests, is because they occurred alongside similar depictions of Buddha, Jesus, or Krishna (2007:126). 
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Arabo-Islamic countries (2007:793).  While the press may have shown restraint in 
not reproducing the cartoons, familiar themes still predominated in their reporting. 
 
The second dominant approach to discussion of Islam and the West is outlined in 
Said’s work Orientalism (1995) which is further developed in his study of media 
coverage of Islam (1997).  Here, he argues that the media control and filter 
information selectively, determining what Westerners learn about Islam. Said claims 
that representations of Islam are not shaped by local or concrete circumstances, 
instead they show Islam’s inferiority compared with the West.  The assumption, he 
argues, is that the ‘West’ is greater than and has surpassed the stage of religion, 
while the world of Islam is mired in a belief system that is opposed to both social 
and economic development. Propositions stemming from this assumption encompass 
orientalism.  Orientalism, he argues, is used by the West to justify the need to 
dominate, restructure and have authority over the Orient.  Central to this is the 
difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and 
the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped and inferior while also fascinating, 
mystifying and alluring.  Said observes that the Western media present a limited 
series of crude, essentialised caricatures of the Islamic world.  Arguing that very 
little of the detail or humanity of Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even 
journalists reporting on the Islamic world, he states that media coverage is reduced 
to constructed images of Muslims and Arabs as either oil suppliers, or potential 
terrorists. 
 
Said’s theory explores the historical relationship between Islam and the West, and 
the echoes of that history that resonate today, resulting in particular types of media 
narrative.  He claims that Islam and Muslims were of little interest to the American 
media until the Opec oil price crisis of 1974 brought the Middle East to the front 
pages. The Iranian Revolution that followed five years later was perceived in the 
West as a ‘holy war on the world’ and one that introduced the concept of ‘jihad’ – a 
term that has been systematically misinterpreted and misused by the media in the 
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following decades38.  For Said, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, led by Saddam Hussein in 
1990, confirmed a media story about Islam, oil and terror that still dominates the 
front pages. 
 
Said’s theory of Orientalism is discussed in several critical studies of Islam and the 
media (Fowler 2000; Poole 2000; Oktem 2009; Jung 2010).  Over two years Poole 
(2000) found what she describes as a radical and explicit anti-Islamic presence in 
the media.  Following Said’s rationale, she argues that the perception of British 
Muslims in the media is consistently shaped by references to Islam in its historic and 
global context, producing the idea that all Muslims are the same.  Three years after 
the 1991 Gulf War, she identified the theme of Islam as a threat to British society 
throughout the media.  Islam was depicted as an antiquated religion and Muslims 
unable to fit in with British society.  The media constructs Islam as a threat and 
Muslims as extremists, and few people in the UK have alternative images of the 
religion and its believers.   
 
Oktem’s (2009) work looks at Said’s work through a more political lens, when he 
comments that much European mainstream discourse and government policy on 
Muslims today is characteristic of an orientalist prejudice with deep historic roots.  
This has been simply updated from its colonial – or even medieval – context,  right 
up to the contemporary war on terror framework in which it fulfils functions of 
inclusion/exclusion and produces references to ‘the Other’.  Oktem argues that the 
recent use of the ‘us or them’ language with regard to Muslims is the latest 
manifestation of older frames of reference for such assorted ‘Others’ including 
communists, black people or the Irish. 
 
In their discussion of what they call ‘security journalism’, Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
(2010) describe the ‘translation’ of extremist messages by western news media, 
especially in the UK and the US. Like Said, they argue that media narratives about 
Islam have deep roots in history but in contrast to Said, who argues that such 
                                            
38
 Literally, jihad means ‘striving’ and describes any sincere struggle for God. The ‘Greater Jihad’ is a moral, 
inner struggle; the ‘Lesser Jihad’ can be a literal battle, but only under strict conditions of self-defence or the 
protection of others from oppression (Masood 2006). 
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translation, or filtering, perpetuates a negative image, Hoskins and O’Loughlin argue 
that the UK and US media reporting generates longstanding understanding of 
Muslim suffering, reminding Muslim audiences of underlying narratives of grievance 
and frustration.  In doing so, British security journalism hinders comprehensive 
understanding of the terror threat.  Short, heavily edited clips of jihadist rhetoric 
shown on television or quoted in the newspapers mean that the full context of such 
texts does not appear, hindering proper discussion and analysis of this type of call to 
arms. 
 
Orientalism suggests that media and representations of Islam are reliant on a deep 
rooted and cultural perception of historical Islam.  Halliday (1999) challenges this, 
asserting that the past provides a reserve of reference and symbol for the present, 
but he does not explain it.  Crucially, he observes, Said’s theory does not offer much 
hope or possibility of change.  Jung (2010) takes a more moderate approach in his 
discussion of Said, acknowledging that contemporary debates about Islam and the 
West are still informed by some of the stereotypes which Orientalism describes.  He 
describes the modern image of Islam as dominated by the essentialist assumption 
according to which Islamic societies rest on a unified and unchanging codex of 
religious, juridicial and moral rules, supposedly regulating the life of both the 
individual Muslim and the Islamic community in all its aspects.  The Muslim religion 
is presented as a holistically closed system, a social and cultural unity resisting 
historical change.  This has become a building block of globally shared public 
knowledge about Islam in the Western and Muslim worlds alike.  However, Jung also 
supports critics of Said, who accuse him of being blind to ‘Orientalism in reverse’ 
which he defines as the self-application of Orientalist stereotypes in the ideologies of 
Islamists and Arab nationalists.  Orientals not only perceive Western people through 
similar stereotypical lenses, but they have also firmly incorporated some of the 
Orientalist stereotypes in their self-image. 
 
Hafez (2009) identifies a structural similarity between the approaches of Said and 
Huntington.  Both of them treated the ‘Other’ (Islam from Huntington’s perspective 
and the ‘West’ from Said’s) as some kind of cultural monolith.  Hafez argues that 
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Said failed to understand the very logic behind the construction of Western 
discourses.  While he is convinced that Said’s critique of the Western mass media’s 
disparaging image of the Middle East and Islam is sound, Hafez points out that 
media coverage in Europe is not only made up of stereotypes.  He suggests that 
apart from Said, few scholars have studied the constructive mechanism behind 
popular images of the Islam-West divide.  He proposes an approach for doing so, 
which examines multiple processes involved within different social environments – 
including the psychological system of the journalist, the politico-economic system, 
the national and international media and the audience39.  This focus on the social 
environments is developed further in this study although, to date, Hafez’s proposal 
about this has not been fully undertaken.  Instead, echoes of Said and Huntington’s 
rationales resonate through much of the existing literature about Islam and media.  
While the literature is quicker to identify these tropes within media coverage than in 
their own analysis, existing studies of Islam and media can fall into a similar trap by 
focusing on a study of the overarching macro-environment rather than the processes 
and interactions which form part of the creation of an individual news story. 
 
The discussions of media coverage outlined above provide large-scale explanations 
for broad categories of media coverage, focusing on the historical context,40 the 
global environment in which the media operates or the overall impression that large 
volumes of coverage collectively convey.  What they provide are macro level frames 
for understanding overall themes and trends, rather than a micro level appreciation 
of processes between different actors or practice within a field overall.  It is the 
combination of smaller, individual actions and processes which make up the bigger 
picture, particularly in the complexity of the news environment.  Said and 
Huntington’s theories do not take us any further in understanding how particular 
media narratives are constructed, or how they might be challenged or changed.  The 
implication of Said’s theory in particular is that media narrative is pre-determined by 
history and cannot be changed.  While this provides a useful context for 
                                            
39
 Hafez does not include public relations, which is the focus of this study, in his proposed approach. 
40
 Said’s approach was echoed in interviews with representatives from Muslim groups in the UK conducted for 
this study.  When asked about the reasons for particular types of coverage about Islam more than one 
interviewee recounted historical chains of events sometimes going back to the Crusades. 
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understanding the prevailing media narrative about Islam, this study challenges this 
assumption and suggests that the practice of public relations can change media 
narrative.  It does this not by changing history, or the global environment or the 
events which generate news, but by the adopting the form and logic of the media 
through PR practice.  The process by which this happens is discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
The burgeoning academic literature discussing Islam and the media is accompanied 
by a growing canon of material with more practical intent, aimed at policy makers or 
others in positions of influence with the media.  This material typically includes 
recommendations for ways of challenging or changing the representation of Islam in 
the media.  This more practical approach, often based on analysis of existing media 
coverage, has preoccupied non-governmental organisations, political institutions and 
think tanks, all of whom have an interest in the relationship between Islam and 
media (e.g. Runnymede Trust 1997; Bunglawala 2002; UNESCO 2003; Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2006; British Council 2006; Greater 
London Authority 2007; Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2008) as well as Muslim groups 
(e.g. Quilliam 2006; Islamic Human Rights Commission 2007; Soliya 2009; Engage 
2011; Future and Centre of Islamic Studies 2012).  For some of these groups, their 
interest stems from social concerns about Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997; 
Bunglawala 2002) or in response to the challenges of security (OSCE 2006), while 
others are responding to the increased focus on Islam and Muslims in the media and 
broader public sphere (UNESCO 2003; British Council 2006; Greater London 
Authority 2007). 
 
Typically in these reports the problem of negative or stereotypical media coverage of 
Islam is set out, with recommendations for future change which can include action 
by journalists or the creation of ‘media events’, such as roadshows or exhibitions 
about Islam.  Thus, a working group convened by the Centre of Islamic Studies at 
Cambridge University concluded that: ‘Greater efforts should be deployed [by 
journalists] to highlight the positive contributions of Muslims to the societies they 
live in, including in the areas of arts, entertainment, science and politics’ (Centre of 
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Islamic Studies 2012:3), while the report commissioned for the Mayor of London 
(GLA 2007) recommended that news organisations should review their coverage of 
issues and events relating to Muslims and Islam and should consider drawing up 
codes of professional conduct and style guides of terminology (2007:133).  Similarly, 
the British Muslim Media Guide, published jointly by the British Council and the 
Association of Muslim Social Scientists (Masood 2006), focuses on addressing 
journalistic ignorance and misunderstanding about Islam.  The guide, which contains 
sections on Muslim finance, Sharia law, mosques and the place of women in Islam, 
says it is responding to the need for a clear, dispassionate explanation of who British 
Muslims are, what they care about and what they do.  A short section on Muslim 
public relations activity cites the launch of the Muslim Parliament fourteen years 
before as an example of good public relations by a Muslim group (2006:58)41. In the 
same way, non-profit organisation Soliya, working with the United National Alliance 
of Civilisations, collaborated with representatives of Muslim organisations to address 
the question of how the media specifically can be used to promote better 
Muslim/non-Muslim relations (Soliya 2009).  The conclusion was that developing a 
new discourse on Islam and Muslims requires the joint efforts of politicians, 
policymakers and scholars, as well as thought and religious leaders, civil society 
organisations, business representatives and the media.    
 
One route for redress which is absent from most of these reports is the regulatory 
system for newspapers in the UK; a self-regulatory system which is now overseen by 
the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) - a body funded at arms-
length by most national newspapers (two exceptions to this are the reports  by the 
Runnymede Trust (1997) and the GLA (2007) both of which raise concerns about 
the effectiveness of the previous self-regulatory system in resolving complaints 
about inaccurate press reporting about Muslims). IPSO began work in September 
2014, replacing the now defunct Press Complaints Commission (PCC) which oversaw 
the self-regulatory system for newspapers when the reports cited here were 
published.  Concerns about representation of Muslims within the British press were 
                                            
41
 This publication also contains a section on  Muslim media which details Muslim newspapers, magazines and 
websites active in the UK (Masood 2006: 48). 
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also raised at the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British 
press (Engage 2010, 2011; Bari 2012; Bunglawala 2012).  In their submission to the 
Inquiry, ENGAGE say that they regularly monitor print, broadcast and social media to 
record and challenge misrepresentations and inaccurate reporting of Islam and 
Muslims in the UK (Engage 2010:2).  They list a series of complaints to the now 
defunct Press Complaints Commission, including about headlines such as ‘POPPIES 
BANNED IN TERROR HOTSPOTS Muslim snub to forces’ (Daily Star 6 November 
2008, their capitalisation) and ‘MUSLIM PLOT TO KILL POPE’ (Daily Express 18 
September 2010, their capitalisation)42.  ENGAGE state that the responses to their 
complaints demonstrate that the then PCC’s Code of Practice had limitations in 
handling complaints which are inaccurate or discriminatory when lodged by third 
party complainants.  They call for a more robust system of self-regulation, arguing 
that British Muslims as a social group suffer from poor media practices.  While the 
future regulation of the media was the focus of significant recent public debate 
following the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press, the 
absence of any widespread consideration of the potential for regulatory redress in 
the literature plays to the underlying assumption that the coverage of Muslims and 
Islam is embedded as an overarching theme which cannot be challenged or 
changed. 
 
If the increased coverage of Muslims in the UK press has generated greater 
awareness of Islam among the public (Field 2007), it has also served to recast 
Muslims with a political as well as religious identity.  However, such visibility has not 
come easily.  As media coverage of Islam has spread following the events of 11 
September 2001, the literature which analyses it has begun to recognize the political 
implications for Muslims in the UK of a continuous and negative narrative (Allen 
2010; Poole 2011; Petley and Richardson 2011; Centre for Islamic Studies 2012). As 
outlined above, political and other public agencies have also begun to consider the 
implications for Muslims and for society. These are social and political analyses, not 
theological ones.  Alongside the ongoing association of Muslims with terror, conflict 
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 The first complaint was resolved by a clarification in a subsequent edition of the paper.  The second complaint 
was unresolved at the time of the submission. 
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and violence, other issues pertinent to religious identity- such as veiling or mosque 
building – have also become political issues, with senior politicians raising questions 
about their compatibility with British values.  While practices such as veiling or 
arranged marriage may be blamed on cultural differences, Poole (2010) points out 
that a continual association of Muslims with immigration – sometimes as illegal 
immigrants or those seeking unwarranted asylum – positions them as a drain on 
resources, importing alien values and practices to the UK and therefore threatening 
mainstream British values.  The prominence of the keyword ‘counter-terrorism’ in 
relation to the words Muslims and Islam in press coverage (Baker et al 2013) also 
serves to associate religion with political issues of national security.  Currently, Islam 
and politics are irreparably intertwined, with issues concerning Islam and Muslims 
becoming political issues (for example, issues relating to veiling or mosque building) 
and existing political concerns – such as immigration or security – being associated 
with Islam.  It is this intertwining which is of particular interest to this study.  The 
current framing of Islam within politics in the UK media, sets the conditions in which 
Islam has to be thought about in political, rather than social or theological terms by 
media audiences.  The agenda setting power of the media is discussed in 
subsequent chapters, but the media’s potential to inform and form public opinion 
means that even the mundane and routine can be made political. 
 
Spielhaus (2010) takes issue with over-generalisations of media coverage about 
Islam, arguing that there is a difference between the representation of Islam on the 
one hand and of Muslims on the other and the two things are not the same.  In 
similar vein, there is a difference between those Muslims who step forward to speak 
on behalf of others, and the ordinary person who may identify as Muslim but not 
associate themselves with any particular grouping. The absence of any 
representation of ‘normal’ Muslims in media discourse (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010; 
Spielhaus 2010) serves to perpetuate the politicization of Islam, because the 
absence of ‘normal’ Muslims43 encourages representations of negativity and threat 
(Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010). Without a ‘norm’ with which to compare it, the 
                                            
43
 Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) claim that this absence is evident not just in the news media, but also in popular 
soap operas, literature and reality TV. 
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representation of extremist points of view risks being perceived as usual or 
commonplace among Muslim communities. 
 
Spielhaus (2010) studies the construction of a Muslim community in Germany 
through the lens of media coverage, arguing that media representations of Muslims 
after 11 September 2001 steered ordinary Muslim individuals, with no connections to 
Muslim organisations to become active or change their self-representation and act as 
Muslims.  He calls this a ‘coming out’, observing that previously it had only been 
individuals who defined themselves predominantly through their religion who had 
appeared as speakers for Islam and Muslims.  Becoming a ‘Public Muslim’ rather 
than remaining a private one is motivated by a desire to take control of how Muslims 
are perceived: ‘Many of the Muslims in Germany who actively raise their voices in 
the media and in the public sphere stress the fact that they refuse to accept the role 
of victims but struggle for control of how they are perceived by society’ (Spielhaus 
2010:18).  Yet Spielhaus makes no assessment of how successful such attempts are 
or the extent to which ‘Public’ Muslims are able to control, or shift, the overarching 
media agenda.  As is explored in later chapters, to do so, individuals and groups 
need to learn the rules of the media game and be prepared to confront the 
expectations of the media.  
 
O’Toole et al (2013) suggest that a similar process of participation has taken place in 
the political sphere in the UK as a result of Muslim activism (for a discussion of 
Muslim participation in politics see also Centre for Islamic Studies 2012).  They 
explore Muslim participation in contemporary governance, concluding that Muslims 
have become increasingly visible in recent years in both public and media debates.  
Greater Muslim inclusion in governance, as well as more widespread government 
recognition and engagement with Muslim groups has arisen as a result of Muslim 
activism.  However, O’Toole et al focus on political rather than media environments, 
and, in particular, local rather than central government.  Nevertheless, Spielhaus 
claims that media engagement is having a tangible impact on the Muslim community 
in Germany.  He argues: ‘In many rather complicated ways, media, but not only 
media, are playing an important role in creating a consciousness of being Muslim 
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and thereby fostering the emergence of a Muslim community.  One can judge this 
process as being positive or negative, but either way, the cliché of the bad media 
excluding Muslims proves to be incorrect’ (2010:26).  This conclusion is supported by 
the literature discussed above.  There is scant evidence that the media are excluding 
Muslims.  While it is indisputable that the representation of Islam and Muslims is a 
negative one, this may be the result of absence or misunderstanding rather than 
exclusion. 
 
As Islam becomes more politicised the question of who represents and speaks for 
Islam is asked recurrently in politics as well as in academic studies.  As is outlined in 
Chapter 5, the fieldwork for this study includes those working for Muslim groups 
which undertake activity to represent their community(ies) to government and the 
media. The results of that fieldwork suggest that the position of what Spielhaus 
would call ‘Public’ Muslims in the UK may be somewhat conflicted, particularly for 
those who operate in the political sphere.  O’Toole et al (2013) cite Labour MP Sadiq 
Khan who states that the British media and politicians have been lazy, particularly in 
the years after the Muslim Council of Britain’s (MCB) representative status had been 
questioned, because they have often looked for Muslim politicians as replacements 
for the MCB. Khan is clear that he is not a Muslim spokesperson but feels pressure 
from others to ‘speak up’ as a Muslim (2013:27).  Once again this suggests that the 
media’s agenda about Islam is predominantly political.  Khan’s experience is that 
rather than seek out community leaders, artists, writers or others who might speak 
on behalf of Muslim communities, the media turn to politicians.  However, this may 
be because (as is discussed in Chapter 2), politicians conform to the logic of the 
media in a way that other Muslim groups or representatives do not. 
 
When reviewing the literature about Islam and media over the last two decades it 
would be easy to assume that media coverage is as homogenous as its depiction of 
the Muslim community. But the conclusion that the media present an unvarying 
picture of stereotyping and misrepresentation44 (for example, see Poole 2002; 
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 While the volume of news coverage – and literature studying it – about Islam may have increased dramatically 
in recent years, such attitudes are long standing. Fifty years ago, one scholar of Islam, G.S Hodgson (1964) 
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Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008; Oborne and James 2008) risks perpetuating as many 
stereotypes as the media reporting it analyses.  Aydin and Hammer (2010) conclude: 
‘In many existing studies, Muslims are represented in various forms of media mostly 
negatively and as passive, on one side, while the media appear as a self-
perpetuating institution with no human access or participation on the other side…. It 
seems important at this point in time to go beyond this sharp and artificial distinction 
and to construct a more complex picture of the ways in which Muslims and media 
are connected and mutually influenced’ (2010:3).  This study seeks to contribute to 
a more nuanced understanding of those connections and influences, through a 
discussion of the exchange of power which flows between Muslims and the media 
and the potential of public relations agents as intermediaries within that power 
dynamic.  
 
Karim (2002) counters the prevailing assumption that Muslims are helpless to 
challenge or change the dominant narrative of powerful media.  He disputes the 
suggestion that Muslims are victims of negative media reporting and posits that a 
significant responsibility for negative media coverage rests with Muslims themselves 
for failing to engage effectively with the media and for allowing militant Islamists to 
become key spokespeople.  Alternative voices and positive coverage of Muslims and 
Islam do appear and this is increasingly acknowledged in the literature45.   The 
Guardian and The Independent have been cited for their ‘open’ views of Islam which 
have been presented consistently in their reporting (Bleich et al 2013).  The 
unanimous decision by national newspapers not to reprint the cartoon caricatures of 
the Prophet Muhammad following their publication in Denmark in 2006 was widely 
seen as both responsible and respectful (Petley 2006:46; GLA 2007; Newspaper 
                                                                                                                                      
observed: ‘Historians and outsiders generally have tended to find Islam relatively arid and uninteresting.  They 
have found the religion arid, to begin with…. Islamic culture is almost regularly characterized by what it did not 
have’ (1964:224, italics in the original). 
45
 In a report commissioned by the Mayor of London (GLA 2007), researchers spoke to journalists who identified 
as Muslims.  While the journalists expressed their frustration at the negative coverage of their religion and often 
felt as if their religious identity was seen to take precedence over their professional identity,  they expressed the 
hope that coverage of Muslim issues in the media would be improved if there were more good journalists of 
Muslim backgrounds employed in the media (GLA 2007:67) . 
46
 Petley cites the different rationales given by the British national newspapers for not publishing the cartoons.  
He argues that The Guardian and Independent’s decision not to publish for fear of causing offence was 
consistent with the overall tone of their coverage, but accuses the Daily Mail of ‘sheer gall and breathtaking 
hypocrisy’, given their past record of misrepresenting all matters Islamic (Petley 2006:108). 
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Publishers Association 2012).  Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery (2013) warn of over-
simplifying the way Muslims are depicted47.  While their study concludes that the 
picture emerging from the press is negative overall, they note that it would be 
wrong to consider the British press as monolithic and it would also be wrong always 
to attribute Islamophobic motives to journalists.  As they conclude: ‘We argue that 
the words themselves are not necessarily the problem; quite often the issue is the 
contexts and combinations they are used in.’ Instead, ‘What emerged is a more 
subtle and ambivalent picture, which indirectly contributes to negative stereotypes... 
Thus a significant amount of reporting across the whole of the British press involved 
placing Muslims in the context of conflict’ (Baker et al 2013:269).  
 
Bleich et al (2013) claim clear evidence that the political leaning of the newspaper 
has a strong effect on the way it portrays Islam and Muslims, with right-leaning 
papers significantly more negative in their tone than left-leaning newspapers.  Their 
research reveals that left-leaning papers (they describe these as The Guardian and 
The Daily Mirror) portrayed Muslims in a net positive light48.  The Guardian in 
particular is often cited as a newspaper which regularly features discourse which 
counters the prevailing media coverage (Petley 2006; Poole 2011).  The local press 
also has a different set of news values from the national newspapers which can lead 
to more inclusive coverage (Halliday 1999).   This is evident in its coverage of 
community relations and interfaith activities and also reports that depict Muslims as 
ordinary everyday members of local communities.  Poole (2011) speculates that as 
societies diversify and Muslims gain a greater presence in the public sphere so 
coverage will evolve (2011:59). 
 
The literature reviewed here demonstrates how stories linked to Islam and its 
followers in the UK news media are constantly alongside reporting that 
overwhelmingly associates them with threat, conflict and terror.  According to the 
literature, anyone who believes what they read in the papers comes away with a 
                                            
47
 Halliday, writing before the events of 11 September 2001 (1999) observes that on both sides discussion about 
Islam and the West tends towards alarmism and simplification.  There is alarmism about the threat and 
simplification of different issues – e.g. terrorism.  He suggests that even use of terms such as ‘threat’ and 
‘terrorism’ simplifies the issues, hindering proper debate and understanding. 
48
 This finding should be viewed alongside concerns about methodology outlined above. 
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perception of a religion linked with threat and terror, perpetually seeking to 
dominate and change British culture and way of life.  The media presents an 
ideology which is wholly at odds with mainstream British values and a religion with 
both leaders and followers quick to take offence, or exception, to perceived slights.  
The accuracy of such a depiction of Islam is widely disputed by many of the scholars 
and interest groups cited here. It is not the intention of this study to enter the 
debate about the characteristics of Islam as a faith or the characteristics of its 
followers, but such analysis provides a useful rationale for this research, exposing 
the need overall for a more stratified and nuanced understanding about how the 
prevailing narrative has come to be and the processes by which it could be 
challenged or even changed.   
 
The study also suggests that there are gaps in current scholarship. The research to 
date presents a narrow framework of understanding based on individual researchers’ 
analyses of the framing of media coverage.  Crucially, media coverage is seen to 
stand in isolation, with few connections made between the depiction of Islam and 
Muslims and the wider UK public sphere. Baker et al (2013) identify difficulties in 
assigning motives for the more indirect forms of stereotyping in the British press, 
observing that some of it may be accidental or unconscious.  Conclusions about 
whether the media offers a positive or negative depiction of Islam lead to calls for 
more positive representations – be it explanation of areas of common ground among 
faith leaders, the telling of positive stories about the lives of individual Muslims in 
Britain or explanation of Muslim practice and belief.  Responsibility for acting on 
these calls is often placed with journalists, with expectations that they will work to 
improve their understanding of Islam, or present news which is more cognizant of 
different aspects of the faith and its followers.  In making these recommendations, 
useful though they may be, few attempts appear to have been made to understand 
the mechanisms of the construction of current media narratives. To date, where 
explanations have been offered, these rely on the theories of orientalism and the 
clash of civilisations as prevalent cultural attitudes or frames that shape negative 
reporting.  These theories assume an independence and insularity in journalistic 
practice which belies the actual process of news gathering. While more varied 
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approaches to understanding Islam and media are now evolving, these have yet to 
explore fully the processes of news gathering and the role of different agents, both 
within and external to Muslim communities, in creating and disseminating news.  
 
Fieldwork conducted for this study reveals that the sheer volume, consistency and 
tone of much of the coverage leaves Muslim groups in the UK grappling for an 
adequate response.  The political positioning of much of the coverage – be it about 
war or about veils – creates a political perspective on religion which, to its followers, 
may be unfamiliar and perturbing.  But the press reporting cannot easily be ignored, 
and a cumulative media picture which results in misunderstanding and 
misapprehension about Muslim communities and their faith can lead to adverse 
political and other consequences.  If Muslim groups hold back from challenging or 
engaging with the press, politicians will not hesitate to do so. Political reaction to 
media headlines about Muslims and immigration, terror, veils, mosque building and 
more can drive a policy agenda which affects every day Muslim lives.  The 
development of the Prevent programme, intended to help counter terrorist activity in 
the UK, is a prime example of this.  The emergence of Prevent is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Baker et al (2013) suggest that the only beneficiaries of such press coverage are 
newspaper editors, who benefit commercially from stories about conflict, war and 
threat, and the ‘extremists’ whose ideology is aired and promulgated via the media.  
But there is some evidence to show that negative media coverage is mobilizing 
Muslims, rather than enervating them (Spielhaus 2010; O’Toole 2013).  The process 
of stepping up to engage with the media and political discourse is also a process of 
renewal of community, fostering religious identity and empowering others to do the 
same.   
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Chapter 2: Media, society and power: theoretical perspectives 
 
The literature review in the previous chapter demonstrates the different quantitative 
and qualitative approaches that have been used to understand the depiction of Islam 
and Muslims in the UK news media.  Collectively, the literature paints a cogent 
picture of a religion which is repeatedly associated with news content about 
violence, threat and terror.  While this conclusion is predominant within existing 
literature, a convincing explanation for why this should be so remains largely elusive.  
The theories of orientalism or the ‘clash of civilisations’ provide an overarching or 
macro context in which coverage can be viewed, but there are fewer explanations of 
how the processes of news gathering, and in particular those which take place 
outside the newsroom, result in particular types of reporting. This thesis seeks to 
offer an alternative approach to understanding the representation of Islam in the UK 
news media.  It does this not through a study of news media content or of 
journalistic practice or news reporting49, but by suggesting that the current literature 
on Islam and media could be developed by a greater scrutiny of the social role of 
news media and the processes through which news stories are constructed. 
 
The social role of news media relates to an understanding how news media operates 
within society and in particular, the function it fulfils for citizens of that society 
(Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; Krotz 2009; Hepp 2009).  While media processes are 
central features of modern societies, the news media in particular represents a form 
of social power, determining the flow of information from the state to citizens and, 
increasingly, from citizens to the state.  As a fundamental means of communication 
between the state and the public, the news media plays a part in helping groups and 
individuals understand societal norms and values, construct their own identities and 
make judgements about the identities of other groups and individuals.  It is a means 
by which people can participate in culture, providing interpretation about what is 
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good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, normative or different within society 
(Stevenson, 1997).  
 
This thesis focuses on the social function the news media performs in connecting the 
political field in the UK with citizens, through the flow of news – or information – 
about the political field, the events that take place and the individuals and groups 
within it50.   The news media is an important mechanism for providing information to 
the public about Islam and its followers and, as the literature review in Chapter 1 
illustrates, news coverage about Islam and Muslims in the UK is frequently focused 
on matters pertinent to the UK political field and associates the religion and its 
followers with topics such as national security, war, immigration or community 
cohesion.  In its reporting of Islam, the news media becomes an authoritative 
substitute for other sources of information and a means of helping individuals 
construct a perceived identity for Muslims. 
 
The thesis goes on to consider what this association means for relationships 
between Muslim groups and the news media, in particular those currently operating, 
or attempting to establish themselves within the political field.  It also considers the 
extent to which Muslim groups are participants in the processes through which news 
stories are constructed.  These are not purely production processes – that is, 
activities that take place within the journalistic field or the newsroom - and which 
may be examined through interviews with media personnel or exploring how 
practical and organisational needs shape news media choices.  Instead, the 
construction of news involves interactions between journalists and practitioners in 
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 For example, in the 2015 general election campaign, the news media provided a constant flow of information to 
voters about the different parties, their policies and their perceived relative merits.  The coverage included 
judgements about the party leaders as well as encouragement to citizens to vote in a particular way.  While some 
of the coverage was factual reporting of party manifestos or other policy announcements, other reporting was 
more subjective, depending on the political leanings of the newspaper concerned.  Described as the ‘defining 
image of the election’, an unflattering picture of Labour leader Ed Miliband eating a bacon sandwich was used 
repeatedly to support judgements about Miliband’s inadequacy as a potential Prime Minister.  The day before the 
election, The Sun newspaper featured the image on its front page, with the headline: ‘SAVE OUR BACON’ (The 
Sun, 6 May 2015, capitalisation in original).  The accompanying text exhorted readers not to let Miliband make a 
‘pig’s ear’ of Britain and not to ‘swallow his porkies’. Miliband’s struggle to eat the sandwich – the photograph of 
which first appeared in the Evening Standard a year earlier in May 2014 - would never have been seen by voters 




other spheres and the nature and process of these relationships are also part of the 
mechanisms by which news is produced.   
 
At the heart of these relationships is an exchange of power – power invested in 
news and the nature of news and in those who seek control over what makes news.  
The processes by which power is exchanged goes to the heart of the social role of 
news media – how the news adapts and responds to what is happening beyond the 
newsroom – in other spheres.  My emerging contention is that in overlooking public 
relations practice, existing social theories of media may misconstrue the relationship 
between media and the state or political sphere.  Any assumption that the 
interaction between the news media and the state operates directly and without 
intervention or intermediaries does not reflect the complexities or the reality of the 
relationships at play.   
 
This chapter reviews theories of media which are relevant to this task of scrutiny.  It 
focuses on social theories of media that have a bearing on news media and politics 
and on an understanding of the relationships between politics, state and media.  In 
its discussion of these theories, this chapter notes the wider failure to take account 
of mediating factors which can affect these relationships, and in particular, highlights 
the role of public relations as one such factor.  By largely overlooking the 
significance of public relations, social theories of media may miss out on a more 
nuanced and layered understanding of how media works and is constructed and the 
relationships on which it depends.  The interdependency between the political field 
and the journalistic field means that understanding the processes of public relations 
tells us something about the nature of the political field itself; where different 
players are positioned and where the power rests within the field.  This is because 
power is, in part, conferred by the relationships that individuals within the field have 
with the news media. 
 
This perspective on the role of public relations as a mediating factor in the 
relationship between the political field and the news media has profound implications 
for Muslim groups seeking to challenge or change media representation.  To pursue 
 50 
 
this, subsequent chapters consider public relations as a social field and its role in 
intervening in the exchanges which take place between the journalistic field and the 
UK political field.  This chapter concludes by setting the groundwork for that 
discussion, by exploring the relationship between public relations practice and 
theories of media power and influence. 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical basis for exploring these perspectives and 
relationships.  It begins by looking at social theories of media and in particular by 
examining the relationship between media and politics through theories of the public 
sphere.  It explores the way in which media narrative can be constructed through 
the use of binary concepts such as good and evil, us and them or those within 
society and those outside of it.  This is not achieved through discourse analysis (as 
discussed in the previous chapter, this approach has already been taken to a study 
of Islam and media (Richardson 2004; Baker et al 2013; Bleich et al 2013; Yusof et 
al 2013)) or by an impressionistic recounting of media coverage, but by looking at 
the nature of media power, the interplay between media power and political power 
and where Muslim groups are positioned within this dynamic. To do this, this chapter 
continues by discussing the power and the impact the media wields through a 
discussion of mediation and mediatisation theory.  This discussion of approaches to 
mediatisation examines the connections made between the media and wider society 
(Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; Krotz 2009; Hepp 2009) including an exploration of 
the effect of media logic on politics, with a consideration of what this means for 
political communication.  
 
Whilst these theoretical perspectives have an important role to play in making sense 
of the processes and roles of news media, they pay little or no attention to the 
significance of public relations within this.  By overlooking public relations practice 
however, these social theories of media misconstrue the relationship between media 
and the state or political sphere.  Any assumption that the interaction between the 
news media and the state operates directly and without intervention or 
intermediaries does not reflect the complexities or the reality of the relationships at 
play.  Disregarding the role of public relations places a limitation on understanding 
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the function of media within society.  A direct relationship between media and state 
is one in which it is hard to intervene.  In contrast, a subtler approach to looking at 
how news media and state interact reveals the potential to disrupt the appearance 
of prevailing narratives or to create new ones. To pursue this, subsequent chapters 
consider public relations as a social field and its role in intervening in the exchanges 
which take place between the news media and the UK political sphere.  This chapter 
concludes by setting the groundwork for that discussion, by exploring the 
relationship between public relations practice and theories of media power and 
influence. 
 
The chapter begins with a review of structural theories which set out the interplay 
between media and society, which have been developed by Jürgen Habermas 
(1992), Ron Jacobs (2000) or Jeffrey C Alexander (1981, 1998, 2006) before going 
on to look at media power and effects, and in particular theories of mediation and 
mediatisation.  Whilst illuminating important dimensions of the role of news media in 
society, these theories do not typically focus on the micro-processes involved in 
interactions between social actors, institutions or professional groups.  Instead, 
theories of media and society, media effects or the nature of media power, risk 
implying a direct relationship between institutions, the media and society, without 
presenting a more finely nuanced discussion of the roles that different agents can 
take.  Similarly, in discussions about the mediatisation of politics, the complex nature 
of the political field may be reduced to a discussion of the relationship between MPs 
and journalists, or the reporting of Parliamentary news and debate within the media 
(for example, Kepplinger’s 2002 study of the mediatisation of the German Parliament 
omits to mention the role of public relations, or press officers in communicating with 
the media).  While these studies usefully reveal the interplay of power between 
different factions, their presentation overlooks the presence and activity – either 
actual or potential - of other agents involved in relationship between politics and the 
press.  Consequently, this study will argue that theories about the relationship 
between media and society raise important and relevant questions about how media 
narratives that are constructed and the interchange of power between media and 
society, but it will show that they are not of themselves a complete theoretical 
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platform from which to understand the formation of media narratives or the 
depiction of particular groups. 
 
Before delving too far into theories of media and society, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the language of media and society is highly contested51, and any 
discussion of different theoretical approaches risks tripping into pitfalls of meaning52.  
This chapter intentionally steers clear of such debates and does not seek to enter 
into discussions of the changing nature of media and the changing relationship 
between media and its audience. Debates about, for example, the impact of digital 
media on society’s interaction with what makes news are outside the parameters of 
this research. In contrast, the chapter is intended take an overarching view of the 
interplay of power between the news media and society.  As in the rest of the thesis, 
the term ‘news media’ is generally used to refer to the national news media in the 
UK and, in particular printed and online newspapers.   
Social theories of media 
Most understandings of how news develops merge a cultural view of news with an 
organisational perspective.  These might include the opportunity to explore the role 
of news within a democratic state (Eldridge 1993; Cook 1998, 2006; Sparrow 1999; 
Davis 2002; Benson 2006) or to study news as a social organisation through 
examining the profession of journalism (Tuchman 1980; Bell and Garnett 1998; 
McNair 1999).  Looking at news through a more cultural lens might involve exploring 
the way in which the media create and perpetuate particular narratives, or their role 
in communicating certain ideologies on behalf of particular groups (Bennett 1982, 
Sparrow 1999, Schudson 2002, Benson 2004). A cultural view of news finds symbolic 
determinants of news in the relations between news reports and symbols.  The 
media is seen as a cultural system of the production and dissemination of symbols, 
signs, messages, meanings and values.  It perceives news as a form of meaning 
making, which helps explain generalized images and stereotypes in the media, 
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 Benson (2004) goes so far as to suggest banishing all references to the word ‘media’.  Often used in the 
singular rather than the plural, it masks the variety and complexity of social construction and its relations of 
power. 
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including characterisations of particular groups or types of individuals as different, or 
‘other’ to the mainstream53.  A cultural account of news is also relevant to 
understanding journalists’ news sense, described by Tuchman (1980) as the 
journalist’s own point of difference from others, an implicit ability which helps define 
what makes news and what does not.  All this recognises that news is a form of 
literature and that among the resources journalists work with are the traditions of 
storytelling, picture making, and language they inherit from their own cultures, with 
built in assumptions about how the world operates54.  This narrative tradition within 
journalism can be analysed through studies of public discourse or mass 
communication, which in turn can be framed through the twin concepts of civil 
society and public sphere.  These concepts - both of which provide explanations for 
the construction of public discourse - overlap but are not synonymous and can be 
studied independently of each other55. But within these varying approaches, 
explorations of the exercise of power, moral authority, social control and 
relationships (between the state, the audience and the media) are dominant.  It is 
this aspect – the relational exchange of power – that is of most interest to this 
thesis. 
 
The concept of civil society (Alexander and Smith 1993; Calhoun 1993, Keane 1996, 
Alexander and Jacobs 1998; Flyvbjerg 1998; Jacobs 2000; Alexander 2006) can 
present such a cultural view of news.  Civil society refers to an autonomous social 
organisation outside the control of the state; it is a way of describing the capacity of 
a community to organise itself, independent of the direction of state power. There is 
no consensus about what civil society is, but broadly it is made up of communities, 
networks and social ties: relationships that go beyond family but that are not within 
                                            
53 Both Silverstone (1999) and Hall (1997) develop this when they address the question of dominant groups in 
society represent people and places that are significantly different.  Hall argues that people who are in any way 
different to the majority – ‘the other’ - are frequently exposed to a binary form of representation, including in the 
media, often using sharply opposed, polarised themes – good and bad, civilised and primitive, ugliness and 
beauty and so on.  Hall argues that this difference matters, because it is essential to meaning.  Without 
difference, meaning could not exist.  It is only possible to construct meaning through a dialogue with, and in 
relation to, the other.  
54 In a Bourdieusian sense, this might be described as journalistic ‘habitus’ – the structuring structures which 
determine how agents within a particular field operate.  While this thesis is not exploring journalists as agents, it 
will explore the nature of habitus among public relations practitioners in the political field. 
55 The differences between civil society and the public sphere are outlined in more detail by Calhoun (1993). 
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the realm of the state56. Most theories of civil society focus on the boundaries which 
define society - such as its autonomy from the state and its dependence on the 
resources of other spheres - to the extent that Keane (1996) observes that the 
definition of civil society is a negative one and it is easier to define civil society by 
what it isn't than by what it is. 
 
Within civil society citizens can have conversations with one another, discover 
common interests, assert new rights and try to influence public opinion and public 
policy.  Although independent of the state, civil society has organisations of its own, 
including the law and the media57.  These organisations exercise power, helping to 
perpetuate the codes and logic of civil society and reinforce what is distinctive and 
elite within it. The form that any particular civil society takes is driven by the 
relationships between the different actors within it.  Alexander (2006) puts forward 
two models for this relationship: a model of power or one of uncoerced agreement. 
The latter model plays to a Habermassian notion of the nature of discourse in the 
public sphere (Habermas 1992) which is discussed in more detail below, while the 
former plays to a more developed notion of media power which is also examined in 
detail later in this chapter.  Calhoun’s work (1993) precedes Alexander’s models, 
observing that nothing in the world happens as a result of uncoerced agreement and 
only power can explain how civil society functions. 
  
According to Alexander, civil society is a realm of symbolic communication.  This 
symbolic communication is played out through codes that exist within civil society 
which define concepts such as civility, equality or respect.  These codes help to 
constitute the very sense of that society for those within it, and for those outside 
it58.   The codes are bound together in the expression of narratives, and supply the 
structured categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential 
member, of civil society is made to fit.  Alexander (2006) suggests that there is no 
                                            
56 According to Jacobs (2000), civil society also includes public relations specialists, media personalities and the 
pursuit of common political agendas as well as common cultural identities. 
57 Alexander describes this in moral terms, explaining that the goal of this civil society is the moral regulation of 
social life and this is administered via the courts, voluntary associations and the media: institutions through which 
conflicts and problems can be resolved  (Alexander & Smith 1993). 
58 Alexander points out that because meaning is relational and relative, the civility of the self always articulates 
itself in language about the incivility of the other. 
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civil discourse that does not conceptualise the world into those who deserve 
inclusion and those who do not59.   Such discourse is often structured around the 
distribution of economic wealth, according status to those with money, resources 
and the capacity to shape public processes of representation.  Failure is attributed to 
those without these advantages.  This makes it difficult for agents without economic 
achievement or wealth to communicate effectively in the civil sphere, to receive full 
respect from its regulatory institutions and to interact with other, more economically 
successful people in a fully civil way.    
 
These descriptions of civil society and the role of narrative within them place an 
emphasis on what the media does and the impact that it has, rather than what it 
is60.  Within this model, power rests with the media as they represent the public to 
itself: for most members of civil society, the news is the only source of firsthand 
experience they will ever have about their fellow citizens, their motives, relationships 
and the institutions they create. Different news media are important, not only for 
public information but for influence, identity and solidarity.  Through narratives, the 
media produce and reproduce these symbolic codes and patterns in order to 
formulate explanations for societal strain and conflict.  The media help to narrate 
events, and have the power to disrupt prevailing systems of belief and to change 
understandings about other events in the past, present and future. The same event 
can be narrated in a number of different ways: groups and associations who 
consider themselves to be continually misrepresented in a newspaper narrative are 
forced to operate from a defensive and reactive position. 
 
Alexander suggests that the ability of the news media to fulfil this normative function 
is dependent on the autonomy granted from powers and authorities that sit outside 
civil society.  This means that reporters must be prepared to enter different social 
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 An alternative perspective on this is the work of Hall  (1997).  While Habermas, Alexander and others approach 
this issue from the macro perspective of societal structures, Hall is more concerned with issues of representation 
as a practice which produces culture. He argues that people who are in any way different to the majority – ‘the 
other’ - are frequently exposed to a binary form of representation, often using sharply opposed, polarised themes 
– good and bad, civilised and primitive, ugliness and beauty and so on.  
60
 This accords with critiques of mediatisation theory, which point out that there is no overriding definition of 
media used by proponents of mediatisation.  In this thesis, ‘media’ refers predominantly to the daily national news 
media, both print and broadcast. 
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subsystems, or environments, in order to establish news sources and contacts from 
whom they then withdraw in order to process and judge the information according 
to independent norms.  This assumes a purity of independence within the media 
which makes the power it wields inherently objective and autonomous.   This 
assumption fails to acknowledge additional pressures or influences on the media – 
for example, economic pressures - which can dilute or affect the deliberative nature 
of the media's role. 
 
The public sphere 
While Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere provides a cultural understanding of the 
relationship between news and society in which power rests firmly with the media, 
Jürgen Habermas’ (1992) notion of the public sphere61 provides a cornerstone for 
analysis of the interaction between the media and the state as institutions62.  
 Habermas developed the model of the bourgeois public sphere as a society engaged 
in critical public debate following an historical analysis of the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth century development of public institutional space between the state and 
the family.  According to his thinking, the public sphere is a space that is distinct 
from both the state and the private domain and is a place where every citizen can 
participate in the creation of public opinion in a free and autonomous way.  It is a 
place where human beings can congregate and communicate openly, expressing 
arguments and views through rational discussion.  Such a sphere enables people to 
think critically about the state and its practices and engage in debate that is 
important for strong democracy63. 
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 Benson (2009) warns that the concept of the public sphere has almost become a cliché, and is perhaps one of 
the most overused words in the sociology of media and communications. 
62
 Like other terms within any discussion of media and society the meaning of ‘institution’ is also contested.  
Here, Giddens’ definition is used: institutions are enduring social forms that reproduce themselves e.g. 
governments, the family, legal systems, political and economic institutions and the media (Giddens 1984). 
63
 Habermas' formulation of the public sphere is seen to evolve from the dominant ideology thinking of the early 
Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School espoused that the media operated a uniform and monolithic system that 
they regarded as a manufactured ‘culture industry’, dominant and imposed from above and in accordance with its 
definitions of what audiences want.  For the Frankfurt writers, the new mass media were not merely a tool of 
totalitarianism, but a major reason for its existence.    The power of the media is so strong that an individual 
member of the audience is powerless to resist the ideological message which plays into the recipient's 
unconscious.  Habermas describes a culture that cannot allow critical forms of dialogue but, unlike the Frankfurt 
School, Habermas limits agendas of social change to the realm of communication in which people rationally 
discuss alternative social policies and attempt to build consensus about them (Curran and Seaton 2000). 
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The norm of the public sphere calls for coercion-free communication which aims for 
consensus, an impartial, reasoned exchange where only the force of better 
argument wins out.  The ideal public sphere requires a forum accessible to as many 
people as possible where large varieties of social experiences can be expressed and 
exchanged64. As the most important agency for public debate, the media fulfils this 
role, acting both as a mediator of argument and a forum for public discourse.  A 
deliberative media adopts a rationalist discourse which is central to the effectiveness 
of the public sphere, aiming for common understanding or consensus and excluding 
emotion, outrage or scandal from their coverage.  
 
Critics of Habermas (Flyvbjerg 1998; Silverstone 1999; Hohendahl and Silberman 
1979; Butsch 2007) are quick to point out that his theory of the public sphere is an 
ideal, which has never existed65.  The life of the public sphere was short, rapidly 
compromised and commandeered by the expanding state which became increasingly 
confident of its ability and right to intervene in the private lives of citizens and by an 
increasingly powerful and insistent market. Various interest groups assert their 
demands and the basis of the public sphere is destroyed and its function of public 
opinion as the advocate of general interest is increasingly undermined.  Rational 
discourse disappears, to be replaced by a manipulated media culture in which the 
masses have become objects, and the public sphere is subsumed into a stage 
managed political theatre.  Instead of acting as a subsidiary to the public sphere, the 
media are now the main focus of it.  
 
Davis’ empirical study (2009) of the communication processes in and around the UK 
parliament tests out Habermas’ theory, and responds to his critics.  Davis conducted 
interviews with MPs, Lords and Parliamentary officials, working on the basis that the 
UK parliament and its actors, practices and institutions operated as the ‘state’ within 
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 While civil society's autonomy from the state empowers its organisations and institutions to be independent 
from politics, the public sphere's process of open rational public communication is integral to the modernist theory 
of politics.  The public sphere is not synonymous with the political field described later in this thesis, but the two 
concepts overlap as arenas for political discussion and debate (Garnham, 1993). 
65
 Habermas acknowledges his critics and cites the development of capitalism as a challenge to the public 
sphere.    Capitalism meant that the media became a commercial enterprise, less concerned with forming public 
opinion than with publicity.  Instead of rational discussion leading to consensus, money and power are seen to 
lead to success.  
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Habermas’ model of democracy. Davis concludes that in many ways, the 
Westminster parliamentary public sphere of the 21st century is a significant advance 
on anything described by Habermas as existing in previous centuries.  His research 
shows that MPs, peers and others rely on the media as valued sources of 
information, and the media in turn influence them on issues of policy and legislation. 
Davis suggests that earlier descriptions of the public sphere (including Habermas’) 
were idealised, and based on limited historical accounts66. However, in the 
intervening centuries, the conditions for what Davis describes as ‘democratically 
institutionalised will formation’, centred on parliament, influenced by media and 
external forces, have been firmly established (2009:283). 
 
Davis’ conclusions may seem optimistic to some, but Habermas’ theory of the public 
sphere establishes a clear and direct link between the media and politics, and 
provides a framework for studying the interaction between the state and the media.  
Unlike Alexander’s theory of the civil society, within the public sphere the media are 
less autonomous and, to a greater extent, are subject to the changing nature of 
society.  The power of the media is dependent on the changing nature of the state: 
as the public sphere becomes more commercial, so too must the media. 
 
However the relationship between media and politics is described, at its heart is an 
exchange of power, a relational dynamic that has profound effects for the society in 
which both forces exist.  The media have been acknowledged as the main channel 
for enabling discourse in both civil society and the public sphere, for expressing 
public opinion and as a channel of power and influence67.  In doing so, they have 
the capacity to act as a bridge or to create tension between the state and civil 
society or between the civil and non-civil spheres. 
 
Theories of the public sphere and civil society provide overarching frameworks for 
considering how media and society interact.  These frameworks are built around a 
                                            
66 In this, Davis suggests, Habermas’ critics are correct: the bourgeois public sphere excluded a majority of the 
public, was frequently irrational and was entirely ad hoc in its social organisation, choice of subject matter and 
deliberations. 
67 The primacy of the traditional news media may be challenged here by the growth of new and social media, 
including social networks.  These are outside of the scope of this research and are not considered here. 
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distribution of power and how it shapes and influences the way in which society 
functions and how the media operate.  Understanding different models of how the 
media operate within these frameworks begins to reveal the workings of media 
power, where it comes from and the impact that it has.  Dissecting the 
instrumentality of the media yields greater insight into how that power is 
constructed and how other institutions or groups can challenge or take advantage of 
it.  This dissection happens through an examination of the relationships that groups 
have with the media and the role of public relations agents as intermediaries within 
that relationship.  For the purposes of this study into the representation of Muslim 
groups in the UK, the focus is on public relations within the political field and the use 
of PR by Muslim groups in particular. 
 
Media power 
The status of the media’s power should not be underestimated.  Silverstone (1999) 
describes the media’s power to set and destroy agendas and says that this means 
they can shift the balance of power between state and citizen and even between 
countries.  Silverstone offers an eloquent description of this power: ‘It is about the 
media’s power to create and sustain meanings; to persuade, endorse and reinforce. 
The power to undermine and reassure.  It is about reach.  And it is about 
representation: the ability to present, reveal, explain: and also the ability to grant 
access and participation’ (Silverstone 1999:143).  The Sun famously laid claim to 
such power when, following the Conservative victory in the 1992 general election, it 
published a front page headline declaring: ‘IT’S THE SUN WOT WON IT’ (The Sun 11 
April 1992, capitalisation in the original).  The headline became a catch-phrase for 
the media’s power to influence elections68 and was referred to again following the 
2007 general election after The Sun switched sides to support Tony Blair who was 
subsequently elected as Labour Prime Minister.  There may be some element of 
truth in the media’s power to influence votes, although the impact on voters of 
                                            
68 A decade later, The Sun’s owner, Rupert Murdoch, distanced himself from the headline during his evidence to 
the Leveson Inquiry.  He said that the headline was tasteless and wrong, stating: ‘We don’t have that sort of 
power’ (Dowell 2012). 
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newspapers of any one particular political persuasion is likely to be offset by the 
impact of partisan newspapers for the other side (Curtice, 1999). 
 
The media’s power is a symbolic one, which differentiates the media from other 
types of power as a result of the resources it possesses69.   Couldry (2003) describes 
it in a ritualised sense:  ritual, he says, organises our movements around space and 
helps us to experience constructed features of our environment as real.  In 
understanding media rituals, Couldry explains, there is a need to shift the emphasis 
in ritual analysis away from questions of meaning or content and towards questions 
of power. Ritualised media events accord with the role of the media within civil 
society – and the power it has to create events and interpretations of events through 
the narratives it creates.  Couldry characterises media power through identifying 
media rituals70, such as the cult of celebrity, or the nature of TV viewing.  All these, 
he argues, position the media as a substitute for something more significant. 
To understand the power that the media hold and disseminate, its dual role – of 
production and representation – needs to be considered jointly.  Couldry (2004) 
argues that existing media research fails to do this or to probe below what he calls 
the chaotic surface of everyday media practice. Positive evaluations of the media 
process address how well media perpetrate the daily texture of private and public 
life but fail to consider the social impacts of media power.  Negative evaluations, by 
contrast, address media power, but lack engagement with the media’s place in 
everyday lives.  It is the combination of the two that create the symbolic power that 
the media hold.  Both Thompson (1995) and Couldry echo Pierre Bourdieu (1989), 
                                            
69 Thompson (1995) defines symbolic power as the capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the 
actions of others and to create events by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms Couldry 
(2003) disagrees, calling Thompson’s definition of media power weak because it does not allow for the possibility 
that certain types of concentration require a special analysis. A strong concept of symbolic power suggests that 
some concentrations of symbolic power are so great that they dominate the whole social landscape and are so 
natural that they are misrecognised and difficult to see. 
70
 Couldry names media rituals as society’s mechanism for acting out, and naturalising, the myth of the media’s 
social centrality (Couldry 2003:2).  Examples of media rituals include forms of TV viewing, or the notion of media 
celebrity.  Media rituals can be understood through questions of power as the closest link between power and 




from whose work the notion of symbolic capital, or power, originates.  Bourdieu’s 
theoretical approach to the study of power is discussed later in the thesis71.   
 
The recent ‘Plebgate’ scandal provides a good example of this.  In September 2012, 
an encounter between a police officer on duty in Downing Street and the then 
government Chief Whip, Andrew Mitchell, was reported in The Sun newspaper which 
quoted Mitchell saying to the police officers: ‘You’re ****ing plebs’  (asterisks in the 
original)72.  This story was picked up and repeated by most other newspapers and 
what had originated as a brief, if unpleasant, private exchange between two people 
became a media event, characterized by numerous press reports, comment pieces 
and leaked accounts.  The media christened the affair ‘Plebgate’ and, with the help 
of this title, the media event became a political event which was imbued with 
symbolic meaning about class, privilege and status.  Groups with vested political 
interests sought to gain political mileage from the publicity, with both the Police 
Federation and opposition politicians making strong media statements calling for 
Mitchell’s resignation.  The initial media reporting of the affair was damning of 
Mitchell and in October 2012 he resigned from his post, stating that it was unfair to 
continue to put his family and colleagues through such continuing and upsetting 
publicity. However, two months afterwards, the leak of CCTV footage of the 
encounter, together with investigations by two journalists, led to a change in tone of 
coverage, as police officers were accused of duplicity in their accounts of what had 
happened.  There were calls for the police officers involved to be disciplined and one 
officer was jailed for 12 months for falsely claiming to have witnessed the incident.  
This was not the end of the story and in a subsequent court case, the judge ruled 
against Andrew Mitchell, stating that he probably did call the police officers ‘plebs’ 
leaving him with a hefty legal bill and his political career in tatters (BBC, 2014).  The 
twists and turns of the ‘Plebgate’ saga provide a vivid example of the power of the 
news media to create political capital out of seemingly insignificant incidents.  As the 
                                            
71
 Couldry argues that Bourdieu’s notion of field does not go far enough to explaining media power.  The media, 
he suggests have a form of ‘meta-power’ through which they exercise power over other fields.   He goes on to 
say that when the media intensively cover an area of life for the first time, they alter the internal workings of the 
subfield and thus increase their own power across the social terrain. 
72 The Sun, 21 September 2012, front page. 
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story also illustrates, the media has the potential to make evaluative, if inconsistent, 
judgements about such events which can have significant effects on people’s lives.    
 
The story of Andrew Mitchell’s political demise is a good example of how an 
examination of the role of power in creating and perpetuating narratives within civil 
society begins with the media, rather than with politics (see Silverstone 2002 and 
Couldry 2004).  In this sense, research into media power is inherently political.  Yet 
Cook (2006) suggests that to date, the main focus of concern has been how well or 
badly media reflect the political agenda, and that this fails to start from the position 
that the institutions and processes of public communications are themselves part of 
the political process.   Schudson (2002:5) concurs, pointing out that one study after 
another, whether at national or local level, comes up with essentially the same 
observation: journalism, on a day-to-day basis, is the story of the interaction of 
reporters and government officials, both politicians and bureaucrats73.   
 
This political interpretation of media power means that research in the media to date 
has focused on the exercise of media power in key events, such as war or national 
crisis (Silverstone 1999; Couldry 2003).  In these exceptional and high octane 
events, the distinction between media and political power and the exchange 
between them may be difficult to draw74.  The structural approaches of the theories 
of media and society discussed here do not enable the unravelling and separation of 
the interchange of power between the media and the state.  Unsurprisingly, the 
degree to which the boundaries between media and politics overlap is contested. 
Jacobs (2000) warns that a distinction should be maintained between the news 
media and the public sphere, while Schudson (2003) suggests that journalism has 
been neglected by political science.  For Jacobs (2000), the news media are an 
                                            
73 Schudson observes that government officials may not admit it, but there is little doubt that the centre of news 
generation is the link between reporter and official, the interaction of the representatives of news bureaucracies 
and government bureaucracies. 
74 Silverstone observes that for most people, it is in the everyday world that the media operate most significantly, 
filtering and framing every day realities through singular and multiple representations, providing references for the 
conduct of everyday life (Silverstone: 1999)74.  While this description of everyday media power accords with 
Alexander’s perspective of the role of the media within civil society, Silverstone also warns of the potential for 
media power to disrupt the day to day and the mundane; by setting and destroying agendas and shifting the 




important tool that people use, providing a common stock of information and 
culture, which private citizens rely on in their everyday conversations with each 
other.  As he concludes, news media may not tell people what to think but they have 
been remarkably successful in shaping what people think and talk about.     
 
New institutionalism 
One alternative theoretical approach to explore this interaction is the theory of new 
institutionalism (Cater 1959; Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999; Kaplan 2006; Ryfe 2006) 
which suggests that the news media are at most a political institution, or at least, a 
framework for thinking about ways in which news organisations operate as political 
actors. New institutionalism posits that the media are separate from politics, but 
increasingly dependent on it; a dependence which is eroding the distinctiveness of 
the media landscape. 
 
Conceived as a political institution, media organisations exist in an uncertain political 
and economic environment in order to stabilise their position they have to compete 
for attention and so establish ties with and develop normalised practices to be able 
to work with the political and economic actors on whom they depend.  Sparrow 
(1999) refers to this as the ‘dance’ of journalists and politicians: a dance whereby 
news is socially constructed via negotiation between journalists and officials.  The 
result of the dance is that news becomes increasingly homogenous as journalists are 
all reliant on the same sources. This can lead to apparent consensus in news 
reporting of political issues.   
 
Like the other media theories described here, new institutionalism views 
relationships with the state from the perspective of the news room and economic 
pressures are at least as significant an influence on the homogeneity of news as 
access to information.  But as with other theories, new institutionalism explores the 
relationship at an institutional rather than agency level, although the individual 
interactions between journalists and government officials are the means by which 
the news is constructed.  It is the structured repetition of these interactions between 
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agents across the institutional media that leads to homogeneity.  This concept of 
constructed news is hugely important for an understanding of public relations 
practice, but like others referenced in this thesis, Sparrow skips past any detail about 
the role and characteristics of the ‘officials’ who are involved in this process. 
Nevertheless, this approach to understanding news highlights a significant role for 
public relations practitioners to play.  Individual journalists and media groups rely on 
public relations as a way of receiving trusted, accurate and reliable information.  By 
providing a consistent narrative to journalists and the institutional media, public 
relations practitioners can influence the nature, content and characteristics of the 
news.  
 
Here, Jacobs’ (2000) scepticism about the authenticity of the link between the news 
media and wider society comes to the fore.   His claim, that the everyday practical 
routines of journalists tend to favour dominant groups over subordinate ones, 
accords with a new institutionalist approach75.  He interprets this in economic terms, 
pointing out that journalists will seek to cultivate high value sources and that public 
relations practitioners are more likely to be available to bigger institutions with 
greater economic resource available to them. In this way, the media reinforce the 
dominant groups, while minority groups and associations lose the ability to influence 
the larger public agenda.  Jacobs is not explicit here, but his critique of the routines 
of journalists suggests that public relations practitioners bring skill and expertise in 
developing narratives which are likely to be absent, or unavailable, to subordinate 
groups76.   
   
The news media may be increasingly homogenous, reliant on a small number of 
sources for information, but its homogeneity can also serve to reinforce its power 
                                            
75
 Jacobs argues that the tendency of the mainstream media to favour elite groups makes it difficult for minority 
groups, such as African Americans, to be adequately represented.  He rejects Habermas’ concept of a single, 
unitary public sphere, arguing for multiple public spheres where minority groups can be heard. 
76
 On one level, Jacobs’ argument appears to be supported by the findings of this research, which demonstrates 
the absence of public relations activity by Muslim groups in the UK.  As the previous chapter has shown, Muslim 
voices or perspectives are less dominant in the news media than narratives stemming from other more powerful 
or politically influential groups.  This thesis would concur with Jacobs that an absence of PR activity contributes to 
this.  However, the interviews conducted with practitioners for this thesis could also be seen to belie his argument 
of exclusion as all the Muslim groups interviewed were involved with and had direct access to senior agents 
within the political field.   
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and influence.  At the heart of Sparrow’s dance is the continual exchange of power 
between the dancers.  As a single unit, or institution, the news media (or the 
journalistic field) have the potential to preserve their autonomy and wield their 
power, in particular with regards to other social sectors.  This is evident in the way 
in which the news media report on each other’s stories.  For example, in May 2009 
when the Daily Telegraph newspaper published a series of exclusives detailing MPs’ 
expense claims (Telegraph, 2009), journalists from other newspapers also reported 
the story – taking their lead from the Daily Telegraph’s coverage - which dominated 
the news agenda for several weeks and had a significant political impact77.  The 
exclusive nature of the scoop enhanced the Daily Telegraph’s power in publishing 
the story, enabling it to set the political agenda and leaving Members of Parliament 
and others waiting each day for the next details that might appear in print. A more 
diffuse and diverse media publishing this story would have found its power diluted, 
with the attention of readers spread over different presentations of the material, 
lessening the impact of the reporting and, perhaps, conversely enhancing the 
potential of MPs or Parliament to respond and challenge the way the story was being 
reported. 
 
The homogeneity of the media is as much about commercial and professional as 
informational interests, but Cook (1998, 2006) suggests that it is resulting in a 
transformation of the media itself.  The media, he argues, have been so dramatically 
transformed and downsized to the point that they can no longer be described as a 
distinct political institution.  Media outlets are still the central means of 
communication between the political system and the public, but they become more 
similar to one another as they seek to differentiate themselves from their political 
environment. Cook’s argument is challenged by reporting such as The Daily 
Telegraph’s coverage of MPs’ expenses, or The Guardian newspaper’s extensive 
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 The Daily Telegraph’s reporting resulted in a number of resignations and some prosecutions of MPs, together 
with public apologies and the repayment of monies.  The reporting also created pressure for political reform. 
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collaboration with Edward Snowden, the American computer professional who leaked 
classified information from the National Security Agency78.   
 
The argument for homogeneity among the media is a compelling one, at least in 
terms of traditional news media, but it presents a single snapshot of the ‘dance’ 
between officials and journalists which tells us more about the positioning of the 
individual players than an understanding of the dance itself.  As a result, the 
presentation of journalists, media and officials is a static one, and the exchange of 
power is primarily seen in binary terms, with power passing backwards and forwards 
between them.  The dancers are long established in the dance and what is missing is 
an understanding of how the relationships between media and government move 
and change over time, and how new entrants fare when trying the steps for the first 
time.  As has been outlined above, this thesis suggests that public relations 
practitioners are an integral part of the dance itself, helping to dictate the direction 
and even the nature of the steps between the dancers.  Bourdieu’s field theory, 
(Bourdieu:1987, 1990, 1993, 1994 ) which is discussed in later chapters, offers what 
new institutionalism does not, namely the opportunity to examine the relationships 
and exchange of power between the dancers and the characteristics of the dancers 
themselves.  It does this through an examination of the positioning and relationship 
of individual agents, rather than the institutions which they represent. 
 
While new institutionalists debate the impact that politics has on media, Thompson 
(1999) turns the debate on its head, and identifies the media’s ability to make 
political leaders visible as a key source of media power.  Prior to the development of 
media, he says, political leaders were invisible to most of the people over whom they 
ruled.  Today, in the media spotlight, they must adapt their activities to a new kind 
of visibility79. This visibility means that face to face encounters are no longer 
                                            
78
 Edward Snowden is described as a computer analyst whistleblower who provided The Guardian with top 
secret documents which evidenced extensive internet and phone surveillance by US security agencies 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden . 
79 For example, Labour party leader Ed Miliband’s attempts to eat a bacon sandwich while campaigning in May 
2014 became headline news as the media judged that he failed to eat it ‘elegantly enough’.  The Independent 
reported: ‘….the mound of oozing grease and ketchup could not be tackled elegantly.  After no more than a few 
bites, the leader’s advisors had to intervene…’  (Independent 21 May 2014).  The incident led to headlines in the 
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necessary for publicity – or what Thompson calls the ‘publicness’ - for individuals, 
actions or events. Instead, new forms of publicness have begun to supplement, 
extend, transform and displace the traditional forms.  This changing nature of 
publicness has profoundly altered the conditions under which political power is 
exercised and those who exercise political power continuously seek to manage their 
visibility before others.  
 
Thompson does not ascribe this new ‘publicness’ to public relations, but the different 
activities within public relations are an important contributing factor to political 
leaders’ visibility.  Yet while the media have the power to make the politician visible, 
it is through the management of information that political power is exercised.  The 
control of information provision – which new institutionalists argue is resulting in the 
homogeneity of the media – aims to restrict media power, through the ‘day to day’ 
business of governing: press briefings, speeches and the creation of soundbites and 
photo opportunities.  By controlling the way information is presented, public 
relations activity serves to limit and direct the media’s capacity to report on events, 
while enhancing the status of politicians as the source of information and news. 
Here, Thompson unwittingly points to the existence of the PR logic which is outlined 
later in the chapter.  While the development of mass media has enabled political 
leaders to be seen by many more citizens, it is the public relations activity that helps 
to shape how they are presented and the impact that this has.   
 
Mediatisation theory 
Institutional, cultural and political approaches to media and society all present 
differing formations and expressions of media power.  Social theories of media which 
start from the perspective of the newsroom may acknowledge the differing external 
pressures on both the media and the state, but they present the exchange of power 
in structural and often linear terms: from the state to the media and back again. The 
complexities of this relational interchange of power may be revealed by 
                                                                                                                                      
press such as: ‘Ed Miliband fails to look normal while eating bacon sandwich’ (Independent 21 May 2014) and 
‘Ed Miliband looks weird eating a bacon sandwich’ (The Huffington Post 21 May 2014). 
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understanding the processes by which it takes place and the role of institutional 
agents and the relationships between them.  Furthermore, such theories risk 
overlooking the impact and influence of agents and structures sitting outside the 
media and state80.  This seemingly straightforward dynamic fails to take account of 
other agents who, wittingly or otherwise, may be drawn into relationships with both 
the media and the state.  As the literature review in Chapter 1 demonstrates, the 
representation of Muslims in the UK press has the potential to bring Muslim groups 
or individuals into this dynamic.  While theories of civil society, or of the public 
sphere, provide an initial framework into which these new players can be added, 
they do not allow scope for them to take a place on the centre stage.  This thesis 
argues for the recognition of additional players - public relations practitioners acting 
on behalf of sponsor organisations or groups – into the exchange of power between 
media and the state.  It argues that rather than being dismissed or unnoticed, 
categorized as government or information officials, they need to be acknowledged 
and studied as a source of power in their own right.      
 
Before addressing this omission in detail, this chapter turns to the theory of 
mediatisation.  Mediatisation is an emerging theory of the process of social change 
in which media have become increasingly influential.  As a theory, it provides an 
alternative way of exploring media power and the process of its interaction with 
society and culture (Hjarvard 2004, 2008; Lundby 2009; Strömbäck and Esser 2009; 
Krotz 2007; Hepp 2013; Deacon and Stanyer 2014). The chapter goes on to explore 
how this theory can be translated and extended to build a greater understanding of 
the operation of public relations practice and how PR practitioners, active within the 
political field, receive, hold and convey power.  Like other theories described here, 
mediatisation is predominantly a theory of media, but it is a concept with which to 
grasp the process of media and societal change, rather than a means of 
understanding and interpreting the actions of the media or of other institutions. As 
such, this thesis argues, mediatisation theory has the flexibility to be extended to aid 
a greater understanding of the process of change that public relations can effect. 
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 For a discussion of this and how other agents, such as advertising and public relations, are left out of this 




While in recent years mediatisation has become a significant concept with which to 
understand the impact of media on various political, cultural and social processes, 
there is still no common agreement about how it is conceptualised or analysed 
(Deacon and Stanyer 2014)81.   Nevertheless, Livingstone (2009) traces the term 
back to the early 19th century when the states of the Holy Roman Empire were 
‘mediatised’ by Napoleon.  She goes on to cite a definition of mediatisation as the 
subsumation of one monarchy into another in such a way that the ruler of the 
annexed state keeps his or her sovereign title and, sometimes, a measure of local 
power (2009:6).  A more recent explanation of the origins of mediatisation relies on 
Postman’s concept of media ecology (Postman 2000), which places media at the 
heart of communication between human beings. Postman argues that human beings 
live in two different types of environment – the natural environment and the media 
environment.  Media ecology is the study of the media environment, its structure, 
content and impact on people, and the ways in which the interaction between media 
and human beings gives a culture its character and helps a culture to maintain 
symbolic balance.  Postman defines media ecology as the study of transactions 
among people, their messages and their message systems (Postman, Lum 2006:62). 
 
This does not mean that communication media are merely neutral, or value-free 
conduits for carrying information from one place to another. Instead, media’s 
intrinsic physical structure and symbolic form plays a defining role in shaping what 
and how information is to be encoded and transmitted and therefore how it is to be 
decoded. It is the structure of the medium that defines the nature of information 
and each medium’s physical as well as symbolic characteristics carry with them a set 
of biases, including intellectual, emotional, political and social biases.  Thus, the 
transmission and decoding of messages sent by text or by Twitter are, by limitations 
of size, very different to messages conveyed in the Financial Times.  The differences 
in the physical nature of the message create differences in meaning, not least 
because a text message is sent and received in seconds, whereas the Financial 
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 Couldry (2008) suggests that it a single answer to how mediatisation works should not be expected, as the 
media themselves are always at least doubly articulated through their roles of production and transmission.  
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Times – at least in paper copy – only appears once every twenty four hours.  
Mediatisation theory takes forward this notion of media’s potential to create effects 
and to define, shape and change the information that it carries. Such potential may 
not be universally beneficial.  It is a theory of the processes of social change which 
posits that characteristics of mass media result in problematic dependencies, 
constraints or exaggerations (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Schulz 2004). 
 
Deacon and Stanyer (2014) identify two approaches to mediatisation and argue that 
most of the literature to date conflates them, which creates confusion.  The first 
approach – which they describe as institutionalist – is where non-media social actors 
have to adapt to media’s rules, aims, production logics and constraints.  The second 
approach is that of the social constructivist - a process where information technology 
drives the changing communicative construction of culture and society.82 This 
research discusses the institutionalist approach, but while this process oriented 
definition is shared by others (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Hjarvard 2004; Schulz 
2004; Strömbäck 2004) few have attempted to specify how these processes have 
evolved from an empirical perspective.  As Strömbäck (2004) observes, most jump 
from a process-oriented definition to the present state of affairs, where almost 
anything can, purportedly, be mediatised.     
 
Mediatisation refers to the long term process of changing social institutions and 
modes of interactions in culture and society due to the growing importance of media 
in all strands of society (Krotz 2009).  Hjarvard (2008) goes one step further in his 
claim that most human interaction and communication is filtered through media.  
According to Hjarvard, the media are providers of information and moral orientation 
as well as society’s most important storyteller about society itself.  Consequently, the 
media also structure feelings of community and belonging and ritualise the small 
transitions of everyday life as well as the events of the larger society.  In this, 
Hjarvard reflects Alexander’s analysis of the role of the media within civil society: a 
channel which, through its definition and dissemination of narratives within society, 
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 For further discussion of the relationship between technology and mediatisation see Schofield Clark 2009.   
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helps to shape what is normative in the way in which that society operates and how 
it sees itself.   
 
Hjarvard goes on to define the mediatisation of society as a process which can affect 
core elements of a social or cultural activity such as politics, teaching or religion 
(2008a:13).  Mediatisation is the process whereby society to an increasing degree is 
submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic.  This process is 
characterised by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the 
operations of other social institutions, while they have also acquired the status of 
social institutions in their own right.  As a consequence, social interaction – within 
the respective institutions, between institutions and in society at large – takes place 
via the media (Hjarvard 2008b:113, his italics).  Asp (2014) sums this up by 
describing how mediatisation goes beyond the visible face of media power and 
approaches the invisible face of media power.  Lundby (2009) concurs; defining 
mediatisation as the process of social change that to some extent subsumes entire 
social or cultural fields into the logic of the media.  Like Hjarvard, he suggests that 
as a result of mediatisation, media are not only an independent institution but also 
become an integrated part of other institutions such as politics, religion or the 
family83.   
 
Schulz (2004) deconstructs the processes by which mediatisation occurs, arguing 
that there are four different ways in which it can take effect.  He suggests that 
mediatisation can involve an extension, substitution, amalgamation or 
accommodation of face to face encounters with mediated encounters (2004:88).  As 
an extension of face to face encounters, the media serve to bridge spatial and 
temporal distances.  Echoing Habermas, Schulz talks about indirect mediation by the 
production of a public sphere – a forum or space accessible to everyone where 
actors can articulate their opinions and interests.  The media’s publishing capacity 
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 Krotz (2009) goes further still, suggesting that mediatisation is a meta-process that changes communication 
and so the core of human action.  As such, mediatisation must be understood as a long-term process that has a 
specific realisation in each single culture and society. For Krotz, mediatisation sits alongside individualisation, 




enables citizens to observe the political discourse and contributes to the mediation of 
politics.   
 
Through its substitution role, the media partly or completely substitute social 
activities and institutions and change their character.  For example, in online dating 
the media act as a substitute for face to face encounters, creating new rules and 
logic for communication between individuals looking for relationships. The rules of 
the game for online dating are different to the rules for face to face meetings, as the 
internet provides among other things anonymity, the ability to communicate round 
the clock and the potential to interact with several prospective partners at once.   
 
The amalgamation of media means that media activities not only extend and partly 
substitute non-media activities, they also merge and mingle with one another.  For 
example, a teenager may sit with his or her family watching television, texting a 
friend and updating their status on Facebook at the same time.  The teenager may 
be physically present in the room, but is also occupying one or more virtual worlds 
that intermingle with what else is happening in the room.  This blurring of the 
boundaries between media and non-media activities affords possibilities for the 
individual to regulate or change behaviour and relationships, both in real life and via 
a screen.  It also offers the opportunity for multiple agents to be involved in the 
process – participating themselves through media.  For example, numerous people 
who have never met can participate in online games together, sign online petitions 
or befriend each other on social networking sites. 
 
Schulz’s final mediatisation process is accommodation - the mere fact that 
communication media exist induces social change. For example, the introduction of 
online shopping has changed shopping habits when compared with the physical 
experience of visiting a shop84, while citizen participation in media, via Twitter or 
through citizen journalism changes the nature of what is reported in the 
newspapers.  Petersen, Heinrichs and Peters (2010) explore the mediatisation of 
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 For example, online shopping can now take place around the clock, without the need to interact with any sales 
assistants or other agents. 
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science, arguing that scientific expertise has increasingly lost its power due to the 
prevalence of controversial expertise in the public sphere, in particular the mass 
media.  The dominance of the news media’s agenda encourages politicians to 
address a particular topic and the media become a source of information and opinion 
formation.  Scientific events, findings and arguments communicated by the media 
can trigger political activities more successfully than those which do not feature in 
the media.  Positive media coverage becomes a criterion for success within science, 
alongside more conventional measures of scientific achievement. 
 
In the political field, politicians adapt to the rules of the media system by trying to 
increase their publicity while adapting to a loss of autonomy and control.  This 
adaptation may affect both what they say and how they say it, benefitting the media 
by making politics more newsworthy and conveniently formatted.  Political events 
such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s annual Budget have also become media 
events, with politicians on both sides regarding the battle of the headlines as an 
indicator of political success85.  In this way, mediatisation acts as a process through 
which other social or cultural fields (such as politics, science or religion) are 
subsumed to some extent into the logic of the media and may even assume media 
form.   
 
The debate about the realisation of media effects continues to be a lively one.  
Strömbäck argues for a conceptualization of media that is sensitive to and 
recognizes the interactions and interdependencies of media systems, institutions and 
actors with political systems and the reciprocal effects that politics can have.  
As scholarship responds, two different concepts – mediatisation and mediation – 
feature heavily (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Silverstone 1999; Schulz 2004; Couldry 
2008; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011; Hepp 2013).  There is often no clear 
distinction between these two terms, although Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) 
claim a growing consensus that they should not be viewed as synonymous.  
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 The Guardian (2014) reported that the agenda for the day of the 2014 budget (Wednesday 19 March) began 
with the Chancellor taking part in an interview on Radio 4’s Today programme at 8.10am.  This was followed by 
the Deputy Prime Minister taking part in a radio call-in show.  At the same time, the Shadow Chancellor was also 
doing broadcast interviews, with some having been pre-recorded the day before.  All this media activity took 
place before the budget announcement was given in Parliament at 12.30pm. 
 74 
 
Mediation is a neutral act of transmission, while mediatisation focuses on increasing 
media influence, or the media as a mediating or intermediary agent whose function 
is to convey meaning from the communicator to the audience or between 
communication partners (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). 
 
Couldry (2008) calls for more substantive definitions of both concepts, arguing that 
theories of mediatisation look for an essentially linear transformation from ‘pre-
media’ (before the intervention of specific media) to ‘mediatised’ social states. This 
suggests an overly simplistic process of change – from one formulaic setting to 
another – through a single mechanism and without recognition or accommodation of 
the complexities of the fields and arenas in which mediatisation takes place.  In 
contrast, mediated approaches emphasise the heterogeneity of the transformations 
to which media give rise and the complexities and divisions within social space. 
Through its intervention, public relations practice seeks to move from mediation to 
mediatisation, by exerting control over the homogeneity and linearity of the 
transformation process. It does this by channelling the ‘pre-media’ state of its 
sponsor organisation through its own form of logic, thus making the transformation 
to a mediatised state appear to be simpler, more linear and more successful.  This 
process appears to reduce the complexity of the fields which are being mediatised 
by eliminating the ambiguity and uncertainty that arises from competing or 
contradictory voices.  Instead, public relations practice ensures that one, official 
voice is heard, such as a spokesperson expressing the official line, either verbally or 
in writing. As the sponsor organisation adapts to this public relations logic, the 
potential for the mediatised state to diversify in form or content reduces and a 
similitude of form is the result.  
 
To resolve this ambiguity between mediatisation and mediation, Couldry throws his 
support behind Thompson’s (1995) term – mediazation –and also Silverstone’s 
description of mediation as the ‘fundamentally, but unevenly, dialectical process in 
which institutionalized media of communication (the press, broadcast radio and 
television and increasingly the world wide web) are involved in the general 
circulations of symbols in life’ (Silverstone, 2002: 762). He goes on to express 
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reservations about Lundby’s definition of mediatisation, which includes the potential 
subsumation of other institutions to media forms. This, he suggests, means that 
mediatisation goes far beyond the adoption of media forms or formats to the 
broader consequences of dependence upon media exposure.  These critiques 
helpfully identify how any process of mediation (or perhaps ‘mediazation’) of an area 
of culture or social life is always multi-dimensional, involving at least a two way 
process of exchange.  The media do not merely work in linear fashion – transmitting 
content, data or messages to be absorbed by recipients (Schulz 2004, Couldry 2008, 
Strömbäck 2004), but through a process of transformation which in its turn, 
transforms the conditions under which any future media can be produced and 
understood. Such a multi-dimensional process provides the opportunity for additional 
agents to participate, belying a direct exchange of information between two parties.  
For public relations practitioners, such participation can be in the form of 
intervention through an attempt to shift the nature of the exchange, to quell it 
completely or to enhance it in order to generate their preferred type of media 
coverage.  Through this, the PR practitioner takes part in the process of 
transformation and, as is discussed below, brings their own logic and form to it, for 
the benefit of both the media and their sponsor organisation. 
 
Media logic 
Media logic has been described as a crucial driving mechanism behind and within the 
processes of mediatisation and central to understanding both the emergence of 
independent media institutions and the adaptation of society to the changing media 
environment (Altheide and Snow 1979; Hjarvard 2008; Schrott 2009; Strömbäck and 
Esser 2009; Asp 2014). While Alexander suggests that the original purpose of the 
media was to advance the claims of particular institutions, today’s media are no 
longer in the service of other institutions but operate according to their own 





Altheide and Snow (1979) were the first to use the term media logic to identify a 
particular form of communication - a process through which media present and 
transmit information.  Media logic is the specific frame of reference of the production 
of media culture in general and of the news in particular. Altheide and Snow define 
media logic as a way of seeing and interpreting social affairs which could include 
how material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis, 
and the grammar of media communication. These production processes imply a 
certain extent of standardization, reflecting the goals, traditions and routines of 
media organisations and an adaptation to the demands of particular audiences. The 
underlying idea is that of a dominant form, a representation of reality, and content 
definitions to which media producers conform. By identifying these ‘formats’ it is 
possible to understand better what lies behind the process of media production.  
 
Altheide and Snow’s concept of media logic has evolved into a broader set of 
definitions, all of which articulate how the media’s own format and needs, rather 
than that of other social subsystems, take precedence and guide the media and their 
coverage.  Included within the scope of media logic are the practical and tangible 
matters of form and presentation, including technological and production 
requirements (Hjarvard 2008a, Strömbäck and Esser 2009; Schrott 2009), and less 
palpable filters and rules about interpreting social, cultural and political phenomena 
(Hjarvard 2008a; Strömbäck and Esser 2009).  These interpretations include criteria 
for newsworthiness – novelty, immediacy and conflict86, as well as commercial 
appeal and viability.  Media logic can be identified in the various media formats, 
production processes and routines that the media adhere to, as well as the need for 
compelling stories which shape how the media interpret and cover public affairs.  It 
covers both the structural environment which journalists work in and cultural factors 
like journalistic attitudes and their repertoire of media formats and grammar, 
professional norms and values, commercial incentives and motives.  For Hjarvard 
these are formal and informal rules, for Schrott they are filters, while Strömbäck and 
Esser describe media logic as the component parts which contribute to media 
                                            
86
 These filters accord with the criteria for content that makes news: for example, content must be novel, 
unexpected, significant, timely and with human interest (Tuchman, 1980). 
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presentation.  However it is defined, media logic acts as a constraint by providing an 
overall structure that shapes the behaviour of those who come into contact with it 
(Asp 2014).  Conversely, it also provides certainty, enabling the efficient production 
of news suitable for a particular audience.  For the public relations practitioner, 
media logic provides the opportunity to shape messages and content in a way that 
exactly conforms to the media’s requirements – increasing the likelihood of 
favourable journalistic attention.  Conversely, it also offers a route for avoiding, or 
minimizing the likelihood of media attention.  By acting counter to the media’s logic 
– often in practical ways which make it difficult for the media to receive or replicate 
information – public relations practitioners can seek to keep information out of the 
headlines87. 
 
These critiques suggest an underlying linear depiction of media logic, whereby one 
state of affairs becomes another because of the intervention of the media.  Couldry 
(2008) highlights Schulz’s (2004) process of substitution as such an example – the 
media replaces a face to face encounter in a straightforward transaction.  In his 
critique of mediatisation, he argues that the reality is not so straightforward, 
particularly because the role of human agents needs to be considered.  Couldry 
suggests that the role of human agents cannot be adequately explored within 
mediatisation theory, and that other theoretical frameworks, such as Bourdieu’s field 
theory may be more appropriate ways forward. This is the approach taken by this 
study, not least because the theory of mediatisation operates on too large a scale to 
provide a granular understanding of how the media effect change and how media 
power is exchanged.  The role of public relations, as outlined above, is a role for 
human agents, contingent on the relationships practitioners hold. Bourdieu’s field 
theory, which is discussed further below, provides the scope for a detailed analysis 
and to understand the role of individual actors in achieving this.  Although different, 
the two approaches are not incompatible.  This study aims to demonstrate how 
mediatisation and field theory can be combined to understand how the relationships 
                                            
87
 For example, the phrase ‘a good day to bury bad news’ is now shorthand for the way in which public relations 
practitioners time their announcements to reduce the likelihood of media coverage.  By releasing information to 
the press after deadline or when another story is dominating news coverage, PR practitioners can hope to 
circumvent media logic and avoid negative publicity. 
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and interactions between human agents can enhance, challenge or even compete 
with media power. 
  
These differing interpretations of media logic reveal an absence of consensus as to 
what it is, how many different types of logic there may be and how media logic 
impacts on the cultural institutions it subsumes.  Krotz (2009) warns against the 
concept, claiming it may be misleading as there is no technical definition of media 
logic.  He points out that the media logic of today is not the same as of a decade 
ago, and that the media logic of a mobile phone will be different for a teenager than 
for an adult because of the different ways in which each will use the phone. 
 
Lundby (2009) argues that the use of media logic as an overall term weakens the 
scholarly argumentation about mediatisation. As a generalised concept, media logic 
hides the constraints of specific formats and the transformations that are shaped in 
concrete social interactions and communication processes. Hjarvard concurs that 
media logic is merely a shorthand for the multiplicity of factors structuring media 
practices while Hepp (2009) agrees that we cannot suppose one single, general logic 
of the media, but have to investigate the concrete interrelation between 
mediatisation and cultural change for certain contexts and fields.  Here, he is 
supported by Couldry (2008), who argues that the concept of a single type of media 
based logic may obscure the variety of media-related pressures at work in society.  
For example, media exposure may be of more importance to one agent seeking to 
establish themselves in their professional field than to another, while some agents 
may consciously seek to avoid media exposure.  In these instances the logic of the 
media varies in its function and its dominance.  These critiques do not dispute the 
existence of some kind of media power or influence, summarized as logic, but rather 
suggest the need for further examination of how the relationship between media 
and other institutions operates. 
Mediatisation of politics 
Hepp (2009) observes that it is possible to assess the nature of mediatisation by 
studying the way in which a field such as politics has become functionally dependent 
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on mass media and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media.  Asp 
(2014) concurs, pointing out that the concept of media logic has first and foremost 
occurred in studies of the mediatisation of politics (e.g. Mazzonleni and Schulz 1999; 
Schulz 2004; Hjarvard 2008; Strömbäck 2008; Schrott 2009; Strömbäck and Esser 
2009; Green-Pedersen and Stubgager 2010; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011).  
 
Unlike new institutionalism, where the media as a political institution are also 
dependent on political sources, the theory of mediatisation suggests a political 
system that is highly influenced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media 
and the way the media report on politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Kepplinger 
2002; Meyer 2003; Schulz 2004; Strömbäck 2007 and 2011; Petersen, Heinrich and 
Peters 2010; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011).  While communication is necessary for 
the functioning of any political system (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), the 
mediatisation of politics suggests that through the operation of media logic the 
media exercise a level of control over the public political agenda.  Without the 
media, the public’s exposure to politicians and to politics would be constrained.  The 
media’s independence from the political system means they have genuine, legitimate 
political functions to perform in voicing a distinct position on an issue.  
 
This perspective on the mediatisation of politics harks back to Habermas’ original 
concept of the public sphere.  Yet Strömbäck suggests that mediated politics goes 
much further, describing it as a situation in which the media have become the most 
important source of information and vehicle of communication between the 
governors and the governed (2008:231).   One part of media logic is the adaptation 
of political communication to meet the production demands of the media, through 
the use of soundbites and other techniques that make politics ‘televisual’.  Political 
actors know, and are able to deliver this.  Here, the argument is not just about 
communicating political performance or aspirations, but about the incorporation of 
media-based logics and norms into political action. At the extreme, media have the 
potential to change the nature of what politics is, because of the requirement for all 
effective policy to be explainable and defensible within the constraints of media 
formats (Kepplinger 2002; Meyer 2003).   
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Strömbäck argues that political communication is either governed by political logic or 
by media logic.  Political logic means that the needs of the political system and 
political institutions take centre stage and shape how political communication is 
played out, covered and understood.  Here ‘what is important for people to know’ 
takes precedence.  The political logic broadly corresponds to the public sphere 
model. However, the dominance of media logic means that in political contexts 
media logic competes with and hypothetically becomes more important than political 
logic88.   
 
Despite reservations about the concept of media logic, Couldry (2008) concedes that 
politics is a field in which the interdependencies with the journalistic field are so 
intense that it does still make sense to say that political logic has come to a large 
degree to incorporate media logic.  But the interplay of politics and media is broad 
and multi-faceted as politicians compete for citizen’s attention through the media.  
Media logic includes the time cycles of politics and news and the overall construction 
of what politics is.   Couldry cautions against limiting the concept of media logic to 
cover the multiple ways in which media outputs become the primary aim of political 
action; the term media logic seems fitting to capture the force that media have in 
contemporary politics.  This does not mean that the outcomes of this media logic are 
simple and straightforward.  If all political actors are driven by this logic then any 
large-scale political strategy becomes unstable, liable to interruption by other actors, 
externally and internally to the institutions involved.   
 
Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) break the interactions between politics and media 
down into four phases by which mediatisation can be judged.  The first phase is the 
extent to which the media constitute the most important source of information and 
channel of communication about politics for citizens.  The second phase examines 
the media’s independence from other social and political institutions as it is governed 
by its own logic, rather than by that of other institutions.  The third phase looks at 
                                            
88
 Deacon and Stanyer (2014) warn that the example of political parties adapting to and internalising media logic 
needs to be seen alongside other system level factors, such as professionalization in political parties or spin 
doctors’ perceptions about the importance of specific media.  While there is a supposition that all political actors 
adapt to and internalize media logic this does not take account of other responses to media logic: e.g. efforts to 
control the media. 
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the degree to which media content is governed by media logic or political logic, 
while the final phase explores the degree to which politicians are governed by media 
logic or political logic.  This deconstruction of the different phases of mediatisation 
helpfully plots the creeping scope of mediatisation within the political sphere.  While 
the first two phases are present within Habermas’ theory of the ideal public sphere 
and would be widely recognised as pre-conditions for democracy, the third phase 
encapsulates the point at which media and political power hang in the balance.  This 
is the tipping point at which media logic can begin to dominate, resulting in the 
eventual subsumation of individual politicians to media power.  The final phase is 
when political and other social actors not only adapt to media logic and predominant 
news values but also internalise these and, more or less consciously, allow the media 
logic and standards of newsworthiness to become a built-in part of the governing 
process.   
 
Kepplinger’s (2002) study of the interdependencies between politics and mass media 
in Germany over five decades highlights the progression through these four stages.  
While this process is slow and long-term, Kepplinger observes that it has been 
accelerated in the last two or three decades because of growth in the importance of 
the news media, the experience of an increasing number of politicians in dealing 
with the media and the growing importance of professional media advisers in 
politics.     
 
Kepplinger concludes that the mediatisation of the German Parliament’s work had 
remarkable consequences on the size and activities of the government apparatus.  
He identifies feedback loops, whereby media coverage changed the way in which 
events were arranged or statements were constructed by politicians.  He concludes 
that politics is not independent of media coverage; in fact, what the media present 
as politics is partly the consequence of the conditions set by the mass media.  The 
increasing importance of media has both established politicians and journalists as 
dominating forces in the process of political communication (2002:983).  Yet the 
media hold the upper hand, with the political system forced to accept the media’s 
criteria of success largely because of the media’s ability to sway the formation of 
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public opinion.  Politics has not only adapted to the media but, in some aspects, it 
has become subservient to it89.  These findings are supported by Van Noije et al’s 
(2008) study of media and parliamentary agendas in the Netherlands and the UK.  
The results of their longitudinal study of newspaper coverage of Parliamentary 
debates in both countries show that media and parliamentary agendas influence 
each other but that the balance of power has shifted in favour of the media agenda. 
 
This interdependence between media and politics might lead to the assumption that 
the news media is full of politics.  Yet mediatisation of politics has not led to an 
increase in political reporting – rather the reverse. Negrine (1999) charts the decline 
of Parliamentary coverage in the UK press, illustrated by the abandonment of a page 
dedicated to Parliamentary reporting in the broadsheet newspapers.  He cites a 
more commercial approach to newspapers, and greater attention paid to readers’ 
requirements as reasons for this shift in focus (1999:348).  In his evidence to the 
Leveson Inquiry, former Home Secretary, Justice Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 
Jack Straw, also observed a decline in the reporting of political news: ‘There has 
never been a ‘golden age’ in political reporting; but in my perception there has been 
a significant decline in the straight reporting of what Parliament and local authorities 
are doing - the decisions they are making…. A significant amount of the work of 
government and Parliament is both very important, and consensual; but this is 
scarcely reported because it is seen as boring’ (Inquiry 2012). The dominance of 
media logic provides the media with greater freedom to pick and choose the issues 
on which it reports.  Only the events which conform to the newsworthiness criteria 
that the logic demands are given space, irrespective of their perceived political 
importance. 
 
Strömbäck and Dimitrova’s (2011) comparative study of the mediatisation of US and 
Swedish election news supports this assertion.  They concluded that in the USA – 
the more mediatised environment – politicians had adapted their presentation to 
accommodate the demands of the media, for example through shorter soundbites 
                                            
89
The recent phone hacking scandal is a case in point, where the demands of the media, and in particular the 
tabloid media, for exclusives and ‘scoops’ led to the illegal interception of voicemails of public figures in an 
attempt to uncover information about their personal lives. 
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crafted for maximum impact in a time-constrained TV news reports. Journalists’ role 
in mediating politics meant that their spoken explanation of events would often be 
played over politicians’ words in a broadcast news report, and politics were framed 
more as a strategic game, where the competition between parties, opinion poll lead 
and tactics would generate coverage alongside the issues.  In his study of the UK 
Parliament, Davis (2007) also concludes that intense media attention on issues can 
shift political agendas and policy development, and that British MPs consciously shift 
their policy agendas with future news reporting in mind.  His research shows that 
politicians are frequently the sources behind news campaigns and use news and 
interaction with journalists to understand what other politicians think are the main 
news issues. 
 
While the media may be the most important communication channel about politics 
for citizens, its impact on politics is not always welcome.  Schudson (2003) is 
scathing that mediatisation has corrupted political life and discourse, pointing out 
that media institutions, unlike politicians, are not accountable to the public.  
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) describe the ‘growing intrusion’ of media into the 
political domain and claim that mediatised politics is politics that has lost its 
autonomy and interferes with political processes.   The risk is that the media will 
usurp political institutions, by constructing the public sphere of information and 
opinion and controlling the terms of their exchange.  In so doing, the media sharply 
differentiate the roles of actors and spectators: it is left to the media to decide who 
will get access to the public.  In addition to conferring status upon actors by giving 
them attention, the media also assign political relevance and importance to social 
problems by selecting and emphasising certain issues and neglecting others.  Giving 
evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, Jack Straw highlighted the risk of the relationship 
between politicians and journalists becoming ‘incestuous, manipulative and self-
serving.’  While such relationships are ‘critically important’ and there is a duty on 
senior politicians in a democracy to have such relationships, he suggested that 
politicians could allow themselves to be influenced by agendas generated by media 
organisations in order to secure favourable coverage for themselves, their party and 
their government (Inquiry 2012). 
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The literature about the presentation of Islam in the UK press reviewed in Chapter 1 
suggests that at first glance, the presentation of Islam is heavily mediatised.  The 
overarching conclusion of studies of Islam and media suggests that it is the media’s 
preferred presentation of the religion and its followers which predominates, rather 
than a presentation shaped by any other type of logic.  In particular, the repeated 
framing of Islam in a context of conflict and politics, rather than a social or 
theological context, may suggest that in the UK the representation of Islam and 
Muslim communities has been subsumed into the wider mediatisation of politics. 
 
Uitermark and Gielen’s study of the mediatisation of politics in an Amsterdam 
neighbourhood (2010) evidences how this works.  When a Muslim group came into 
conflict with local government in an ordinary Amsterdam neighbourhood over plans 
to build a mosque, both sides turned to the media to convey their points of view and 
assert their authority.  The authors describe how the conflict led to a general 
proliferation of media attention on the dispute.  Individuals representing both the 
mosque and the local government turned to the media to promote their differing 
points of view.  In time, both sides resolved their differences and worked together in 
order to promote positive media images about their shared neighbourhood 
(2010:1341).  Uitermark and Gielen quote the chairman of the neighbourhood 
government explaining his growing understanding of the benefits of media 
exposure:  ‘You can think, ‘It’s just a neighbourhood.’ ... [But] there are phenomena 
on all kinds of levels: the family, the street, education, health, the city, the world—
and that all comes together in this one neighbourhood. So if you want to be player 
in that game, you have to use the media. I think that the government should use 
the media. The media also like to be used, because there is a wonderful possibility 
for team work. The media wants a story and we have a story. We give the story’ 
(Uitermark and Gielen 2010:1331, their italics).  The authors conclude that the 
media played an increasingly important role in shaping the exchange of power 
between the neighbourhood government and the mosque.  The media’s effects 
changed over time and showed its potential to both create tensions between 




This case study highlights the mediatisation of a particular neighbourhood situation, 
with both sides of the conflict turning to the media to advance their cause. Both 
sides appointed public relations representatives to ‘play the game’ and work directly 
with the local newspapers, building relationships.  Unusually, perhaps, the resolution 
of the dispute was followed by both sides continuing to work together to promote a 
positive representation of their area within the media.  Once again, Islam was 
politicised through the media as the decision to build a mosque – a place of religious 
worship – came into conflict with the rules and regulations of the local 
neighbourhood authority.  More pertinent to the experience of mediatisation 
however, is the recognition that both sides of the conflict changed as a result of the 
media interest and that this process of change continued.  Some of the impact of the 
media is summed up in the quote from the neighbourhood chairman, detailed above 
– the acceptance of the need to provide a story which has to be constructed from 
the events that are taking place.  The appointment of public relations agents, and 
the development of the structures around which their work was based, are further 
evidence of the impact of mediatisation.   
 
To date, other studies of Islam and media have not delved deeply enough into the 
relationship between the religion and the press to provide further robust evidence of 
mediatisation.  A study of mediatisation requires not only an examination of press 
reporting, but an understanding of the conditions within which the institution or field 
subject to mediatisation is operating.  The studies of Islam and media discussed in 
the first chapter of this thesis have not yet gone this far.  The predominant focus on 
media coverage means that a comprehensive examination of what impact the media 
narratives about Islam have had on Muslim communities in the UK still needs to take 
place.   This thesis makes a first step at redressing this omission, through its 
fieldwork with representatives of Muslim groups operating within the political field.  
However, in its focus on how individual representatives of Muslim groups are 
responding to the media, this research falls far short of a full understanding of the 




The media may not be as omniscient as the theory of mediatisation implies. 
Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) concur that increasingly political institutions are 
dependent on and shaped by mass media but point out that they nevertheless 
remain in control of political processes and functions.  The increasing intrusion of 
media in the political process is not necessarily synonymous with a ‘media takeover’ 
of political institutions.  Instead, views of the media’s omniscience are based on 
misinterpretation.  In Europe, the media systems and political systems interact with 
patterns that protect each from the excessive influence of the other. The existence 
of undoubted media power is counterbalanced and quite often exceeded by the 
power of political parties and institutions (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999).  In their 
study of mediatisation of politics in Denmark, Green-Pedersen and Stubager (2010) 
acknowledge the effects of mass media on politics, but point out that media 
coverage on particular issues is only fuelled by opposition parties’ reaction if it is an 
issue that they want to politicise in competition with the ruling party.  Issues which 
are not the subject of competition between political parties are not likely to be given 
political attention; making them of less appeal to the media.  In this sense, parties 
can exert political control over the media, by choosing which issues to draw media 
attention to. They also point out that sensational issues, which individuals may not 
have direct personal experience of – such as law and order – are more likely to be 
mediatised than subjects such as the economy or the welfare state, where people 
can rely on their own experience to make judgements.  While this observation 
supports the mediatisation of Islam, it also lends itself to an interpretation of 
mediatisation which serves to emphasise the dramatic rather than the mundane.  
While the criteria for what makes news may involve such distinctions, the process of 
mediatisation is neutral in its reach.  Mediatisation’s power comes from its potential 
to take the routine or the mundane and reframe it according to the logic of the 
media. 
 
The theory of mediatisation provides a convenient framework within which to build 
an understanding of the relationship between the media and society and politics in 
particular.  The concept of media logic sits within this framework and acts as a 
rationale for the effect that the media has and the demand that it places on other 
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institutions and social fields.  Mediatisation assumes that other social fields operate 
according to the forms and strictures of the media and within the political field this 
assumption is largely borne out by evidence about the relationships between 
Parliament and politicians and the media.  Yet empirical knowledge of how 
mediatisation works is still patchy with an over-reliance on theory building based on 
media studies, rather than other disciplines.  Even within the political field, the most 
considered in this area, studies of mediatisation focus on the institution of 
Parliament and the effect of the media on the behaviour of politicians, rather than 
taking a broader perspective of the field, including looking at central or local 
government agencies.  This is important for any study of the mediatisation of Islam, 
where such an approach would require a much fuller understanding of the Muslim 
field.  Studying mediatisation from the perspective of the media alone can provide a 
distorted view, which may over-emphasise the media’s importance and effects. By 
implication, any approach to mediatisation that begins with the media will only 
observe where mediatisation has happened, rather than areas in which the media 
are less dominant.  By beginning with the end result  - the mediated state – such a 
study risks misinterpreting or being blind to the actions of agents or institutions 
other than the media.  
 
The current expression of mediatisation is somewhat myopic in its analysis of how 
the media influence other societal institutions.  As we have seen, mediatisation 
currently fails to distinguish between different types of media, assuming similar 
patterns of influence for a national newspaper newsroom as a mobile phone.  One 
reason for this may be that much of the focus of the way in which mediatisation 
works has rested on technology, with less attention paid to the role of human 
agents.  Yet the newsroom is staffed by humans, and the mobile phone is used by 
humans, and increasingly is presented and shaped in ways most appropriate to meet 
individual needs.   
 
Despite the rapid growth of media across society in the last few decades, media may 
not reach as far or as deeply into all societal institutions as mediatisation theory 
implies. Instead, media and institutions may be dependent on intermediaries to 
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facilitate interactions between them.  While the role of technology as an 
intermediary or facilitator of change is being assessed, the role of human 
intermediaries needs to be further defined and clarified.  Their role may be one of 
translation - helping institutions adapt to media logic – or information giving, 
providing the media with information and resources not easily available to it by other 
means.  Such intermediaries may bring the logic of the institution they represent, or 
even their own logic, to the transaction, and may even require the media to adapt in 
order to benefit from the exchange.  They may serve to speed up the process of 
mediatisation, or to resist it or slow it down.  The intermediaries may represent 
particular institutions, or seek to play a role in the interaction between media and 
institutions for other reasons. 
 
Public relations 
The nature of public relations practice is explored later in the thesis but an early 
definition is useful.  This is because social theories of media do not wholly ignore 
public relations practice, but where public relations activity is considered, it is rarely 
described as such.  Instead, it is often depicted in pejorative terms, rather than as 
an integral or enabling factor in the interaction between media and society. As 
Schudson (2002) points out, it is a rare study that has examined news production 
from the view point of the news source, rather than the news organisation90.  Even 
those studies which do approach news from a different perspective, (e.g. Cook 
1989) overlook the specific nature of public relations practice.  Instead PR 
practitioners are categorised with other ‘government officials’ (Schedler 1998; 
Kepplinger 2002; Schudson 2002).  Only Edwards (2006, 2008, 2009) centres her 
sociological research on practice which is explicitly identified as public relations and, 
in doing so, she explores the availability of social and cultural capital to PR agents.  
Her conclusions are discussed later in the thesis. 
 
                                            
90
 For example, see Klinenberg’s ethnographical study (2005) of a US newsroom. 
 89 
 
In the interviews conducted for this study, it has been common to hear interviewees 
reflect that PR practitioners have neglected to use their skills to promote their own 
profession.  In studies where public relations practice is named and identified as an 
activity in its own right, it is often interpreted as an artifice: depicted as persuasion 
or propaganda, or from the perspective of journalists dependent on information 
provided by public relations practitioners91.  While some organisational or social-
psychology approaches look at the success, or otherwise, of PR in promoting 
corporate agendas and ideals to the public, again these rarely begin from the 
perspective of the PR practitioner, instead assessing the audience’s propensity to be 
persuaded of a particular viewpoint or narrative (Pooley and Katz 2008)92. Perhaps 
then, it is unsurprising that while there is scope within the sociological approaches of 
Alexander  (1998; 2006) and, in particular, Jacobs (1998; 2000) for a more detailed 
study of the relationship between power dynamics and public relations practice, in 
the end public relations is merely a sideline within their argument.   
 
Schedler’s work (1998) examining public information programmes in the Netherlands 
is an example of this apparent discomfort with public relations activity.  
Theoretically, her approach is sympathetic to the aims of this study, as she moves 
away from a transmission model of communications93 to looking at the social and 
cultural context in which information programmes are produced, distributed and 
received.  Schedler does this using field theory, in order to understand the power 
relations, social conflicts and tensions at play as public information programmes are 
produced and disseminated.  However, while Schedler acknowledges the power 
available to ‘public information officials’ (her terminology) the purpose of her study is 
not to explore their role or power in particular, but rather the material which make 
up public information programmes and the impact it has.  This approach risks 
looking at the output of these officials in isolation; without considering the nature of 
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spokespeople as ‘parajournalists, seeking to prompt journalists to provide favourable coverage’.  In this 
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journalists.  
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their practice, their relationships or the nature of the fields from which their work 
emerges.94 Kepplinger (2002) also refers to the activities which are intended to 
convey information to the parliament, the media or the public.  He describes them as 
follows: ‘The primary purpose of these activities, even when they occur in 
connection with personnel or policy decisions, is to direct the attention of the 
parliament, the media or the public to certain issues or aspects of these issues.  At 
the same time, they offer the members of parliament the opportunity to portray 
themselves in a good light...’ (2002:974). This is Kepplinger’s understanding of what 
would be called public relations activities.  While these activities may well be 
included in other understandings of public relations practice, the scope of them falls 
far short of the type of activities practitioners articulated during the fieldwork 
conducted for this study and which are described in subsequent chapters.  However, 
Davis offers a warning about placing too much activity on the shoulders of public 
relations practitioners.  He cautions not to underestimate the direct contact that 
politicians have with journalists.  In his study (2007), all government ministers, 
shadow ministers and a slim majority of back-bench MPs talked to national reporters 
on a regular basis.  In all, just over two-thirds talked to journalists on average at 
least once a day and usually several times a day.  (This was often with local 
newspaper journalists in order to retain constituency support). 
 
Schedler (1998) Kepplinger (2002) Schudson (2003) and Cook (2006) all situate 
public information work clearly within the political field. Davis’ landmark book on 
public relations (2000) supports this by stating that historically most interest in PR 
was in its role in the political process and its role in aiding politicians and state 
institutions in their attempts to manage the media.  However Pieczka (2002) 
critiques Davis, by pointing out that he too shifts the study of PR from a political 
perspective to a media studies one, which views PR as a media source and focuses 
on issues of access, participation and audience response.  This, she points out, has 
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bypassed the experience of individual practitioners and their practice, instead 
maintaining the focus on PR as a means of fulfilling organisational objectives95.  
 
If public relations has been largely overlooked in theories of society and media to 
date, this is likely to be because media studies is traditionally approached as a 
sociological discipline, but most studies of public relations come from a management 
or organisational discipline.  In their review of literature about European public 
relations Vercic, Van Ruler, Butschi and Flodin (2001) identify four prevailing 
definitions of public relations practice, the first three of which are managerial, 
operational and educational respectively.  While these three definitions are all 
situated within management theory, only the fourth definition views public relations 
in a societal context, and even this definition suggests that the role of PR is to help 
an organisation adjust its standards and values in accordance with the changing 
values in society.  PR is overwhelmingly defined as an instrument of commerce, and 
most commonly seen from a technical and functional perspective, placing focus on 
the production of communications as a tool to achieve organisational ends (Hutton 
1999; Baker 2002; Vercic et al 2001; Grunig and Grunig 1989; Botan and Taylor 
2004).  It is only within the last decade that a more cultural approach, exploring 
meaning-making as a purpose of public relations, has come to the fore. 
 
As a result, a review of the literature of public relations does not provide extensive 
sociological insight into the relationship between public relations practice, the 
political sphere and the media.  An alternative starting point is the ongoing debate 
about the inter-relationship between media and society where there is no shortage 
of literature to consider.  While none of the existing theories give due weight to the 
role of public relations, they provide a useful framework within which a study of 
public relations practice can be situated.  As the fieldwork described in Chapter 4 
demonstrates, the role of public relations practitioners is to negotiate and move 
between the journalistic field and the political field and, this thesis seeks to find a 
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place for them within existing theoretical frameworks.  As they do this, public 
relations practitioners seek to use the media to shape the reputation of institutions 
and influence public opinion and behaviour.  The role of public relations in 
conducting these processes and transactions is crucial to understanding the nature 
of the media’s influence. The nature of the transactions will depend on the 
institution concerned – transactions between the media and the military, for 
example, will operate differently from interactions between the media and religion.  
Here, the process of change that mediatisation facilitates may not be as profound or 
as linear as the theory may imply.    
 
PR logic 
With its focus on human interaction, rather than institutional or technological 
processes, the theory of mediatisation has the potential to accommodate the 
activities and interactions of public relations practitioners as a mechanism for helping 
to shape media narratives.  The concept of media logic opens the possibility of a 
parallel PR logic – which acts as a bridge between civil society, the state and the 
media, enabling the institutions that make up civil society to approach and 
communicate with the media on the media’s own terms.  PR logic assists the process 
of mediatisation, by enabling companies to accommodate the logic of the media 
without being subsumed by it.  This logic operates through the activity of the public 
relations practitioner who applies filters to potential media content before entering 
into the media space and negotiating directly with the journalist.  This practice of 
filtering can have a significant effect on the PR sponsor and the way in which it 
operates.  It is not a practice that occurs outside the sponsoring institution, but 
within it.  Thus the PR agent can change the way in which the PR sponsor operates, 
shaping their activity as well as their presentation of that activity in accordance with 
the logic of the media96. The power of the media to construct and perpetuate 
narratives justifies the need for such a practitioner: without the filters provided by 
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despite not having any responsibility or decision making authority about the award of the payments themselves.  
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public relations such content risks falling short of the demands of media logic.  This 
failure to conform with the demands of the media could apply to the nature of the 
content - not newsworthy enough - or the production of it. 
 
In fulfilling this role, the public relations agent is not replicating media logic but 
substituting for it.  While he or she has a role to play in filtering potential content 
according to the demands of media logic, they are also required to accommodate 
the logic of their sponsor organisation, and represent this in negotiations with the 
journalist.  The interaction is a negotiation whereby the practitioner is required to 
conform to the logic of the media while maintaining the meaning of the message 
from their sponsor.  If media logic is a particular way of seeing, covering and 
interpreting social, cultural, and political phenomena, then PR logic has the same 
definition but comes from a different perspective. 
 
Here, the nature of PR power comes to the fore.  As with media power, there is the 
potential to create narratives and to create normative values within institutions and 
society, and this may take place in conjunction with the media.  Such narratives will 
serve the purposes of the sponsor organisation or institution and may reduce the 
role of the media to one of disseminating information without testing or challenge to 
the validity or objectivity of that information97.  Even when the media exerts its own 
power through editorial independence and objectivity, the public relations agent has 
the potential to respond by controlling access to information or sources; or through 
the provision of information that is shaped or presented in certain ways.  This 
creates the possibility of a shift in the balance of power away from the media 
towards the PR sponsor.  But the daily, even hourly demands of the 24 hour news 
cycle creates a constant shift of power between journalist and PR agent: a cycle in 
which PR and media are mutually dependent on each other for the continual 
reformulation of content which makes news. 
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 Research by the Cardiff School of Journalism shows that 41% of news stories in four British broadsheets 
contained PR materials that played an agenda-setting role, or made up the bulk of the story (Lewis, Williams, 
Franklin et al 2006). 
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Within civil society there is the opportunity for public relations practitioners to be 
agents in the creation and dissemination of the codes that bind narratives together.  
Here, the PR agent works in collaboration with the media, helping provide the 
necessary content and experience the media needs each day and filtering it to meet 
the media’s demand for novelty and impact.   The filter is a form of PR logic that 
conforms with the logic of the media.  It may appear unfiltered to the final audience, 
but the journalist is a participant in the creation and use of such filters.  Newspapers 
and public relations practitioners can demonstrate flexibility here, bringing particular 
issues to the fore98.  Thus the media, and this thesis argues public relations 
practitioners too, allow public opinion to be organised responsively on a mass basis.  
Alexander (1981) describes this as collusion between a news reporter and his 
sources (1981:33), suggesting that the reporter must stretch into the socially 
unknown, establishing intimate and trustworthy contacts from whom he or she then 
withdraws in order to process and judge the information according to independent 
norms.  This thesis suggests that it is often the public relations practitioner who 
performs the 'stretch' - meeting the reporter on their own terms, offering such 
sources up, pre-prepared and filtered, for easy assimilation as content.  In this way 
a relationship of trust is played out, with both sides conforming to a similar logic: 
reporter and PR practitioner working together to achieve a mutually satisfactory 
outcome. 
 
The power of public relations also affects the sponsor organisation as they gradually 
shape and form their activities to meet the demands of the media.  In the interviews 
described in later chapters of this thesis, public relations practitioners describe their 
close working relationship with senior organisational leaders and the significance of 
their role on the Board of organisations, setting strategy and direction.  The growth 
in public relations over the last two decades reflects the increasing influence and 
significance of PR logic for the way in which organisations represent themselves to 
the media and in society.  Without PR logic, an organisation may be unable to 
conform to the logic of the media, thus restricting its ability to respond to the 
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demands of the media’s agenda and disabling it from being able to exert its own 
influence more broadly. 
 
Thus, PR logic applies to both the PR sponsor and to the media.  For the sponsor, it 
can require a re-engineering of their activity to provide media content filtered 
according to the media’s demands for news, and constructed in a way that is 
compatible with the media’s timing, technology and limitations on space and time.  
For the media, it may require an acceptance and tacit agreement of the perspective 
and positioning of the narrative provided by the public relations practitioner and the 
terms under which such information is provided – for example, on an off the record 
or background basis. 
 
Strömbäck and Dimitrova put forward four phases of the mediatisation of politics.  
This thesis argues that through PR logic, public relations can be part of the process 
of mediatisation.  As such, it proposes four equivalent phases of public relations’ 
contribution to mediatisation.  These phases do not supersede or replace the 
process of mediatisation, but contribute to it and reflect the complexity and multi-
dimensional nature of the relationship between media and state.  If, as described 
above, the four phases of mediatisation help to deconstruct the processes by which 
media power takes effect, adding four phases of public relations serves to add 
greater detail to this understanding of how mediatisation works, breaking down the 
linearity of the relationship. 
 
The first phase is the use of public relations within the political field as a channel of 
communication with the media. This recognises the centrality of the media to politics 
as a form of communication, and puts forward public relations as a mechanism for 
managing that communication for the benefit of both parties.  As is described in 
later chapters, PR practice is not uniformly utilized across the political field and this 
can make it harder for individuals and groups to establish themselves within the 
media and political environment. But for those at the centre of the field, seeking 
approval and engagement of citizens in order to secure and enhance their position, 
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public relations can provide the mechanisms and structures for communication 
through the media. 
 
The second phase is the utilisation of PR logic in bridging the divide between an 
independent media and other social and political institutions.  Without PR logic 
acting as a filter between them, political and media power would be in a continual 
state of confrontation.  This would render public relations practice powerless, 
continually subject to the whims of the media.  Instead, PR logic has the potential to 
reconcile media and political power by enabling both parties to benefit from 
information provision.  It does this by taking information originating from a sponsor 
organisation and shaping it in a way in which it can conform to the media’s 
demands.  PR logic is a means for a two way exchange of power, whereby the 
media’s demands become accommodated in the operational functions of the sponsor 
organisation. 
 
The third phase looks at the extent to which PR logic can exert control over the 
media through the provision of information or by controlling access to particular 
sources.  Research by the Cardiff School of Journalism (Lewis, Williams, Franklin, 
Thomas and Modsell 2006) which studied two weeks’ worth of news stories in five 
national newspapers99 and some broadcast news programmes suggests that such PR 
logic is effective.  The researchers concluded that the impact of public relations was 
much greater than they had assumed.  While they had expected to find an ‘agenda 
setting’ role for PR (2006:17), in fact they found that 41% of national newspaper 
articles studied had some evidence of public relations content within them.  Nearly 
one in five newspaper stories (19%) were verifiably wholly or mainly derived from 
PR material, while less than half of stories had no discernible trace of PR.  The 
research concluded that journalistic dependence on PR is shaping news stories and 
keeping more newsworthy items out of the news (2006:4).  Lewis et al suggest that 
pressures on news budgets are a significant factor in this increased dependence on 
ready-made news.  A report by the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communication found that in contrast to a proliferation in the number of ways to 
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access the news, there has not been a corresponding expansion in professional 
journalism.  Traditional sources of news dependent on original journalism - such as 
daily newspapers - are in decline with falling readership and advertising revenues 
while repackaged news, delivered via news aggregator sites such as Google, are 
proving increasingly popular.  Such sites do not invest in original reporting 
themselves but combine content generated by existing sources, including public 
relations practitioners100. This dependence on public relations has led to a shift in 
relationships between PR practitioners and the press.  Historically public relations 
practitioners and journalists have been cast in conflict, but exchanges between them 
now are increasingly being viewed on both sides as a transaction or exchange.    
 
The fourth and final phase of public relations looks at how the sponsor organisation 
changes its own practice and way of operating in order to conform to PR logic.  This 
might include changes to the way information is collated or presented, which in turn 
might change the way in which an organisation operates or functions.  One 
interviewee who took part in this study is a senior PR consultant working outside 
government.  He explained how within less than twelve months of working part-time 
for an organisation he had ended up with a speaking slot at the annual general 
meeting, making the case for the organisation to change its name. Although not 
formally on the Board, in doing this he had the full support of both the organisation’s 
chief executive and chair. The argument he put forward for the organisation 
changing its name stemmed partly from negative media coverage and partly from a 
consideration of the views of competitors within the organisation’s field of operation.  
He described the decisive factor in his recommendation as the prospect of being able 
to negotiate support from a government department for an additional and separate 
course of action, if the organisation changed its name.  He explained: ‘And it was 
clear to me that although overtly, the [government] Department could have no 
influence on this, I believed that in fact behind the scenes they could have an 
influence and that if the [name of the organisation] demonstrated its willingness to 
change its title, the Department could probably help to facilitate this other change’.  
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His intervention was successful and, directly as a result of his recommendation, the 
organisation voted to change its name and subsequently its branding.  Ultimately, 
the public relations practitioner drove through a change of name in order to enhance 
the organisation’s reputation and relationships with bodies more influential (and with 
greater economic resources) than itself.  His perspective on what was happening 
outside the organisation, in the journalistic and political spheres informed this, and 
he brought these influences back to the organisation, utilising PR logic to persuade 
member of a particular course of action. 
 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis provide the evidence, from fieldwork, to 
support this emerging theory of PR logic and power.  Alongside interviews with 
public relations practitioners working in the political field, the fieldwork includes the 
experiences of those representing Muslim groups, also operating within the political 
field.  These interviews, combined with the prevalence of particular media narratives 
about Islam and Muslims, demonstrate the absence of PR logic in the way Islam is 
being represented to the UK press.  The fact that this logic is not being utilised, the 
thesis suggests, may contribute towards the development of a more extensive 
rationale about why the media narrative about Islam is as it is and how it can be 
challenged or changed. 
 
As yet, PR logic and its potential has not been the subject of extensive scholarly 
consideration.  As the theories outlined in this chapter reveal, public relations seems 
to be a powerful but relatively invisible medium, overlooked by media and social 
studies, or viewed through a distorted lens of propaganda.  This thesis proposes that 
the role of PR be re-evaluated, not only within media studies but within wider 
theories of public communication and society.  To do so provides a richer and more 
in-depth understanding of the potential and limitations of media power and the way 




Chapter 3: Studying public relations through field theory: the 
methodology of this study 
Some of the broad sociological questions about the way narrative is constructed 
within the public sphere and the presentation and representation of particular 
groups, events or news stories have been discussed in the previous chapter.  The 
theoretical approaches of Habermas (1992), Alexander (2006), Jacobs (2000) and 
others provide different perspectives on the role of the print and broadcast news 
media, the way in which the media helps to construct particular narratives and 
discourses and how it transacts with different actors and institutions within society.  
The theory of mediatisation supports and develops these perspectives by examining 
the dynamics of power and influence involved in these processes and how they 
contribute to the changing and transformational impact that the media can have on 
other aspects of society. 
 
These are theories of media power and dominance and its capacity to shape or 
change narratives which go on to become common currency in society.  As 
theoretical approaches, they help to frame the social and cultural contexts in which 
such narratives are constructed, but do not explain the processes and interactions by 
which those narratives appear or how they might be challenged or changed.   While 
the previous chapter has painted a broad picture of the theoretical platform on 
which this work is built, this chapter on the methodology used for the research 
outlines work to fill the gaps in those theories.  It begins by detailing the gaps in 
current scholarship, outlines the route taken to filling them through the application 
of another theoretical approach – field theory, and in particular the use of field 
theory within the political field - and discusses the practical implementation of this 
through fieldwork. 
 
The current theory of mediatisation, described as the capacity of the media to effect 
change on other institutions, is expressed predominantly as a structural theory which 
seeks to explore how the media, as one institution, impacts on other social and 
 100 
 
cultural institutions101.  It provides an overarching perspective on the impact that 
different types of media can have upon society and how society can change to 
accommodate and absorb the media’s logic and ways of operating.  In doing so, it 
provides a macro understanding of the dynamics between media and society; it 
identifies the change that is effected by the media without examining the granular 
detail of the processes and interactions that enable this change to happen.  
Mediatisation theory alone cannot provide an adequate explanation for or a solution 
to the challenges of media coverage facing Muslim groups in the UK, challenges 
which are outlined in the first chapter.  It provides an effective theoretical 
framework through which to understand the dominance of particular media 
narratives, but it cannot be used to effect change.  Instead, an additional and more 
empirical approach is needed.  Such an approach needs to have the potential to 
understand the micro-processes of interactions and relationships between different 
communities and, most importantly, to understand the exchange of power between 
them.  In doing so, it will help to create the building blocks which, when joined 
together, contribute to theory of mediatisation and develop it.  It does this by 
helping break down the linear nature of mediatisation theory, by providing a more 
multi-dimensional perspective, which acknowledges the role of human agents and 
provides a more stratified understanding of power and its exchange. 
 
The previous chapter explores the relationship between mediatisation and public 
relations, concluding that the two are intertwined.  As the description of the history 
of public relations described in Chapter 4 demonstrates, public relations has grown 
alongside mediatisation – as the dominance of the media over other social 
institutions has demanded a response.  That response has been to develop a 
function which can manage the demands of the media and even exert control over 
them.  However, mediatisation is not an appropriate methodological approach for 
studying public relations.  The media’s impact comes from the institutional 
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production of symbolic patterns that create layers of meaning and identity within 
society at a cultural level.  These patterns are crucially important in constituting the 
very sense of society for those who are within the boundaries of society and those 
who are outside102.  While mediatisation theory helps to explain how the media uses 
those symbolic patterns for influence, and a study of the newsroom may explain the 
process by which such patterns are produced103, neither approach provides a 
comprehensive insight into the interactions, relationships and dynamics of power 
which helps to shape those patterns and confer them with meaning.   
 
Alexander (1981) suggests that in order to decode these symbolic patterns it is 
necessary to discover what particular kinds of evaluative judgements the news 
media produce and under what conditions they do so.  He argues that just as 
individuals continually try to organise their experience in terms of formulating 
different normative explanations, newspapers do this for society at large.  It is only 
by continually finding new, unfiltered and unforeseen societal experiences that the 
media can perform their normative function effectively.  In order to create news a 
journalist must stretch out into different, and possibly hitherto unknown fields.  Yet 
the mechanisms by which journalists do this are unchartered by mediatisation 
theory.  It is here that public relations practitioners have a role to play, by 
connecting journalists with the new, the novel and the newsworthy; filtered and 
presented in a way that conforms with the logic of the media.  The role of the PR 
practitioner is to provide the journalist with an expert guide to different and 
unknown fields and at the same time make them known, visible and accessible. 
 
Current debates relating to mediatisation traverse the gap between media and 
society in too big a leap, without providing the means for examining the transactions 
that enable the process of influence to happen.  Couldry’s (2008) observation, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, is that mediatisation theory assumes a ‘one size 
fits all’ model, whereby social institutions are subject to a process of change 
emanating from the media with journalists as the primary agents for enacting that 
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process.  This approach to mediatisation assumes that power rests predominantly 
with the media as an institution and that other cultural institutions are, to a greater 
or lesser degree, subsumed into this.  This power is expressed through media logic, 
whereby other social or cultural fields, such as politics, religion or language, begin to 
see and interpret social affairs and shape their response in a way that conforms with 
the operations and interpretations of the media. Yet the role of agents in enabling or 
facilitating this expression of power, and in particular the role of journalists as 
agents, remains largely undefined.104 Crucially for this study, the intermediary role of 
the public relations practitioner as a negotiator between journalists and the hitherto 
unknown fields has also been largely overlooked.   As such, what mediatisation 
needs, as Lundby (2009) suggests, is more empirical analysis to support it.   
 
The second gap in scholarship which this research aims to fill relates to the 
representation of Islam within the public sphere and, in particular, the media.  While 
this thesis uses discussions of the public sphere as a theoretical foundation, it is not 
intended to supplement or supplant those broader debates or analyses of public 
discourse.  Nor does it intend to approach a study of media power through a 
Habermassian lens105. Instead, as discussed in earlier chapters, it focuses on one 
particular narrative prevalent within the current public sphere, that which relates to 
Islam and Muslims and their engagement in the UK national political arena. 
The current literature about Islam and media, discussed in the first chapter, has so 
far failed to provide a convincing account of the processes by which media content 
about Islam is developed or shaped.  While national newspaper coverage about 
Islam has grown in volume over the last two decades and there is broad consensus 
that it is overwhelmingly negative, to date there is still no comprehensive rationale 
as to why this should be so.  Instead, much of the current literature creates a self-
fulfilling prophecy, relying on stereotypes about media coverage which places 
responsibility for the stereotypes on society at large, rather than examining the 
individual role of agents in its construction (Hafez 2009).   
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Much of the current literature begins its analysis by focusing on coverage of a 
particular media event – such as the Danish cartoons affair, the 7 July 2005 attacks 
on London, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, or a military 
conflict.  This means that the literature around Islam and media repeats the patterns 
it identifies within the press, associating Islam with terrorism, war and fanaticism.  
While these are the events that have brought the discussion of Islam and the public 
sphere to the fore, by starting with the end result – the media coverage – the results 
of any study are already skewed.  Instead, by studying the environments in which 
such coverage appears and the processes and transactions that lead to it, it will be 
possible to make more informed judgements about the coverage itself, and the 
reasons for it. 
 
Instead of a detailed discussion of the role of the public sphere in the media’s 
coverage of Islam in the UK, the current debate has rested largely on an assumption 
that the media is autonomous, generating particular types of coverage as a result of 
its own perspectives and bias.  A different argument suggests that the media are 
‘done to’ as a result of propaganda generated by governments preoccupied by 
security or military concerns. (For a discussion about the use of propaganda during 
the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, see Brittain 1991; Fialka 1991; Bennett and Paletz 
1994; Chrisco 1995; Arnett 1991; Collins and Glover 2002; Gunter, Russell, Withey 
and Nicholas 2003).  Familiar themes such as Orientalism or the clash of civilisations 
– outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis - have been used to contextualise certain types 
of media coverage.  While these theories interpret media content through a 
particular lens and within a particular historical or political context, they fail to 
explore the processes or interactions from which particular narratives emerge.  It is 
indisputable that such themes predominate within current media reporting but a 
more rounded analysis would provide greater insight about how and why they 
appear.  
 
The prevalence of journalism studies as a starting point for discussion of Islam and 
media means that the focus emphasizes the final printed or broadcast piece and the 
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audience reaction rather than the source material and how this information reaches 
the journalist.  As such, the role of public relations practice in communicating and 
disseminating messages pertinent to Islam and Muslims in the UK has not yet been 
explored in the literature.  How the media receive or generate the imagery and 
messages they currently convey is not adequately answered by the current 
literature.  Nor is there any understanding of how the demands or logic of the media 
feed back to the sources of those messages, and the impact therefrom. 
This is where this research can contribute to ongoing scholarship.  Studying the 
construction of public relations messages, the environments within which they are 
framed and developed and the logic that they work to, provides a fuller rationale 
about how such media coverage relating to Muslims or Islam appears in the UK.  In 
particular, by exploring the role of public relations agents in intervening in the 
dynamic between the media and society, this research offers insight about why such 
coverage is as it is, and the potential for it to be changed.  Furthermore, by 
providing empirical evidence of the relationship between Islam and public relations, 
this research aims to be able to add a new and previously unexplored dimension to 
the current literature. 
 
The research focuses on both public relations and the representation of Muslim 
groups within the UK political sphere.  While Islam and public relations both operate 
within numerous other social arenas, the political context was chosen because of the 
politicization of Islam and Muslims through the media.  As has been described in 
previous chapters, the media’s association of Islam in the UK with political issues, 
such as asylum, benefits and security, and the politicization of religious 
characteristics – such as the veil or arranged marriage – means that the political 
sphere is likely to be the most revealing for the purposes of this research.  In 
particular, the research focuses on the public relations activity around the launch of 
the current government’s Prevent strategy.  This strategy and its consequences were 
a recurring theme in fieldwork with representatives of Muslim groups and firmly 
places Islam and Muslims within the UK political field.  It has also been subject to 




The fieldwork also includes interviews with public relations practitioners, many of 
whom are working or have recently worked within Parliament or for government 
bodies.  Several interviewees work at the heart of government as senior practitioners 
leading the public relations function for central government departments. These 
interviews provide compelling insight into the relationship between politics, PR and 
the media.   
 
The research questions 
A series of research questions were developed which initially focused on the use of 
public relations by Muslim groups and organisations in the UK.   These questions 
were then broadened to encompass a more general understanding of public 
relations practice within the political field.  This examination of public relations 
practice was approached from a sociological, rather than an organisational or media 
studies perspective, seeking to understand public relations as a social and relational 
activity.  To do this, the research examined the nature and strength of power that 
public relations practitioners bring and utilize by focusing on the relationships and 
interactions they have with other agents, both within and external to their sponsor 
organisations.  To achieve this, fieldwork with public relations practitioners focused 
on how they see themselves and the skills and experience they bring to their roles.  
These questions relating to public relations practice were focused in particular on 
public relations within the political field.  This was to garner an in-depth 
understanding of this type of public relations practice, and the factors which make it 
successful.  While the questions were structured around the relational nature of PR 
practice, the questions did not explicitly seek to explore practitioners’ relationships 
with journalists.  Instead, questions sought to elicit a greater understanding of public 
relations practitioners’ interactions and encounters with others within their field of 
operation – including those agents in positions of greater power and influence.  The 
final questions focus on the use of public relations practice by agents responsible for 
undertaking PR on behalf of Muslim groups and organisations.  These questions 
were honed down further as the research continued in response to the emerging 
findings which demonstrated that the circumstances of practice were not directly 
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comparable.  Thus, those responsible for public relations practice for Muslim groups 
had a different understanding of what public relations practice meant.  As a result, 
questions became more focused on their experience within the political field and 
how far public relations practice is understood and being utilized by these groups.   
 
The final research questions were: 
 
 What is public relations?  How is it defined and what role does it 
play?  These questions draw on existing scholarship, which looks at public 
relations from organisational or management perspectives. The different 
definitions of public relations were elicited through both desk research and 
fieldwork.  Each of the public relations practitioners interviewed was asked to 
define their role and the position that they saw themselves holding within the 
organisation. 
 What is the nature of PR practice in the UK political field?  How are 
PR practitioners positioned within this field and what sources and 
level of capital do they have access to?  With a focus on the political 
field, these questions seek to establish the use of public relations within and 
by central government.  For the purposes of this research, public relations 
within the UK political field is defined narrowly - and even geographically - to 
the activity which takes place within Westminster and in connection with 
Parliament and the central government departments that are located there.  
The questions ask about the purpose of public relations within the political 
field and seek to understand the balance of work it encompasses, including 
the provision of public information, the management of news stories and 
political positioning: managing the reputation of political parties or 
government departments and their agencies. 
 How do PR practitioners within the political field relate to other 
agents in their own field, and agents in other fields?  What tensions 
exist between the capital that PR practitioners possess and others in 
the field?  These questions open up the perspective of public relations as a 
social field and network of relationships.  In order to answer this question, 
 107 
 
interviewees were asked about the different types of capital – including 
professional and educational qualifications and career experience – they 
possess.  They were also asked about their networks and the types of capital, 
or power, which they receive as a result of the contacts and relationships they 
have, both within their sponsor organisation and externally.   This approach 
seeks to elicit how public relations agents are positioned within their sphere of 
operation, and in particular what their role and their skills contributes which 
cannot be found elsewhere.   
 What influence do PR practitioners and PR practice have on the 
institutions they represent?  How does this influence work and what 
impact does it have?  These questions set out to understand the two way 
nature of relationships that public relations practitioners hold and the flow of 
power and capital within those relationships.  While earlier questions 
examined the position of public relations practitioners vis à vis others in the 
field, these questions focus on the logic of their work and the processes of 
change and transition that it can effect. 
 How are those practitioners who undertake public relations for 
Muslim groups located within the UK political field?  What sources 
and level of capital do they have access to?  These questions focus in 
particular on those representing or working on behalf of Muslim groups within 
the political field.  As these groups may not be well embedded within the 
political field, it begins by asking how the practitioners are positioned in 
relation to other agents, as well as what power that have access to more 
generally within the field.  This is not intended to be a comparison between 
between those undertaking public relations for Muslim organisations and 
other PR agents, but to understand their relative positions in the field. 
 To what extent do Muslim groups use public relations practice in 
order to compete or change their position within the political field?  
Having established how PR logic can support public relations practitioners, 
this question seeks to understand how far PR agents working for Muslim 
groups utilise this practice for their own benefit, or for the benefit of the 
groups they represent.  This question evolved during the course of the 
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fieldwork as it became apparent that understanding of PR practice varied 
considerably among these groups and the practitioners who worked on their 
behalf. 
 
Answering these questions requires an understanding of process and practice, 
interaction and relationships that Habermassian and mediatisation theories do not 
satisfactorily provide.  Most critically, it requires an explanation of the motivation and 
role of agents and a perspective which interprets broad, structural theories from the 
perspective of the actions of individuals.  This demands a theoretical model which 
enables an analysis of the relationships and interactions through which power is 
exchanged.  To achieve all this, I have chosen to utilise the field theory first 
espoused by the French philosopher Pierre Bourdieu.  
 
Bourdieu was born in 1930 in a rural area of southwestern France. Initially a student 
of philosophy, his focus shifted to social sciences after he was drafted into the 
French army and sent to Algeria at the height of its war of liberation (1956-1962).  
He took up a post as lecturer in the faculty of Algiers and sought to understand the 
clash between the Algerian people and French colonialism by studying the economic 
and social structures of the indigenous peoples, and in particular the Kabyles and 
the Berbers.  In so doing, he became an observer of large-scale social change and 
the organisation of social practices and how the material and symbolic combined to 
establish hierarchies within the society.  He identified the notion of ‘playing the 
game’, or undertaking the correct action in order to succeed as he witnessed the 
struggles of peasants from the villages to adapt to the games of the city (Calhoun 
2006).  This observation pertaining to the rules of the game in different social 
environments and, in particular, the ability of different agents to compete depending 
on their experience and position within that sphere, and the types of capital – 
economic, cultural, social or symbolic – which they have access to provides the 




About field theory 
Field theory provides an investigative framework for this research which helps 
understand the mechanics and movement of power between agents engaged in the 
media, in public relations practice and the sponsor organisations or groups which 
they represent.  This chapter describes how field theory has been applied to answer 
the research questions listed above and to support and develop the theory of 
mediatisation in the context of this research.  It explains how field theory has been 
used to structure fieldwork among public relations agents working within the political 
field and among those undertaking public relations for Muslim groups operating 
within that field.  It goes on to explain how the results of that fieldwork can 
contribute to the larger structural and institutional questions that mediatisation 
poses. 
 
Field theory views society as a number of structured spaces, known as fields, with 
their own rules and laws of functioning.  Bourdieu (1993) describes a field as a social 
universe (e.g. politics, economics, education or journalism), usually forgotten or 
ignored, in which social agents exist, as well as the institutions which support them.  
Fields are semi-autonomous from the wider social space and it is the connection and 
struggle between fields, and between the individual agents within fields, that 
influence dynamics of power and change within society.  The study of a field 
involves an examination of the relationships within the field, both between individual 
agents and between agents and the structures that exist within the field.  Couldry 
(2011) describes the benefits and flexibility of field theory in helping to identify the 
nature and order of what individual agents do.   
 
In his study of the literary field, Bourdieu (1993) observes that the field glorifies 
great individuals but that this can be at the expense of understanding the structural 
relations between social positions that are occupied and manipulated within the field. 
To explore the literary field it is not enough to identify great writers, there needs to 
be an examination of their positions within the field and in relationship to each 
other, and the way in which these positions impact on how their literature is 
 110 
 
perceived by the wider reading public.  In this, Bourdieu posits that a literary giant’s 
kudos and reputation stems from their situation in relationship to other writers as 
well as from the distinctiveness of their work.  This insight is of particular pertinence 
when looking at the position of those undertaking public relations practitioners for 
Muslim groups in the UK.  The understanding which field theory yields about the 
literary giant and the other writers is not a comparative one.  Instead, understanding 
the positioning of the individual writers within the field sheds light on the resources, 
status and power which the other writers possess.  Agents within a field – be they 
writers or public relations practitioners – are connected through their collective 
endeavours within the field and the competition which results between them.  This 
competition may not be explicit but instead takes the form of a continuous 
movement within the field, with those nearer the centre having greater access to the 
power and influence that the field possesses. 
 
Relationships within and between fields are based on power and the struggle for 
power and are central to how fields function.  Fields are arenas in which individuals 
and organisations compete, consciously and unconsciously, to increase the power 
they possess.  As a result, some individuals within a field will dominate and others 
will be dominated.  The occupants of different positions have strategies to help them 
defend or improve their positions: strategies which depend for force and form on the 
position each agent occupies in the power relations (Bourdieu 2003). This means the 
field is continually changing and this change is driven by and impacts on the 
positions of individual agents with the field.  Those agents less dominant within the 
field, or at the margins of it, are more likely to struggle as a result of that change, 
which tends to be driven by powerful new entrants or the actions of those closer to 
the centre of the field. 
 
The actions and reactions of agents within a field are dictated by the rules and 
forces specific to that field, including the capital, or sources of power, within the 
field.  There are three types of capital: economic, cultural and social (Bourdieu 1986) 
and the rules of how the field functions legitimise the capital and establish the 
different types of value capital has.  The specific form of economic and cultural 
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capital within each field varies, economic capital is money or assets that can be 
turned into money.  Cultural capital is embodied in individuals as well as available 
through cultural goods such as books, instruments or pictures and, institutionally, 
through educational qualifications (1986:47).  Social capital – defined by Bourdieu as 
‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition.’ (1986:51) - is borne out of the resources available to 
an individual as a result of their networks and relationships and the attributes they 
bring which enable these to succeed.  As a result, the amount of capital agents 
possess will determine their position in the field and the strategies they use to 
function. An agent with increased amounts of capital will be positioned strongly and 
centrally within the field, while an agent with less capital will be peripheral within the 
field.   The possession of capital enables agents to adapt to changes within the field 
– for example, within the political field an agent possessing a high degree of social 
capital is more likely to be insulated from the impact of a change of government 
following a general election than one who has less effective networks on which to 
rely.  The political field is structured around social capital meaning that an agent’s 
contacts and relationships are as likely to be as or even more helpful in securing 
their position than any qualifications they may possess. 
 
This research into public relations practice is situated with the political field, the 
arena where political parties and politicians compete for the attention and approval, 
and the right to speak on behalf of citizens who are situated outside of the field. Like 
other fields, it is a field of struggles, but it is also a field of forces; it aims to change 
itself – and the world around it – from within.  Words uttered within the political field 
have the weight of a manifesto for action or change as agents within the political 
field are seeking to persuade others of the legitimacy of their vision; it is the 
ultimate site of power where the symbolic character of power itself is at stake.  It is 
the competition between agents within the field which creates the policies, concepts 




Bourdieu’s mapping of the political field forms a central tenet of his sociological 
approach.  Bourdieu’s sociology is inherently political, developed in close connection 
with political events during his time in Algeria (Wacquant 2005). He charts the 
development of the political field as it emerges through transition, from the 
household of the king, where power is situated within the identities of a few 
individuals, into a field of forces and struggles oriented towards the monopoly of the 
legitimate manipulation of public goods (2005).  As the field emerges, power is 
diffused and differentiated, no longer held as hereditary power within a single 
dynasty but spread among different roles and forces within the state.  As the field of 
power develops, it is linked to education, competence and merit – highlighting the 
emerging importance of cultural capital above the riches and the wealth held 
centrally in the household of the king.  A properly political order is conceived and 
grows with its own laws, logic, values and language.  The political field becomes 
public, rather than private, and a bureaucracy develops which of itself becomes a 
relatively autonomous administrative field, independent of politics and the economy, 
obeying the specific logic of the public.   
 
Unlike the household of the king, the political field is not a monolith with a single 
source of capital; instead it is made up of a series of linked institutions which use 
their capital to wield their own particular type of power (Bourdieu 1994).  This 
differentiation of power is important because each of those institutions contributes 
to the capacity of the field to dominate those outside the field. Their contributions 
are the tactics of politics – including opinion polls, campaigning and public relations 
– which are conducted from within the field in order to shift and sway the opinions 
of those outside of the field.  It is only through an understanding of how these 
tactics work, and the power that underpins them, that the power within the political 
field can be fully understood106. 
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 In his study on the social uses of and reactions to public opinion polls, Champagne (Wacquant 2005) identifies 
polls as one of the techniques used by politicians to garner the support of audiences.  Champagne argues that 
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methodology of opinion polling may not always be statistically robust (because, as Field (2007) observes, of a 
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this sense, it is the political reading of opinion polls that is seen as most important, rather than their technical 
analysis.  Champagne comments that these types of surveys allow journalists to intervene directly in the political 




The political field is very powerful: with high levels of all types of capital - economic, 
social and cultural.  As individuals, politicians possess both personal and professional 
capital.  Their personal capital comes from the recognition they achieve, while their 
professional capital is based on the resources they have available to mobilise support 
from others within and outside the field. 
 
At its heart, the political field is imbued with symbolic power – or capital – which 
transcends and encompasses the personal and professional power that politicians 
hold.  Couldry (2003) distinguishes between the symbolic power that Bourdieu 
ascribes to the state and the field of power, the social space occupied by the elite 
(Bourdieu 1993:43) which Couldry defines as politicians, civil servants and those 
passing through the public school system (2003:6).   Symbolic power is the capacity 
to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and to create 
events by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms (Thompson 
1995).  It is a power which serves to construct reality and one which tends to 
establish the immediate meaning of the world.  Symbolic capital creates the power 
of political words and slogans – a belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who 
utter them.  It is not the words alone which carry symbolic power, rather is it the 
recognition and belief held by those who hear and respond to the words and slogans 
that creates symbolic power.  
 
Symbolic power is a power which the submissive person grants to the person who 
exercises it because the person who submits to it believes that it exists. It is founded 
on the belief or recognition by which agents confer on a person the very powers that 
they recognize in him or her. It is a power that can be exercised only if it is 
recognised – that is, misrecognised as arbitrary (Couldry 2003).  This type of power 
is endowed with legitimacy – and presupposes active complicity on the part of those 
exposed to it.  The free flowing nature of political capital is based on belief and 
credibility. It is because politicians are dependent on the credit accorded to them by 
                                                                                                                                      




non-professionals that they are especially vulnerable to suspicion and scandal: 
precisely because their power is symbolic they must constantly nourish and sustain 
it. This can only be maintained by avoiding that which might discredit those which 
hold it, such as inconsistency, untruth or scandal.    
 
The power and capital within the political field grants it a considerable degree of 
autonomy but it is not completely independent of other fields and forces.  In order 
for the different institutions – and agents within them – to succeed and serve their 
purpose, they must appeal to groups situated outside the field.  It is the necessity of 
these relationships – which, as discussed in the previous chapter, can include the 
demands and logic of the news media - which place constraints in the production of 
political discourse.  These relationships are with agents, groups and institutions 
operating to a different logic and understanding, with different experience, social, 
cultural and economic capital.   Thus, when the political field reaches out to the 
journalistic field to convey its vision for action and change to citizens, it needs to 
understand and conform to journalistic logic in order for its messages to be received 
and disseminated.  For those working within the political field, this appeal must be 
continuous as politicians are continually dependent on the approval and credit of 
those outside the field in order to maintain their own status within the political field.     
 
The outcome of these internal struggles depends on the power that the agents and 
institutions involved in this struggle can mobilize from outside the field. Here, the 
role of public relations practitioners comes to the fore. As the fieldwork among public 
relations practitioners outlined below demonstrates, PR practitioners are endowed 
with symbolic power by their sponsor organisations. Contained within this symbolic 
power is the belief that public relations practitioners can manage relationships with 
the media and exert control over them.  Their relationships, both within the political 
field and outside it, enable them to access and utilise power which gives them the 
capacity to intervene.  Through this intervention they are able to do what other 
agents within the political field cannot: shape, produce and convey messages which 
conform with media logic and result in media coverage.  Thus the strategies of the 
public relations practitioners converge with the strategies of the media. 
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Bourdieu (1994:179) describes politics as a game and nothing is demanded more 
absolutely by the political game than the fundamental adherence to the game itself.  
The political field is pointless and inaccessible to the majority of people who do not 
play the game and do not understand the compulsion to do so.  It is the feel for the 
game which enables politicians to predict the stances of other politicians and what 
makes them predictable, ready to play the role assigned to them. 
 
Speech is an important expression of symbolic power, dependent on the recognition 
and reaction of those outside the field.  As Bourdieu explains, ideas only become a 
political movement when they are recognised outside the circle of those that 
developed them (1994:189).  A significant part of the output of the political field is 
speech: slogans, soundbites, promises and pledges, intended to build up credibility 
in the eyes of those on the receiving end.  These types of speech are imbued with 
symbolic power – representing the power to change laws and policies and to make a 
difference to ordinary people’s lives.  Yet, despite the potency of speech, politicians 
have, to some degree, conferred responsibility for this symbolic power onto public 
relations practitioners acting on their behalf.  This then is the role of the public 
relations practitioner within the political field – to preserve the belief and credibility 
placed on the professional politician and to avoid that which might discredit him or 
her – scandal107.  The public relations practitioner also has the task of mobilising 
support from outside the political field – through different means, most obviously for 
the purposes of this research, through the media.  The role of the public relations 
practitioner is to build belief in the legitimacy of the political party or government 
that they represent.  In this, PR practitioners benefit from political capital, although 
they are rarely visible holders of it themselves. They also work within structures – 
which allow them to organise and campaign to encourage support and belief, as well 
as dispositions of loyalty, or credibility. 
 
This conferred capital provides public relations practitioners with the authority to act, 
or even speak, on behalf of the politicians they represent.  Bourdieu writes of the 
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 There are different types of public relations agents operating within the political field.  Those working for 
political parties have responsibility for promoting their party policies and reputation.  Those employed as civil 
servants are bound to be politically independent. 
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authorized speech of the spokesperson, stating that an authorized spokesperson can 
display the force from which he derives his authority by calling on the group to 
mobilize and by effectively mobilizing it, thus leading it to manifest itself (1994:107). 
The way in which the group is represented – via giving it a name, a logo or 
descriptors – accords power to the public relations practitioner that is derived 
directly from the group – what Bourdieu calls a misrecognized ‘circular circulation of 
recognition’ which is at the root of the capital and symbolic power that the 
mandated agent holds over the group (Wacquant 2005:61) This dual role of looking 
out from the group and back to it is something which is characteristic of the power 
of public relations practitioners and is discussed further below.  Bourdieu does not 
define who spokespeople are; they may be professional politicians or inexperienced 
amateurs or anything in between. 
 
Couldry (2003) identifies a growing symbiosis between symbolic capital and the 
media, suggesting that the increasing influence of the media over what counts as 
symbolic capital will lead to the increasing convertibility of symbolic capital derived 
mainly or exclusively from media exposure or access across social space as a whole. 
In this, Couldry reflects Bourdieu’s assertion of the dominance of the journalistic 
field.  Bourdieu (1998) describes how the journalistic field exerts an increasingly 
powerful hold on other fields.  This is not a result of the power that journalists hold 
as individuals, but is the result of the relationships between the journalistic field and 
other fields.  The journalistic field increasingly imposes its constraints on all other 
fields, particularly the fields of cultural production, such as social sciences and 
politics.  In doing so, the journalistic field does not necessarily reinforce the power of 
the status quo, but under certain conditions it may actually transform power 
relations in other fields.  
 
The power of the journalistic field does not mean it operates without constraints.  
Bourdieu suggests that as the journalistic field increasingly becomes subject to the 
constraints of the economy and politics; it imposes its constraints on all other fields 
more and more, thus strengthening the impact of external forces in each of those 
other fields (Bourdieu quoted in Benson et al 2005: 31).  Some of the constraints on 
 117 
 
the journalistic field are economic, such as the need to produce content which will 
serve to maintain or increase circulation and advertising revenues.  Other constraints 
are political, such as the state setting limits on access to or publication of certain 
kinds of information or opinion.  The journalist’s position is a powerful one in its 
effects, but at the same time, his or her operation is strongly dominated and 
controlled by other fields, especially the economic and the political.  
 
Couldry (2011) describes one of the benefits of field theory as providing a useful 
understanding of the media’s role in the relations between, and operations within, 
specific fields of social competition.  The relationship between the journalistic field 
and the political field is fundamental: enabling the journalistic field to produce a 
particular vision of that discourse which is imposed upon the public.  This 
relationship places the journalistic field as part of the field of power; that is, it tends 
to engage first and foremost with those agents, such as politicians, who possess 
high volumes of capital.  Bourdieu (Benson et al 2005) argues that such constraints 
work both ways - while politicians dictate conditions and rules of access and 
designate certain events and issues as important by providing an arena for them, 
journalists can and do take this material while deciding whether something is 
interesting enough to cover and then how to craft it into a coherent narrative.  
Sources may make themselves available but sources cannot make news unless and 
until they conform with the news criteria of the journalistic field.  Similarly, the state 
can be enabling as well as restrictive, for example when it enables the media to exist 
or thrive indirectly  by means of technology or distribution networks, or directly, 
such as via the provision of licences to broadcast or financial aid.   
 
The centrality of the journalistic field within field theory is significant for this 
research, but the perspective that field theory offers - of boundaried social spaces in 
which hierarchies of power and capital prevail – applies across society.  For example, 
Anheier et al (1995) used field theory to study the hierarchy and relative social 
status of fiction writers in Cologne, while Sallaz (2006) used field theory to conduct a 
comparative study of the gambling industry in South Africa and California.   Warde’s 
study (2004) locates the practice of eating out within the culinary field while Skille 
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(2007) plots the changing landscape of sport in Norway using field theory.  And as 
has already been discussed, Uitermark and Gielen (2010) use field theory to explore 
the mediatisation of politics through conflict between Muslim groups and local 
government in Amsterdam. 
  
In particular, Anehier et al’s work (1995) illustrates the way in which access to 
capital can be used to position agents individually and collectively within a field.  In 
questionnaires and interviews Anehier et al asked writers about their knowledge of 
other writers and their work, their social and professional contacts with others, and 
their membership of different writing organisations.  From the results, they were 
able to map a network of social capital made up of an ‘elite’ and a ‘periphery’ of 
writers within the field, linked to economic capital (represented by income).  They 
concluded that his study shows strong support for Bourdieu’s hypothesis that actors 
are distributed in social space both by the overall volume and relative composition of 
capital.   
 
Champagne and Marchetti’s (2005) work presents an alternative perspective on field 
theory.  Their case study of a public scandal in France, about young haemophiliacs 
being given blood infected with HIV, uses field theory to illustrate how changes to 
agents in one field can have a lasting impact on other fields and on society more 
widely.   They present the case for changes in the journalistic field, including the 
retirement of long-standing medical journalists and arrival of generalists writing 
about medicine, leading to a new economy of medical information based on the 
misunderstanding of science.  The result was the construction of a public scandal 
about young haemophiliacs being given blood contaminated with HIV which included 
a misrepresentation of the debate. The new entrants in the journalistic field – the 
generalists - were unable to discern what information was scientifically accurate and 
what was not, reporting misinformation as fact, creating a scandal. 
 
This use of field theory is particularly pertinent to this research. Not only does it 
focus on the construction of a media narrative, but it illustrates how the actions of 
agents can intertwine to influence changes within more than one field.  Champagne 
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and Marchetti’s study points out that it was not just the journalistic field which 
changed as a result of structural developments and new entrants, but the medical 
field changed too.  The changing capital within the journalistic field became 
dominant within medicine, undermining the practice of medical research according 
to purely scientific principles.   
 
As described above, a field is a relatively autonomous structured domain or space 
which has been socially instituted and, as a result, it needs to have a definable but 
contingent history of development.  Bourdieu and Waquant (1992) set out a model 
for identifying a field which involves first, sketching the development of the field 
through its history; second, identifying the relations between the actors struggling 
for specific capital within the field; and finally analysing the structure and change of 
the field.  This is the approach taken by Sallaz (2006), who begins his comparative 
study of the gambling industry in South Africa and California by recounting the 
history of gambling legislation in each region, using Parliamentary debates, 
legislative histories, government reports and what he describes as ‘media 
propaganda’ (2006:32).  As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, defining the 
nature of a field through its history is one of the ways field theory has been applied 
within the context of this research. 
 
The nature of capital within a field helps define its characteristics and the 
dispositions of the agents within it. To enter a field, agents must have particular 
knowledge and skills required to act within the field108.  Those entering the field for 
the first time can only establish themselves by marking their difference from those 
already operating within the field. The arrival of new agents can serve either to 
transform or conserve the practices of the field, and the struggle is for the power to 
impose the dominant vision of the field.  Yet these struggles are always based on 
the fact that even agents in competition with each other accept a certain number of 
presuppositions that are fundamental to the very functioning of the field.    
These characteristics of a field mean that the actions of individual agents are, in 
themselves, pre-constrained by structure.  The hypothesis of this is expressed 
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 This is the second stage of a definition of a field, as defined by Bourdieu and Wacquant  (1992) . 
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through Bourdieu’s theory of habitus109 - or ‘durable, transposable dispositions’ 
(1990:53) - which constrains and enables the actions and choices of individual 
agents. Habitus is fundamental to the ways in which society shapes individual 
actions (and vice versa) and assumes that individuals’ predispositions, assumptions, 
judgments and behaviours are the result of a long term process of socialisation, for 
example in the family or through education. Any explanation of attitudes, discourses 
and behaviour of agents must draw on an analysis of both structural position within 
the field and the habitus by which an agent arrived at that position.  It is the 
encounter between the habitus of the agent and the characteristics of the field 
which determines the nature of practice within the field.  As the fieldwork reveals, it 
is the particular form of habitus that public relations practitioners bring to a field 
heavily loaded with cultural and social capital that determines the highly relational 
nature of their work and the exchange of power through those relationships. 
 
In his study of ongoing change within the Norwegian sporting field, Skille (2007) 
explores the habitus within that field, describing the competitiveness that exists 
within and between individual sports and the power of sporting organisations.  As 
well as the desire to win among individual athletes and their teams, this capital is 
also defined by the way in which sports compete for funding and the profile that can 
be granted by the sports’ governing bodies in Norway.  Skille identifies 
snowboarding as a new entrant to the sporting field and explains how it is 
challenging the field’s current conventions.  Snowboarding, he explains, was 
developed by ‘unorganised adolescents’ and, with an emphasis on experience rather 
than competition, it presents a heterodoxy compared to the established sporting 
field (2007:111). Its entrance into the sporting field exposes it to the influence of 
sporting capital, and the potential for it to change and conform to the field’s 
conventions of competitiveness, desire for funding and profile. 
 
Like the theory of mediatisation, Bourdieu’s field theory includes a central premise 
about the dominance of the media.  Field theory’s assertion of the dominance of the 
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 Bourdieu (2007) also describes habitus as ‘a structuring structure, which organises practices and the 
perception of practices’ (2007:170). 
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journalistic field echoes the changing influence of the media and the wider social and 
political consequences of the media process that is central to the theory of 
mediatisation.  Through mediatisation other social or cultural fields are subsumed to 
some extent into the logic of the media and may even assume media form.   
Bourdieu’s description of the interaction between the political and journalistic fields 
is an example of this logic: the political field needs to create ‘news’ that conforms 
with the demands of the journalistic field.  If the political field fails to do this in the 
right way, or to provide the right elements for the narrative, the ‘news’ may be 
ignored or may be reported in a manner that is undesirable to the political 
instigators. 
 
In contrast to mediatisation’s structural and institutional approaches for examining 
this logic, field theory opens up a new unit of analysis for media research – an 
examination of the roles of individual agents and media organisations within the 
journalistic field as well as their influence as a collective whole.  In particular, field 
theory assigns levels of capital or power to individual agents within fields and, as 
such, field theory offers the potential to supplement mediatisation rather than 
supplant it.   
 
The relationship between field theory and mediatisation has already been explored 
(Couldry 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011; Benson 2005; Hjarvard 2009; Uitermark and 
Gielen 2010).  Couldry (2011) argues that the mediatisation debate rests entirely on 
the basis that it looks for an understanding of ‘media power’ where it cannot be 
found – at the level of society as a whole rather than in the specific operations of 
the media field and its interrelations with other fields.  In contrast, field theory looks 
at the micro-processes by which power is obtained and utilised.  As a result, there is 
a risk of a stand-off between field theory and mediatisation debates.  As Couldry 
observes the former never refers to the latter and the latter rarely refers to the 
former (2011:3).  In attempting to align the two theories, Couldry describes the 
influence of the media as a form of meta-capital through which dominance is 
exercised over other forms of power (Couldry 2004). This meta-capital, he suggests, 
might work in two ways: by influencing what counts as capital in each field and by 
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legitimising representations of the social world that may be adopted or taken up by 
any field.  This second type of influence introduces the media’s agenda setting role 
across many specific areas of life and the media’s role as the frame within which the 
generality of social issues get expressed and settled. 
 
Couldry (2003) observes that one limitation in Bourdieu’s field theory is that by itself 
it has no way of accounting for how representations made by actors in one field can 
influence the actions and thoughts of agents in another field.  Couldry cites 
Champagne (2003:9) stating that he attempts to harness the question of media 
influence on non-media agents back into field theory by claiming that people’s ability 
to work with the media somehow reflects a mysterious interrelationship between the 
workings of the media field and the workings of the quite different fields in which 
those actors are players.  Champagne introduces the notion of a new specific type of 
capital – ‘media capital’ – to capture people’s relative ability to influence journalistic 
events based on the capital they have already acquired elsewhere. But there is only 
the briefest explanation of this new term, even though it implies an effect of capital 
acquired for use in one field on actions in another that field theory cannot easily 
encompass (2003:662). 
 
Champagne’s empirical point is that people, through their sense of what 
performances, or images, work in the media and their own capacity to deliver them, 
are increasingly drawn into, and influenced by, the specific constraints of the 
journalistic field.  What is needed, however, to provide some theoretical coherence, 
is a model that allows for the fact that one field (media field) can influence the 
workings of another (the political field), and which shows the mechanisms through 
which that influence can occur. It is interesting that even one of the most 
sophisticated recent exponents of Bourdieu’s field theory for media analysis, Benson, 
is also drawn to a similar problem when he claims that journalism is a ‘crucial 
mediator among all fields’ (1999: 471) but, no more than Champagne or Bourdieu, 




While power is central to the relational nature of field theory, and despite Couldry’s 
description of media meta-capital, the role of power within mediatisation is less 
clearly defined.  As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Krotz (2009) 
describes mediatisation as the long term process of changing social institutions and 
modes of interactions in culture and society due to the growing importance of media 
in all strands of society, while Hjarvard (2009) posits that mediatisation involves an 
extension, substitution, amalgamation and accommodation of face to face 
encounters with mediated encounters.  Both definitions may involve the exertion of 
power, but I would suggest that it would be premature to assume that the nature of 
the influence is the same as expressed in field theory.  Mediatisation provides an 
overarching rationale for the change and impact that the power of the media can 
have on society, rather than a rationale for power itself.  While field theory’s 
understanding of power stems from its study of the relationships between agents 
within a field, there is little place for agents within mediatisation theory, which relies 
on the interplay of institutions.  As such, it would be overreaching to attempt to 
explain the structural influence that mediatisation describes by assuming that this is 
solely brought about by transferring or magnifying the power of the journalistic field.   
Similarly, the reciprocal power exerted over the journalistic field by economic and 
political capital is a key tenet of the relational aspect of field theory.  This type of 
constraint, and the impact it has on media, is not so evident within the theory of 
mediatisation.  Mediatisation explores the changing impact of external forces, and 
technology in particular, on media, but this is presented as an enabling force, rather 
than a restricting one.  Alexander (1981) presents a challenge to mediatisation here, 
arguing that because of its very flexibility the news media cannot be a self-conscious 
organiser of norms in the way that institutions in other dimensions are: it does not 
formulate basic goals, which is a political responsibility, or basic values, which is a 
cultural one.  Instead, he states that the news media reflect the conditions of society 
around it and, as a result, is vulnerable to external pressures.   
 
Hjarvard (2009) argues that mediatisation is fundamental to habitus formation, 
suggesting that the media intervene in the creation of structures through their 
interaction with society.  This suggests that mediatisation is not merely a 
 124 
 
consequence of field theory, but an integral part of it.  The journalistic field fulfils a 
cycle of influence which turns in on itself, as its agents collectively operate according 
to a structure which they have themselves helped to create110.  Benson (2005) 
echoes this when he says that field theory serves to highlight processes of change – 
how the media field affects other societal sectors and how it is itself transformed.   
Hjarvard (2008) goes on to suggest that examining the mediatisation of different 
fields can help to bridge the gap between structures and agents.  The media 
produce a continuous representation of our contemporary society that makes 
accessible today’s political realities, contemporary problems and history.  In doing 
so, media outlets actively link various networks of audiences and become part of the 
reproduction and renewal of cultural and social distinctions in the population. Here, 
Hjarvard suggests, mediatisation provides the opportunity to rethink habitus. In 
habitus, Bourdieu has tried to transcend the contradiction between the demands of 
the external and objective social world and the inner and subjective dispositions that 
guide the action and interpretations of the social actor.  By habitus, Hjarvard refers 
not to social or cultural identity, but the way in which an individual relates to and 
interacts with his or her surroundings.  Lundby (2009) agrees, suggesting that 
studying the mediatisation of different fields such as political communication and 
democracy, economics or entertainment, can help extend the knowledge of how 
mediatisation works.  He suggests that media in mediatised societies are a means 
for transporting norms and rules to people, although he cautions that this 
assumption needs empirical analysis to find out how this happens and in which field. 
 
Benson (1999) also suggests that field theory provides a theoretical and empirical 
bridge between structure and agency, describing it as having a place between 
                                            
110 Timothy Cook’s (1998) examination of the relationship between journalists and their sources can be used to 
develop this further in order to illustrate how field theory and mediatisation intersect.  Cook argues that journalists 
and their sources have some interest in co-operation and collaboration, particularly in building a stable exchange 
relationship whereby journalists receive information in exchange for the publicity they offer sources.  This 
interdependence on sources may require journalists to stretch into new fields, which may be previously unknown 
to them, and establish relationships of mutual trust in order to elicit information in return for publicity.  For the 
information to feature prominently in the media, the source must be powerful and authoritative within their own 
field. Yet, the source, while dominant within their own field, is not able to communicate their message without the 
filtering influence of the media.  Cook explains that once the journalist has secured the information they require, 
they then withdraw to their own field, in order to process and judge the information according to journalistic 
norms.  The encounter with the journalist is likely to have a changing impact on the source, as they make 
judgements about what and how much information to make available, how to present it and how to respond to the 
subsequent publicity.   
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institutional and micro-organisational approaches to media.  It provides the 
opportunity to examine how structures are linked to organisational routines and 
journalistic practices through the behaviour and interrelationships of agents and 
organisations.  While organisational studies merely emphasise the bureaucratic 
constraints imposed on journalists by their employing organisations and by the 
official agencies who serve as their chief sources, field theory offers a more 
systematic attempt to incorporate empirical data on individual journalists, newsbeats 
and media organisations, into progressively larger systems of power.   
 
As outlined above, field theory provides an approach to examining the detailed 
interactions of an institutional media which affects change on other institutions.     
As such, it provides scope to understand one aspect of mediatisation.  But this does 
not mean that the two theories fully intertwine.  The news media may be a product 
of the journalistic field, but mediatisation as a theory does not restrict itself to the 
news media alone.  Instead it includes the changing impact of technology, 
entertainment and electronic media111.  Similarly, the journalistic field is not the only 
field involved in the creation of media, which includes other fields such as design, 
production, technology or distribution - all of which may have an impact on 
mediatisation.   
 
Field theory provides a route by which the researcher can look at the role of 
individuals within the context of a particular social space and understand their 
actions within that space and in relation to other spaces. To achieve this, field theory 
looks at the access to capital for individuals and how they utilize that capital to 
establish their respective positions within that space.  This methodology alone 
provides a useful and relevant framework for this research, but the dominance of 
the journalistic field adds a further dimension.  The strength of the capital within the 
journalistic field means that other fields submit to the dominance of that field, 
adjusting their rules of operating to accommodate the logic of the journalistic 
                                            
111
 For a discussion of the role of technology in mediatisation see Schofield Clark (2009).  An over-emphasis on 
the technological developments in media risks straying into technological determinism. Bourdieu’s field theory is 
distinct from technological determinism, but whether technology has a place within field theory is unclear. 
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field112.  This research attempts to identify the role of public relations agents as 
mediators and participants in this process: bridging the gap between fields and, 
through their capital, adapting the processes and rules of one field to the demands 
of the journalistic one.  It explores how the role of public relations agents can be a 
substitute for, or extension of, the role of journalistic agents within field theory, and 
that public relations practice carries a logic which is akin to the logic of the media.  
Their role as substitute does not imply that PR agents are journalists by another 
name.  PR agents are not part of the journalistic field, and their practice is not to 
publish news.  Yet this thesis will examine whether their practice carries its own logic 
– a PR logic – which by its very nature conforms to the logic of the media but also 
places its own expectations and demands on the field in which the PR practitioner is 
situated.  As we will see, this is evident in the political field, where the PR 
practitioner negotiates and mediates between the demands of the politician and the 
demands of the media. 
 
Understanding the relationships between fields and the agents within them is at the 
heart of this research.  The centrality of relationships to PR practice means that field 
theory is an appropriate way to analyse the way in which power is symbolised and 
operationalised within PR113.  This would not be achievable by relying on the 
Habermassian model of the public sphere as the operational theory for my research.  
Poupeau (2000) observes that both Habermas and Bourdieu want to combine, in a 
single theory, an analysis of the nature of domination and the mechanisms by which 
it occurs and is legitimised but they differ in approaches to achieving this.  
Habermas’ approach is to understand human action from the perspective of a 
society founded on the universality of reason, while Bourdieu takes social interaction 
as his starting point in order to study the conditions for the emergence of reason.  
Habermas elaborates a theory of society where power relations are replaced by 
relations of meaning, where reason and the force of rationality enable agents to 
                                            
112
 Benson (1999) observes that relatively autonomous fields may be wary of journalists, although once allowed 
in, journalists can provide crucial support to those inside agents closest to the heteronomous pole who seek to 
overturn existing hierarchies within the field. 
113
 The nature of power in PR has been the focus of Edwards’ work (2006, 2008 and 2009), through both 
quantitative and qualitative research.  She explores the different types of social and cultural capital available to 
PR practitioners and how this reflected the capital possessed by more dominant groups in society as a whole. 
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reach agreement and thus give rise to consensus.  For Bourdieu, reason serves to 
legitimate the force of power relations and domination and it is the legitimation of 
domination from which meaning is derived. Those who have the greatest power 
within society also possess the power of reason, which comes from the habitus of 
the field.  The dominant groups derive their authority from the loyalty of the 
dominated and legitimate their own interests, while the dominated acquiesce in the 
principle of their domination. 
 
Benson (2005), too, highlights the differences between Bourdieu and Habermas, 
observing that Habermas’ conceptualisation of the mass media’s relation to the 
public sphere largely revolves around the single variable of commercialisation.  The 
press lacks defences against the market and the mass welfare state, making it 
vulnerable to the blunt instrument of editorial control through commercialisation or 
propaganda.   In contrast, Bourdieu’s understanding of the journalistic field 
possesses both autonomy and capital, and this expands and contracts through 
relationships with other fields. 
 
In his study of the journalistic field, Benson (1999) observes that the first step 
towards understanding how and why journalism functions as it does is to locate it vis 
à vis other fields.  This involves locating the journalistic field in its immediate 
environment of cultural production and then within its immediate structural 
environment – the ensemble of fields.  Benson proposes that this be accomplished 
through a mapping exercise, consisting of ethnographic observation and statistical 
analysis, followed by an analysis of the constitution of the particular subjectivities of 
the actors in the field. An understanding of the function of public relations can be 
similarly understood by studying public relations not as a single entity, but in terms 
of its relationships with other fields. To do this, this research has examined the 
history of the PR field and analysed the types of capital available to agents within it.  
Having built up a picture of the habitus of the PR field, it continues by exploring PR 
practice within the political field, its interaction with other fields and the use of 




This study of practice within a field is an approach taken up by Warde (2004) who, 
in his study of the culinary field, examines the relationship between practice and 
fields114, describing eating out as a practice which takes place within the culinary 
field.  Eating out is not a field itself, but is a part of the field and a practice within it.  
It is a form of behaviour which emerges from the economic and social development 
of the culinary field, including competition between chefs and restaurants, the 
growth in popularity of different types of cuisines, and the emergence of restaurant 
guides and critics.  Using interviews with consumers, Warde comes to a definition of 
the practice of eating out, arguing that although there are differences both socially 
and materially in how different consumers view eating out, there are also common 
factors115.   
 
Finally, this research looks at how far PR practice has been adopted by individuals 
acting on behalf of Muslim groups operating within the political field.  This includes a 
consideration of the availability of capital to Muslim agents within the field.  This is 
not a comparative study between Muslim agents and PR practitioners, but instead is 
intended to explore the dynamics between different agents operating within a single 
field, the different levels of capital available to them and the implications this has for 
their influence on the presentation of narratives for use by the journalistic field. 
 
The research process 
This research has engaged with field theory in different ways and the type of 
engagement has changed during the process of the fieldwork.  While the work of 
Anheier et al (1995), Skille (2007), Uitermark and Gielen (2010) and others tends to 
utilise field theory within a single field116, when the research began, its parameters 
were not so clearly defined.  During the course of the fieldwork those parameters 
have become clearer, shaped to a large extent by the emerging findings.    
                                            
114
 Warde argues that Bourdieu ‘abandoned’ practice theory with his multiple uses of the term having resulted in 
its failing to fulfil any effective function in empirical analysis. 
115
 For example, eating out takes place away from home, it does not involve the consumer in labour and it 
involves eating a meal, rather than a snack. 
116
 The fields that these types of literature use vary from a network of writers (Anheier et al 1995), to a sport 
(Skille 2007) to activities defined within a particular geographical area (Uitermark and Gielen 2010).  
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The starting assumption was that public relations practice operates across fields as a 
trajectory which begins in the field in which the sponsor organisation is located and 
concludes in the journalistic field117.  In between, the PR practitioner might engage 
with one or more intermediary fields and the agents within those fields.  For 
example, public relations activity about the UK government’s work to prevent young 
Muslims from being drawn into terrorist activity would be conceived in the sponsor’s 
field, which would be the political field. The aim of the PR activity would be to secure 
press coverage promoting the government’s work to prevent terrorism in order to 
reassure the electorate and to position the government as alert and responsive to 
the threat of terror.   The PR practitioner, usually working for a government 
department or agency, would construct a narrative about the government’s Prevent 
work, based on the rules and logic of the political field in which they are based118.  
The practice of public relations would require the practitioner to make this story 
newsworthy and of maximum interest to the journalistic field.  This might involve 
engaging with the Muslim religious field to develop the narrative by including human 
interest stories about the impact of the preventative work on young Muslim men, or 
endorsement from Muslim leaders of the effectiveness and relevance of the 
approach within their community.  The final narrative would then be presented to 
the journalistic field, by means of a press release, or a media interview, possibly 
resulting in a newspaper or broadcast news story.  The Muslim religious field might 
also be encouraged to engage with the journalistic field by putting up spokespeople 
for interview, or inviting the broadcast media to film in or around a mosque.  
 
As the expert in this process, the public relations practitioner would guide and direct 
the narrative’s trajectory, leading the engagement with the different fields, either by 
imposing the rules and structures of their own field on others, or by entering other 
fields and adapting their rules and ways of operating.  This conceptualisation of how 
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 This assumption stems in part from my own professional experience as a senior public relations practitioner 
operating in the political field. 
118
 For an example of such a narrative, see Home Secretary Theresa May’s interview with The Daily Telegraph (8 
June 2011) about the government’s work to counter the radicalisation practices taking place in British 
Universities.  In the interview, which was published to coincide with the launch of the government’s new Prevent 
strategy, Mrs May said that the government would challenge and oppose groups operating on university 
campuses which did not espouse ‘British values’.  This narrative echoed a speech made by the Prime Minister in 




PR works relies on the expression of power, or capital, by the PR practitioner as they 
manage their engagement with other fields according to the shape of the narrative 
they wish to develop and then filter the contribution from other fields to ensure it 
conforms with their requirements.  Here, the concept of PR logic comes to the fore, 
as the other fields adapt their ways of seeing, or operating, in order to conform with 
the requirements and expectations set by the public relations practitioner.  Yet in the 
final stage, the public relations practitioners themselves are required to operate 
according to the logic of the media because the narrative in its final form has to 
conform to the demands and expectations of the journalistic field. 
 
In order to substantiate this assumption, my fieldwork began with an assessment of 
the different types of capital held by PR practitioners.  It is from the amalgamation 
and utilisation of capital within and between the sponsor’s field and the journalistic 
field that PR logic evolves.  This examination took place via a series of interviews, 
which are described in more detail below.  As the interviews progressed, the 
strength of the connection between public relations practice and the political field 
became clear.  Most of my public relations practitioner interviewees either worked or 
had worked within the political field,119 or described the significance of the political 
field to the emergence of public relations in recent years.  At the same time, it 
became clear in my interviews with representatives of Muslim organisations that all 
had experience of operating within the political field. 
 
While the emerging findings highlighted the significance of the political field to my 
research, they also suggested that PR could be construed as a field in its own right, 
albeit a newly emerging one120.  That PR is a social universe is clear: definitions of 
public relations place relationships at its essence and all of my interviewees spoke 
                                            
119 Clearly this is also a result of my sampling, which is covered further below. 
120 This view of public relations as a young and emerging discipline is supported by the professional body in the 
UK, the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR).  In A CIPR report described as ‘the next stage in the 
evolution of our profession’ (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 2005), prominent PR practitioners 
describe PR as still ‘growing up’ and suggest that opinion is still divided as to whether PR consultancy is a 
‘serious career.’  Despite these growing pains, the report states that the UK PR industry is made up of 48,000 
professionals with a £6.5billion turnover.  
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about the importance of communication skills and relationships for their work121.  Yet 
to be defined as a field, public relations would also need to be an autonomous social 
space, with its own history, structures and habitus. Work to establish whether PR 
could be classified as a field included a literature review relating to the history of PR, 
engagement with the professional body for public relations in the UK, the Chartered 
Institute for Public Relations (CIPR), and interviews with PR practitioners.  The 
results of this are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Although public relations is commonly linked with advertising or journalism, its 
autonomy from those fields came out clearly through interviews; but the relationship 
between public relations and the political field is more complex.  While many 
interviewees spoke at length about the recent history of public relations, none of 
them attributed significance to any public relations activity that took place prior to 
the 1990s.  However, the associations between public relations and the 
contemporary political field are very strong: most interviewees linked the growth of 
PR as a profession with recent political history, citing the 1992 US presidential 
campaign of Bill Clinton or the Labour Party’s 1997 General Election campaign in the 
UK as examples of both the effectiveness and increasing recognition of the value of 
public relations122.  These events, they argued, supported by the prominence of 
political communicators such as Alistair Campbell and Bernard Ingham, helped to 
establish PR as a profession, although one which has now grown beyond the political 
field123. 
 
The interviews suggest a common and recognised history for public relations, as well 
as a broadening of the profession’s remit away from an exclusively political focus.  
But history and variety alone do not constitute a field.  According to Bourdieu’s 
definition, a field is autonomous or quasi-autonomous, with its own structures and 
laws of functioning; it is independent of politics and the economy.  For public 
                                            
121 These relationships varied from relationships with senior management (Chair or Chief Executive), to 
journalists, different public groups and colleagues throughout their organisation.  
122 One senior practitioner, outside government explained: ‘I think that the Blair campaign, the Labour party 
campaign in the run up to the 1997 campaign was just a perfect lesson in how to use communications in a way 
that’s going to persuade people to your cause’.  
123 This is supported by a survey by the Centre for Economics and Business Research (2005) which cites retail, 
manufacturing, utilities and finance as examples of sectors engaging with public relations. 
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relations to be a field in its own right it must be autonomous, distinct from the 
political field from which it has emerged and in which it is so prevalent.  This can be 
demonstrated, by examining the structures which help to shape PR today. 
 
The scope of public relations activity is clearly defined and structured: interviewees 
provided a consistent picture of the different activities that made up their role124. 
These core activities are well established and recognised and acknowledged within 
the organisations they serve.  While the role is established it is also expanding.  
Almost all my interviewees acknowledged the growing importance of social media, 
particularly Twitter, to their role125.  Of the interviewees who worked in-house, most 
were supported by, or part of, established in-house teams structured according to 
the different activities undertaken.   
 
The structures of the PR field are emerging: PR involves a clearly defined and 
recognised set of activities and there is a developing career path being championed 
by the industry’s professional body126.  The majority of PR practitioners work in-
house, with broadly common grades and salaries according to their seniority and 
role127. The position of PR practitioners within organisations is often very senior, and 
this too is a recent development.   A senior practitioner outside government 
explained: ‘I think that one of the things that we’ve seen in the last 20 years is a 
genuine recognition in the role of communications at senior level.  So when I started 
my career, we were the Cinderella making a noise at the back of the building.  And I 
think it’s a very different set up now if you go and talk to people working in 
communications departments.  They, their status and their role is much more firmly 
recognised and that’s key.’  PR practitioners have a distinct position within 
                                            
124 These typically included media relations, managing websites, events and stakeholder management. 
125
 Although most of my interviewees accepted that social media is now part of a PR practitioner’s remit, only 
one, senior practitioner within a government body spoke with confidence about tweeting; others were less certain 
and expressed nervousness about their lack of experience. 
126 This includes the introduction of ‘chartered status’ for senior practitioners, a form of professional recognition 
similar to that of chartered accountants, or surveyors.  This is clearly an attempt to put the industry on a more 
professional basis, introducing a hierarchy of experience and skills, but it is also an example of the industry’s 
struggle to introduce a professional structure that would be recognised outside the field.  According to one senior 
practitioner outside government there are only 30 chartered practitioners in the UK – suggesting a reluctance or 
ambivalence on the part of senior practitioners to participate. 




organisational structures: while the most senior practitioners expect to be on the 
Board, even more junior PR staff have direct access to senior management.  Finally, 
PR practitioners rely on strong internal and external networks through which they 
can gather information and apply their influence.  Yet while Bourdieu describes the 
competitive nature of the journalistic field in terms of journalists competing with 
each other for scoops, this type of competition was not evident in the PR field128.  
The PR practitioners interviewed did not suggest that they were competing with 
other PR practitioners to get stories on the front page129.   
 
Having identified the characteristics of the emerging PR field, the research sought to 
achieve similar clarity in relation to a Muslim, or Islamic religious field.  This proved 
more challenging and ultimately, beyond the scope of this study.  Islam as a religion, 
or Muslims as followers of that religion, could be included in any number of fields, 
including but not limited to, religion, education, fashion, arts or science.  Exploring 
Islam as a religious field itself did not fall easily within Bourdieu’s model of definition 
for a field.  Attempts to characterise the Muslim or Islam religious field faltered, 
partly because the disparity and lack of homogeneity within the field meant there 
could be no contingent history or habitus within the field130. To define the Muslim 
religious field would require a broader spectrum of fieldwork than was possible 
within the confines of this research.   
 
The decision not to define the Muslim religious field challenged the assumption of a 
PR trajectory as outlined above.  The existence of such a trajectory assumes clear 
delineation between fields and a linear approach to the construction of narrative 
whereby the public relation practitioner guides the narrative in and out of fields 
before laying it to rest in the journalistic field.  As the fieldwork demonstrated, the 
                                            
128 Bourdieu argues that the journalistic field exerts an increasingly powerful hold on other fields.  This was not 
evident from my interviews; in fact, several interviewees spoke of the way that the growth in media had 
weakened the power and resources available to journalists. 
129 Junior and senior practitioners, inside and outside government all talked in detail about interactions with 
journalists but spoke of their work in isolation, with no suggestion that they needed to persuade the journalist that 
their story was stronger or more appealing than someone else’s. 
130 Much of the literature about the nature of the Muslim religious field is constructed by those outside the field, 
including agents within the political and journalistic field. Often this narrative is politically biased, or inaccurate. 
For example, the Muslim religious field is hugely diverse, but may be depicted as homogenous.  Similarly, the 
extremist views of small numbers of people within the field may be presented as representative of the whole field. 
 134 
 
reality is more complex and multi-layered, with some public relations practitioners 
remaining fixed within the political field and some representatives of Muslim 
organisations joining them there.  What emerged from the fieldwork is that all 
interviewees were positioned to some extent within the political field or had direct 
and recent experience of working within it, and it is within this context that the 
research is situated. 
 
Sampling 
There were two different cohorts among interviewees: public relations practitioners 
and those representing Muslim organisations operating within the UK political field.  
Interviewees who were public relations practitioners were selected by snowball 
sampling, beginning within my own professional network of former colleagues and 
other contacts.131 (My professional biography is included in Annex 3).  The sample 
consisted of 10 men and 11 women, who were all white and, with one exception, 
based in the South East of England, mainly in London.  The practitioners worked in-
house, as freelancers or for PR agencies and had between six months and over thirty 
years’ experience in public relations.  In nearly all cases, initial contact was made by 
email, or through the LinkedIn social network.  Where the sample ‘snowballed’ (e.g. 
through recommendations from an interviewee), the names of possible new 
interviewees came up spontaneously during the course of the interview rather than 
at my request. 
 
A strong interconnection between public relations practice and the political field 
emerged during my interviews and this was reflected in the sampling and enhanced 
by the snowball effect.  Most interviewees had a current or former role that was 
situated within the political field. For most, this meant employment within the public 
relations or communications function of a central government department or agency, 
but others had been employed in local government or by political parties.  This 
                                            
131 To avoid a conflict of interest between my professional role and my research, no-one I work with currently 
(either within my organisation or among professional contacts outside my organisation) was approached for 
interview.  It was made clear to all interviewees that the research was unconnected with my professional role and 
all interviewees were given contact details (e.g. email address and phone number) that were separate from my 
professional contact details.  
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pattern was influenced to a large extent by the sampling method which began with 
my own contacts, reflecting my own professional networks within the political field.  
The sample was not restricted to practitioners within the political field, yet even 
interviewees who were employed by different agencies (in the fields of advertising, 
education and finance) spoke of the political nature of their role - responding to or 
seeking to influence changes in legislation or other elements of public policy.   
 
While snowball sampling cannot claim to produce a sample that is representative of 
public relations practice, it has one significant advantage.  Through snowball 
sampling within a relatively limited professional sphere it was possible to gain access 
to senior practitioners – for example those with the job title of Director of 
Communications in government departments and communications practitioners at 10 
Downing Street - which would have been more challenging via another sampling 
method or approaching them cold.  In total, just over half (11) of my interviews 
were with senior public relations practitioners and could be categorised as ‘elite’ 
interviews132 (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002; Goldstein 2002; Neal and 
McLaughlin 2009; Moore and Stokes 2012).  This categorisation, which is based on 
the seniority of their professional role or the location in which they worked133, served 
to position these agents at the centre of the political field before the interview had 
even begun and shaped my approach to the encounter134.  Despite their senior 
position, the process of the interview was similar to those undertaken with other 
practitioners.   
 
The dominance of practitioners within the political field means that, for the purposes 
of this research, interviewees have been grouped according to their employment and 
characterised as practitioners either within government or outside government.  
Those outside government often had political aspects to their role and were not 
necessarily operating outside of the political field.  As many of the interviews were 
                                            
132 An elite is constituted of individuals and collectives that form a separate and distinct echelon or grouping in a 
given society or section of society.  Elites are in a minority but typically can be seen to have knowledge, 
influence, control and power in a given setting or situation. 
133 For example, an interviewee working in a communications role at 10 Downing Street was categorised as 
‘elite’, although they were not in the most senior communications role. 
134 In general, this categorisation as ‘elite’ was reinforced by the findings of the interviews, although sometimes 
for reasons other than their professional seniority. 
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among senior practitioners, an additional grouping of interviewees as ‘junior’ or 
‘senior’ practitioners has been introduced.  In this instance, a ‘senior’ practitioner is 
an in-house Director of Communications or agency equivalent, responsible for 
leading the public relations activity within their organisation (and usually a 
department or team of staff) and reporting directly to a Chief Executive, Permanent 
Secretary or other organisational leader.  A ‘junior’ practitioner would typically be a 
press officer or agency account manager who engages directly with the media as 
part of their role but is not responsible for leading the public relations activity within 
their organisation. 
 
All the interviews were secured through personal contact with a first approach being 
made by email or via LinkedIn either by me, or someone else making an introduction 
on my behalf.  In this first approach it was made clear that the interview would 
focus on the nature of PR practice, rather than on the particular political or other 
context in which the interviewee was employed.  This generated a response rate of 
over 90% with interviewees responding very quickly to the request – often sending a 
response email within minutes of receiving the initial contact.  Despite demanding 
jobs and busy schedules, interviews were usually arranged within a week of the first 
approach, with interviewees stating their willingness to accommodate the research 
timetable, which they assumed was pressing135.  Interviewees often showed a high 
degree of enthusiasm or interest in my research, with several using language such 
as: ‘I would love to take part’ in their acceptance, or expressing their enjoyment of 
participating in research of this nature. 
 
The interviews, which were taped with the interviewees’ consent136, took place face 
to face, and in one case, by telephone at the interviewee’s request137.  All the 
meetings took place at a venue of the interviewee’s suggestion, usually a central 
                                            
135 In fact, my timetable was never fixed and I made requests assuming that interview dates would need to be 
scheduled weeks or even months ahead. 
136 One interview was not taped, at the interviewee’s request.  This interviewee, who fell into the ‘elite’ category 
of interviews, expressed the view that they could be more open about their work if not on tape. 
137 This interviewee had a disability which made travel difficult. 
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London bar or coffee shop and lasted no more than 45 minutes138 and followed a 
semi-structured format based around open ended questions.  This structure evolved 
somewhat during the course of the research and as the sample became more senior.  
When interviews were requested, all interviewees were informed of the nature of the 
research and my status as a doctoral researcher.  Where snowball sampling had 
taken place, reference was made to the person who had made the introduction and 
the route by which they were known to me. Interviewees were given the assurance 
that the interview would stay focused on their professional roles and responsibilities; 
rather than delve into any aspect of their personal lives.  It was also emphasised 
that my interest as a researcher was not focused on their employer but on their 
professional practice.  This was reiterated during the course of the interview.  When 
interviewees were asked to give examples, it was stressed that this could be from 
any stage of their experience. (In fact, without exception, all public relations 
practitioners spoke openly and fluently about their current roles.) Additionally, all 
interviewees were given the assurance of anonymity.  At the meeting and before the 
interview began, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form signalling their 
agreement to participate in the research and this form is included at Appendix 2.  
They were also advised that at any time they could ask for the tape recorder to be 
switched off.  Two public relations practitioners made this request this during the 
interview – on both occasions they recounted stories about named senior politicians 
which have not been included in this thesis. 
 
Typically, the conversation began by asking the interviewee to describe their role, 
followed by a question about their career path to date. Interviewees were not given 
a steer about how to respond to this question and most responded with a timeline of 
their career beginning with an undergraduate degree. They were then asked to talk 
in detail about one particular piece of public relations work they had been involved 
in, with particular probing about the processes they had followed during this piece of 
work.  In later interviews, as the importance of social capital emerged, this changed 
                                            
138 I set a time limit of 45 minutes for all interviews (with one exception where the subject volunteered that he 
was happy to talk for longer).  This was based on my professional experience that, including time to settle in and 
wrap up, senior people would be reluctant to devote more than an hour of their time to a non-work related 
request.   The time frame of 45 minutes was mentioned when I first contacted them asking for an interview. 
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to specific questions about their professional networks and the influence they had 
within their organisation.   Finally, all interviewees were asked to explain how they 
thought the practice of public relations had changed during their career, and what, 
in their view, made a good public relations practitioner.  For the more senior 
practitioners, who led communications teams or departments, this question was 
framed by asking them what they looked for when hiring junior staff. 
 
Literature about elite interviewing (Aberbach and Rochman 2002; Goldstein 2002; 
Moore and Stokes 2012) suggests that a high degree of research into interview 
subjects is helpful in advance of the meeting, in order to give the researcher added 
credibility.  Here, my own professional experience in public relations provided an 
advantage as I approached the interview with an in depth knowledge of the 
professional role my subjects fulfilled and, very often, understood the broad 
organisational structures within which they were operating.  All of the public 
relations practitioners I interviewed acknowledged me as an agent within their field 
and this gave me peer status among senior practitioners139 .  Some of the junior 
practitioners acknowledged the seniority of my experience during the conversation.   
 
On balance, my professional experience was an advantage during my fieldwork, 
helping secure access to senior practitioners in the political field and conferring a 
high degree of credibility during the interviews.  I shared a common language with 
the interviewees and, by and large, their views about public relations as a 
profession.  This familiarity built rapport and empathy with the interviewees, but 
risked a certain myopia in developing a critique of the nature of their practice.  
During the interviews with PR practitioners, I was regarded as an ‘insider’ within the 
profession rather than as an academic researcher140 and this may have meant they 
were more open with me than they would otherwise have been. My ‘insider’ status 
was perpetuated by the context in which the interviews typically took place in the 
                                            
139
 Typically this was acknowledged by a reference to shared experience or shared professional contacts, or 
language such as ‘As you know yourself...’. 
140
 This was evident in conversation before and after the formalities of the interview questions, when my 
interviewees by and large asked me about my professional work rather than my academic endeavours. 
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middle of a normal working day141.   My professional experience carried a high 
degree of reflexivity too. As we shall see in the next chapters, interviewees 
portrayed a strong sense of mystification in their responses: suggesting an 
unwillingness or inability to reveal the exact processes or methods by which they 
worked.  My participation in the same professional arena meant that I was part of 
that mystification142 and so less likely to probe what lay behind it.  Thus, during the 
interview it was harder for me to spot when interviewees glossed over the processes 
of their work, using phrases such as ‘and so I just sorted everything out…’ or ‘I 
spoke to the journalist and it all worked out from there.’  These phrases mask the 
detail of what actually took place but risked going unchallenged by me as a 
researcher, because I assumed I knew what the interviewee meant having 
undertaken similar processes in my own professional role. 
 
Almost without exception, the interviews produced a rich flow of conversation and 
depth of response.   Initial questioning about their background appeared reassuring 
to participants and often led spontaneously to reflection about the nature of public 
relations as a career and the authority and influence it inferred.  My interviewees 
were skilled and practised performers, providing well-structured and controlled 
answers to questions.  They rarely lost track of what they were saying and, even 
when answers were lengthy, referred back to the original question.  They made little 
or no reference to my interpretative power as a researcher: this may be because 
they were reassured by my insider status or because their professional experience 
talking to journalists meant they were less likely to be affected by the capital I 
brought to my work as an academic researcher. 
 
My interviewees’ experience of engaging with the journalistic field was evident on 
occasion when they lapsed into what seemed to be a rehearsed spiel about their 
place of work or, to a lesser degree, their career path.  Interviewees were clearly 
                                            
141
 This meant that I arrived at the interview straight from my place of work and returned there afterwards, thus 
reinforcing my status as a PR practitioner and peer, rather than a researcher. 
142
 As well as being a participant in the mystification displayed by my interviewees, my role as researcher and 
communications practitioner carried with it its own mystification.  While I attempted to delineate between the two 
roles when sourcing interviews and at the beginning of the meeting, this may have become more blurred as the 
meeting went on because of my ‘insider’ status. 
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used to answering questions about their place of work and although this was not the 
focus of the interview, their answers often framed their organisation in a positive 
light.  Although they gave the impression of talking both fluently and freely, the 
control they were exerting over what they said was evident as most examples and 
vignettes were framed in a positive light, both for them as individuals and for their 
organisations.  One senior practitioner, working inside government, peppered his 
narrative with disclaimers and caveats.  For example, when talking about how 
Government Ministers listened to advice he added: ‘I’m particularly talking of the 
communications function but I could apply it equally to the rest of the [government] 
department.  I could probably apply it to other departments too if I had that 
experience’.  At a separate point in the interview, when talking about communicating 
messages to the media he said: ‘It’s like that typical Sun headline where there’s 
some scandal – we don’t get caught in scandal – where there’s some scandal and it 
doesn’t matter whether it’s a pound, ten thousand or a million, it’s ‘They spent a 
pound on this!’ ‘  The care taken to avoid any potential negative interpretation of 
what he said suggests the interviewee was used to being interviewed and was well 
aware of the potential of what he said being misconstrued. 
 
This somewhat scripted approach could be disrupted by a return to questioning 
about the nature of PR practice.  While my interviewees were clearly used to 
communicating a particular narrative about their own career or their employer, they 
were less well prepared to answer questions reflecting on the nature of their 
professional practice.  As a result, these types of questions could be met by a brief 
pause for thought, with answers prefaced by the words ‘I guess’ or ‘I think’ , or an 
articulation of interest in the question, such as ‘That’s an interesting one…’.  In 
contrast, questions which were answered with reference to their employer 
organisation were rarely answered with such initial hesitance.  This suggests that 
answers to questions about public relations practice were less rehearsed and less 
familiar to participants than other narratives expressed during the interview. 
 
The approach to interviews with representatives of Muslim organisations was similar, 
but the results were somewhat different.  Again, snowball sampling was attempted, 
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beginning with some of my own contacts and approaching some of the biggest 
Muslim organisations in the UK on a ‘cold calling’ basis.  LinkedIn was not a viable 
access route for these groups; not all potential interviewees could be found on the 
site and for those who did have a profile, my extended network did not include 
them.  Instead, contact was made by email143 or by phone and, on one occasion, via 
Twitter.  I proactively shared a synopsis of my research and professional biography 
with potential interviewees. These are included at Appendix 3. 
 
The success rate was much lower (less than 30%) than among the PR practitioners 
and ten interviews took place in total.  Most potential interviewees did not respond 
to contact of any kind, even when the contact came from another interviewee 
making an introduction.  Of those who did respond, several observed that they 
received numerous interview requests from researchers, particularly with regards to 
Islam and media.  Here, my professional background carried no advantage, and 
even served to confuse some interviewees who seemed uncertain on what basis I 
was approaching them.     
 
The interviews followed a similar format, lasting no more than 45 minutes with a 
series of open ended questions.  Interviewees working on behalf of Muslim groups 
were given the same assurances of anonymity and asked to sign the same 
agreement form.  Unlike my interviews with PR practitioners, which took place in a 
variety of locations, the majority of these interviews took place in respondents’ 
offices144.  Here, my status as an outsider was confirmed as my ethnicity, dress and 
sometimes even gender stood out within the office environment145. These interviews 
felt more formal, sometimes even stilted, and my interviewees were more likely to 
enquire about the academic credentials and status of my research. 
 
                                            
143
 Emails were sent from my University of Kent email address to provide reassurance of my status as a doctoral 
researcher. 
144
 In two instances it took several exchanges of correspondence before the address of my interviewees’ office 
was revealed. The interviewees said this was for security reasons. 
145
 I made some adaptations to my approach reflecting my ‘outsider’ status: for example dressing conservatively 
and, where my interviewee was male, waiting to see if he would offer to shake my hand on meeting me. 
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The questions asked during these interviews changed over time: initially intended to 
probe respondents’ familiarity with public relations practice, it quickly became clear 
that this was not a concept with which respondents were familiar or comfortable 
talking about.   Instead, questions were framed in terms of media coverage of Islam 
and Muslims and the success or failure of work to challenge or change the media 
narrative.  Questions did not assume interviewees’ engagement with the political 
field but this was always raised by the interviewee.  It was clear that each 
interviewee had worked with or alongside the UK government in recent years.  
Usually this related to the prevention of terrorism, but also to community cohesion 
or acting as an advisor on international affairs.    
 
All the interviews, with both PR practitioners and representatives of Muslim groups, 
were transcribed and the transcripts analysed.  Because of the political and 
potentially sensitive nature of the content of some of the interviews, all interviewees 
were offered the opportunity to review the transcript and redact any content if they 
wished to.  Only one interviewee, a senior government public relations practitioner, 
asked to see the transcript and he did not make any redactions. 
 
The transcripts were analysed in terms of content, tone and language with a 
particular focus on identifying references to types of capital and habitus. This was 
done through examining and comparing responses to questions about skills and 
success in public relations and by probing the process of how public relations 
practitioners worked, especially in relation to the networks utilised to achieve 
professional goals and the conferring and receiving of authority within their 
organisations.  Representatives of Muslim organisations were similarly probed in 
relation to the skills and capabilities among their professional network and their 
interactions with other agents in the UK political field.  For both groups, repeating 
characteristics or themes were drawn out: within the two groups of interviewees 
there were some clearly identifiable patterns of language and style of responses.  In 
particular, within the public relations practitioner grouping, there was an evident 
mystification about the nature and process of their role. This is discussed in more 
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detail, together with the wider results emerging from this methodology, in 
subsequent chapters.   
 
Field theory has proved to be a suitable methodological approach to help 
operationalise the theory of mediatisation and shape a response to some 
overarching questions about the construction of media narrative within the public 
sphere.  It has provided a range of access points to engage with structural theories 
and enabled an exploration of the dynamics of power. These access points have 
included an exercise in defining fields which helped to shape the parameters of this 
research, resulting in a more detailed examination of the practice of public relations 
and the engagement of Muslim organisations with that practice, within one particular 
field.  Other ways of engaging with field theory have included looking at the history 
of relevant fields, the examination of structures within fields and, finally, the 
fieldwork among agents within fields. 
 
For a researcher, mediatisation theory, field theory and the nature of the practice 
being explored – public relations – sit well and comfortably together.  Field theory’s 
focus on journalistic capital means that it is particularly apposite for research 
examining the wider environment of media influence and effects, while its emphasis 
on relationships and interactions between agents found ready respondents in PR 
practitioners.  The operationalisation of field theory in interviews, through 
questioning relating to capital and habitus, has been notably effective with PR 
practitioners.  These practised elites, fluent in promoting themselves and their 
employers, readily engaged with questions about the social and cultural resources 
open to them as well as the skills and experience they brought to their roles.  The 
result has been a rich flow of qualitative data, relating to their own status and their 
relationships with others, both within and outside the political field. 
The experience of using field theory to engage with representatives of Muslim 
organisations in order to support and enhance the theory of mediatisation has 
proved more challenging.  The extensive work needed to scope and define the 
Muslim religious field is outside the remit of this research and, although all the 
agents interviewed voluntarily positioned themselves within the UK political field, it 
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has been more difficult to situate their relative positions within that field.  The 
networks and capital available to them have been less readily evident through the 
interviews, particularly with regards to public relations practice.  However, it is here 
that the benefits of exploring power relations by establishing the relationships 
between agents comes to the fore.  While the interaction between representatives of 
Muslim organisations and public relations practice (and indeed the journalistic field) 
is varied and unclear, an examination of their relationships and interactions with 
others both within and outside the field provides a way forward.  The results are 





Chapter 4: The field of public relations 
The research questions set out in Chapter 3 provide an exploratory framework for an 
examination of public relations practice.  Previous chapters have established the 
theoretical framework and methodological approach which sit behind the questions.  
In particular, the discussion has set out the rationale for a sociological rather than 
management or organizational understanding of public relations, and its use 
primarily within the political field.  By understanding how public relations 
practitioners make use of their networks, relationships and access to different types 
of capital the research aims to provide a more rounded perspective on public 
relations practice than some of the literature has previously achieved. 
 
This chapter addresses the first four research questions set out in Chapter 3.  
Through a discussion of existing literature and fieldwork it seeks to understand the 
role of public relations within organisations, including those operating in the UK 
political field.  The definitions that emerge are developed into a deeper 
understanding of the nature of public relations practice and the sources and type of 
capital that practitioners have access to.  To do this, the fieldwork narrows its focus 
to the UK political field and seeks to understand how public relations functions within 
this particular sphere.  The questions are intended to elicit an understanding of the 
different resources practitioners have to draw on in their work – including their 
professional networks, their skills, educational qualifications and professional 
experience.   The final question seeks to understand how public relations 
practitioners’ work can affect the organisations they represent.  In particular, this 
area focuses on the logic of their work and the processes of change and transition 
that it can effect.  What emerges from the fieldwork is a form of mystification of 
practice which is discussed in detail below.  This mystification, which is perpetuated 
by practitioners themselves, takes the form of seemingly casual and dismissive 
descriptions of how they achieve what they do and the processes they are 
undertake.  This mystification is an oblique expression of the symbolic power that 
practitioners hold as they contribute to the transforming process of mediatisation.  
Practitioners are aware of the potential of their work to influence both the media and 
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society more widely, but are reluctant to disclose the exact mechanisms by which 
this is achieved. 
 
In particular, this chapter seeks to understand the relationship between public 
relations practitioners and the field in which they operate and their relative 
positioning within that field.  It uses field theory to evaluate the contribution that 
public relations can make to the emerging discipline of mediatisation. It begins by 
asking if PR can be considered as a field in Bourdieusian terms, and considers the 
nature of professionalism in PR and the correlation between the emergence of a 
profession and the emergence of a field. To do this, it maps out public relations as a 
field in its own right, with a discussion of the emergence of public relations as a 
social arena, the distinctiveness of practice emerging through a debate about 
professionalism and the different types of resources or capital which public relations 
practitioners have to draw on.  This combination of practice and capital helps to 
determine the habitus that practitioners bring to the field; it explores the structuring 
structures which characterise public relations and which help practitioners to 
succeed. The research goes on to draw conclusions about what this means for 
practitioners’ ability to engage with others outside their field, and the expectations 
placed on them to do this.  In keeping with Bourdieu’s field theory and using the 
results of interviews with public relations practitioners, it goes on to establish the 
different types of capital available to PR practitioners and discusses PR as a 
relational practice which negotiates between differing fields. The chapter then goes 
on to look in detail at the role of public relations in the political field based on 
interviews with senior public relations practitioners working within government. 
Finally, it assesses the contribution this research makes to the role of PR in 
mediatisation and, in particular, to the emergence of PR logic.  
 
Definitions of public relations 
Nearly 100 years ago, Bernays (1928) famously described public relations as the 
attempt by information, persuasion and adjustment, to engineer public support for 
an activity, cause, movement or institution. That definition proved to be the first of 
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many, and the history of attempts to define public relations is probably as long as 
the history of the profession itself. Fifty years after Bernays, Harlow examined 472 
definitions of public relations in an attempt to arrive at one, definitive version 
(Harlow, 1977). Despite this effort, literature on public relations still approaches it 
through a range of disciplines including management, psychology, mass 
communication, economics or organisational studies (Ihlen and Van Ruler 2007).    
Perhaps unsurprisingly having considered such a large volume of interpretations 
about what public relations is, Harlow’s final definition is a long one, which 
encompasses a range of functions for PR – from tracking public opinion to serving 
the public interest, utilizing change and serving as an early warning system to help 
anticipate trends.  Most fundamentally, Harlow concludes that public relations is a 
‘distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain mutual lines of 
communication, understanding and acceptance and co-operation between an 
organisation and its publics’ (1976:36)146.   
 
Today, the debate about what PR is, and where it is situated as a discipline has yet 
to be settled (Hutton 1999; Vercic, Van Ruler, Butschi and Flodin 2001; Baker 2002; 
Botan and Taylor 2004; Curtin and Gaither 2005; Van Ruler, Butschi and Flodin 
2007; Ihlen and Van Ruler 2007; Crawford and Macnamara 2011).  The early 
definitions, cited above, originated from America and PR is still dominated by 
American theory and practice (Vercic, van Ruler, Butshci and Flodin 2001).  In 2012, 
Harold Burson, founder of one of the biggest global PR agencies, Burson Marsteller, 
criticized efforts by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) to come up with a 
new definition for public relations.  The PRSA had concluded that PR was ‘the 
management of the relationship between an organisation and its publics’.  In 
response, Burson wrote: ‘What I am talking about is best summarized in the rapper 
line ‘if you’re going to talk-the-talk, you gotta walk-the-walk.’ I don’t know of a more 
succinct definition of public relations’ (Burson, 2012).  
                                            
146
 Like Bernays, Harlow was an American who founded and became president of the American Council on 
Public Relations (New York Times 1993).  There are differences in approach to defining public relations between 
Europe and America.  Van Ruler, Butschi and Flodin (2001) argue that in Europe at least, the translation of the 
term ‘public relations’ into different European languages influences the meaning and definition of the discipline. 
For example, the German term for public relations – Offentlichkeitsarbeit – means public work and is explained 
as working in the public sphere, with the public and for the public, while in America, definitions revolve around the 
concept of PR as the ‘management of the relationship between an organisation and its publics’ (PRSA no date).  
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These differences in approach to defining public relations summarise the core of the 
debate about what public relations is: a management function or an activity focused 
on improving the quality of the public sphere through discourse and the free flow of 
information.  This latter understanding of public relations includes a reflective 
responsibility to analyse the changing standards and values and society (Sharpe 
2000; Curtin and Gaither 2005).  The management perspective is that the role of the 
public relations practitioner is to convey these changes back to their sponsor 
organisation and to adjust the standards and values of the organisation regarding 
social responsibility and legitimacy (Hutton 1999).  This perhaps is reflected Burson’s 
appropriately soundbite like definition – ‘you gotta walk-the-walk’ – which 
encapsulates PR logic, but also in the other approaches to defining PR which suggest 
that organisations change (either through influence or through the building of 
mutually beneficial relationships) as a result of PR practice (Vercic, van Ruler, 
Butschi and Flodin 2001).  These suggest not only that PR is a discipline dependent 
on effective relationships, directing the interactions that a sponsor organisation has 
with other groups, but also that it has the potential to affect significant change 
within its sponsor organisation. Thus, PR is not merely a discrete set of actions 
which can be started or halted at any time; but it goes to the heart of what an 
organisation does and how it operates.  
 
Hutton (1999) chooses to define PR as a management discipline, identifying four 
different roles for public relations. These are managerial, operational, educational 
and reflective.  The first three are activities that take place within an organisation, 
helping it manage relationships with external parties and prepare the way it 
communicates.  The fourth, the reflective role, relies on the capability of the 
practitioner to operate outside their sponsor organisation, reading and reacting to 
the external environment.  Sharpe (2000) errs towards the notion of public relations 
as a social function, suggesting that public relations is a form of communication 
which leads to understanding.  The achievement of public relations is not through 
management performance, but through social behaviours with dialogue at the core.  
Public relations cannot be successful until an organisation achieves open, two way 
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communication, and changes in accordance with the outcome of that 
communication.   
 
To understand public relations as a purely management function is to rely on a 
functional and one-way, transmission model of communication.  As has been 
discussed in Chapter 2, this transmission model of communication fails to explain 
adequately the exchange of power and response between a communicator and their 
audience.  To move away from a functional theory of public relations also demands 
a departure from a linear based communication model to the model of a more 
discursive process.  This emphasizes the meaning-making of public relations and its 
relationship to culture rather than management.  Aldoory (2005) attempts to 
reconcile these two approaches, arguing that dialogue, power and social meaning 
have become key concerns for both organisations and their publics because they 
affect relationships and relationship outcomes. 
 
The history of public relations and politics 
For the scholar, there is a second debate to get to grips with concerning the 
definition of public relations. This is the historical approach: an attempt to define 
public relations by its evolution. Hutton (1999) dates the modern beginnings of PR to 
the early 20th century, tracking its evolution from ‘a guide to social conduct’ 
(1940s), to ‘interpreter, devil’s advocate and catalyst’ (1950s and 60s) to ‘distinctive 
management function’ (1970s) (1999:201). He sums this up by suggesting that PR 
has evolved from: the public be fooled to the public be damned; the public be 
manipulated; the public be informed; and finally, the public be involved or 
accommodated147.  
                                            
147 Crawford and Macnamara (2011) observe that attempts to construct histories of public relations are 
characterised by their propensity to be about public relations for public relations. They suggest that the history of 
PR shows a trajectory (summarised by Hutton 1999) in which the relationship with publics evolves from 
indifference and even contempt towards the public to a full-fledged two-way relationship. This, they argue, 
permits PR practitioners and future practitioners to envision themselves in space and time with a clear picture of 
their collective accomplishments and contribution. While this observation reflects the risks of my own position as 
a practitioner and a scholar, it may also be applicable to studies of other fields. Nevertheless, Crawford and 
Macnamara may not be surprised that some of the most prominent scholars of public relations in the UK today, 
notably Professor Anne Gregory, and Dr Lee Edwards, are both practitioners.  
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In the UK, Gregory (2011) highlights the significance of the development of 
government communications and public information provision to the emergence of 
public relations, citing efforts by the Post Office to promote savings in the 19th 
century148 as the beginning of mass public communication. It was a former General 
Post Office Public Relations Officer, Sir Stephen Tallents, who set up the Institute of 
Public Relations in the UK in 1948149.  Davis (2000) supports this and states that 
historically, most interest in public relations was in its role in the political process – 
aiding politicians and state institutions in their attempts to manage the media150.    
 
This association, between government or political communications activity and PR, 
was reflected by almost half my interviewees who cited examples such as the Labour 
Party’s 1997 General Election campaign as central to the increasing recognition of 
the value of public relations. 151 152 These events, they argued, supported by the 
prominence of political communicators such as Alistair Campbell (who provided PR 
support to Tony Blair) and Bernard Ingham (who supported Margaret Thatcher), 
helped to establish PR within the political field. However, those interviewed referred 
merely to two or three decades of history, with little reference to any existence of PR 
before the 1970s. None of them attributed significance to any PR that existed prior 
to the 1990s. One interviewee was particularly dismissive of government 
communicators in the UK at the time of the 1982 Falklands war: ‘You know, a little 
man with glasses who came out and read from a piece of paper at a set time each 
night, who wasn’t seen as somebody who knew or shaped what was going on.’ 
While this may seem like a casual dismissal of historic PR, it also sets a standard for 
                                            
148 She describes the Post Office’s campaign to encourage savings in 1876 as the first government mass 
advertising campaign and the development of the Office of Special Inquiries and Reports in the Board of 
Education in 1895 as the first specialised information unit in Government. 
149 The Institute, now with a Royal Charter, defines PR as ‘about reputation - the result of what you do, what you 
say and what others say about you’ (Chartered Institute of Public Relations, no date). 
150 The growth in the number of government communicators is evidenced by figures provided by the Cabinet 
Office to the House of Lords Communications Committee, which showed a 72% increase in the number of 
government press officers in central Whitehall departments between 1998 and 2008 (from 216 to 373). There 
was a corresponding increase in the number of staff employed in ‘communications’ by government departments 
in the same period (from 795 to 1,376) (House of Lords Communications Committee, 2008). 
151 One senior practitioner said: ‘I think that the Blair campaign, the Labour party campaign in the run up to the 
1997 campaign was just a perfect lesson in how to use communications in a way that’s going to persuade people 
to your cause.’  
152 In similar vein, one interviewee spoke of a time when journalists would ring a local council leader direct to 
speak to them, whereas now local councils have teams of press officers. 
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the current day practitioner as someone who does know and does shape what’s 
going on.  
 
Grunig and Hunt (1984) made the first attempt to use the historical development of 
public relations to define different models of PR. They described the models as 
either one-way or two-way. For one-way PR, the behaviour and activity rest with the 
organisation conducting the PR. This can include ‘propagandistic public relations’, 
that seek media attention in any way possible, or the provision of public information 
(for example, via the production of organisational newsletters or magazines). The 
two-way models demand both change from the organisation conducting the activity 
and a response from the invited audience. In the model identified by Grunig and 
Grunig as most successful (1989) the organisation would use bargaining, negotiating 
and conflict-resolution strategies to bring symbiotic changes in the ideas, attitudes 
and behaviours of both the organisation and its publics (for example, through 
contact with the public via events or roadshows or more informal research). This 
was the first attempt to connect types of public relations practice with organisational 
success, and again suggests the impact of some type of PR logic, whereby the most 
successful public relations activity has an impact on the sponsor organisation as well 
as the intended audiences.  
 
While management, organisation and publics continue to be dominant components 
of public relations activity, a more contemporary definition is that PR is about 
‘managing strategic relationships’. Hutton (1999) argues that there are many 
metaphors for PR, such as campaigner, image maker, reputation manager, but only 
one model, which is relationship management. Botan and Taylor (2004) take this 
one step further, describing PR from a ‘cocreational’ perspective, whereby PR 
practitioners and the public created shared meaning, interpretation and goals that 
go beyond any one organisational objective.  This approach to understanding PR via 
the outcome of the relationships it manages and holds has been adopted by the 
industry’s professional bodies, both in the UK and in the USA153. 
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 The UK body for public relations – The Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) defines PR as: ‘Public 
Relations is about reputation - the result of what you do, what you say and what others say about you.  Public 
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The lack of a common definition of public relations generates ongoing theoretical 
and academic debate and can also lead to confusion in terminology around PR 
practice. When asked how they defined their role, my interviewees described 
themselves as either communications or PR professionals and these two terms 
seemed to be interchangeable. This apparent ambiguity about how to describe their 
role did not seem to concern them and both descriptions seemed to encompass the 
same type of activity and, importantly, the same status and nature of relationships 
within their sponsor organisation.  Similarly, interviewees did not seem perturbed or 
confused about the overall purpose of their role, and in this they appeared to bypass 
the theoretical debates about whether public relations is primarily a management 
function or one which focuses on discourse within the public sphere. Instead, they 
overwhelmingly presented their role as one which had always been focused on the 
creation of discourse and narrative within the public sphere (usually via their 
responsibility for managing relationships with the media) but which was now 
becoming more widely recognized within organisations.  Alongside this recognition 
was a shift towards public relations as more of a management function, with 
associated accountabilities for performance (for example, measurement and 
evaluation), operational processes (for example appropriate sign off and approval of 
press releases and other documentation) and managing relationships internally (for 
example, utilizing internal networks for the creation of news and events).    
 
While the debate about what public relations is continues, the scope of activity 
within the discipline seems more clearly defined and structured.  All my interviewees 
provided a consistent picture of the different activities that made up their role154. 
This picture provided a more consistent ‘bottom up’ definition of what public 
relations involves than the theoretical debates.  These core activities are well 
established and recognised and acknowledged within the organisations they serve. 
Yet, as the interviews demonstrated, while maintaining an organisation’s contact 
with the media (sometimes described as ‘media relations’, ‘press’, or even ‘spin’) is a 
                                                                                                                                      
Relations is the discipline which looks after reputation, with the aim of earning understanding and support and 
influencing opinion and behaviour. It is the planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain goodwill and 
mutual understanding between an organisation and its publics’ (CIPR: About PR). 
154 The activities include media relations; and it is to this element of their work that I shall primarily refer, using 
the term ‘public relations’ or ‘PR’ 
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significant part of PR155, it is just one part of a changing mix of communication 
practices156.  Interviewees’ exposure to other areas of communications’ work (such 
as managing a website, organising events or using social media) depended on their 
organisation, their role and, to some degree, their level of experience.  
As we have seen above, with a comparatively short history, public relations 
continues to change with ongoing debates about a theoretical and practical 
definition of PR practice. While history provides a useful context about the 
emergence of PR, evidence from my interviews suggests that its role in the 
workplace is still developing for both practitioners and their sponsor organisations. 
As one interviewee explained: ‘...whereas maybe in the past, issues’ management 
was seen as separate to PR and comms. You do the fluffy comms bit, and we do the 
serious issues management. More and more I think they’re merging, so comms is 
taking on a more strategic role, linking comms to business outcomes and employee 
engagement to business outcomes and seeing the value, rather than ‘oh we just 
need you to fanny around with that document, or make that look pretty.’ I think as a 
comms professional you’re asked to do more now.’   This explanation suggests a 
change in attitude from the sponsor organisation and a previous lack of 
understanding about what public relations does and can achieve.  If public relations’ 
focus on the public sphere is an accurate depiction of its purpose, it also suggests 
that this organisation has not previously been concerned with its position in the 
wider public sphere. 
 
The ongoing debate about what PR is articulates its place and purpose within 
organisations and suggests a form of logic whereby PR can have an impact on both 
the organisation which sponsors the PR activity as well as on the recipients or 
audiences of the PR activity. This logic is dependent on the receptiveness of the 
sponsor organisation, as well as the expertise of the practitioner.  If adopted, PR 
logic has the potential to change the way in which the organisation functions and 
                                            
155 According to a recent COMRES survey, the majority of in-house PR practitioners (78%) are likely to be 
involved in media relations (COMRES, December 2012). 
156 This is supported by research by the Chartered Institute of Public Relations among communications 
professionals in the not-for-profit sector which reveals that while 91% of practitioners’ organisations view their 
role as ‘media relations’, the practitioners themselves say they are responsible for activities including website 
development, organising events, developing strategy, fundraising, producing publications and public affairs (not 
defined) (CIPR Fifth Estate in partnership with Amazon PR, 2011). 
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relates to the public sphere.  The aim of this research is not merely to provide a 
definition of PR, or a descriptor of the current activities that public relations 
practitioners undertake within their sponsor organisations, particularly within the 
political field. Instead, it seeks to establish how PR works as a social function, using 
field theory to understand the way in which practitioners negotiate between different 
fields or spaces – primarily that of their sponsor organisation and the journalistic 
field. In doing so, field theory supports an examination of dynamics and interplay of 
power between agents, and fields and the power or capital that the PR agent wields 
to achieve their goals. As we have seen, definitions of PR allude to the influence that 
it can have, but to apply field theory to public relations as a discipline a more 
rounded examination of how PR operates as a social function is needed. The power 
and capital that practitioners bring to their role, and the way in which they utilize 
this power, are important here, as this dictates how they are received by others both 
within their sponsor organisation and more widely.  As has been discussed in 
chapter 3, it is only through understanding an individual agent’s position in relation 
to others in the same field that it is possible to understand the distinctiveness of 
their role and contribution to the field.  To achieve this, this chapter begins with a 
discussion about the professional status of PR as an industry and its position as a 
field.  
 
PR and professionalism  
A discussion of professionalism within PR supports discussion of the nature of the PR 
field; Noordegraaf and Schinkel (2011) and Schinkel and Mirko (2011) observe that 
while Bourdieu discredited the notion of professionalism, he substitutes ‘fields’ for 
professions – seeing both as distinctive social spaces, held together by 
institutionalised practices (Bourdieu 1987, 1993). Like fields, professions have 
histories and are communities where different types of capital – such as education, 
networks and connections – prevail (Bourdieu 1986:241)157. All my interviewees 
made claims for increasing professionalism within the industry: one senior 
                                            
157
 The medical profession and legal profession are two examples of profession/fields: each with their own 
distinct practices, relationships between members and ways of operating. 
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practitioner outside government said he felt it was important that PR should be 
recognised as a profession in the same way as accountancy or law. Yet the drivers 
of this professionalism are not yet explicit and, as we shall see, this may impact on 
public relations’ status as a field.  
 
Sociological approaches (Johnson, 1982; Evetts 2011; Noordegraaf & Schinkel, 
2011; Schinkel & Mirko, 2011) describe professionalism as the organisation of work 
by workers themselves, in contrast to the more hierarchical or managerial control of 
organisations. The concept of professionalism is linked to workers’ initiatives to 
control themselves; deciding who can legitimately act as ‘professional’ members of 
the group and how members should behave. Membership of the group is achieved 
by having the right qualifications, training and education as well as adopting the 
right behaviour, or through compliance with particular codes of practice.  
By setting its own standards, a profession becomes self-defining: it is the member 
practitioners who determine the qualifications or draft the codes of practice which 
are used to admit or exclude new members to the profession. Johnson suggests that 
this self-definition means that ‘professional skills’ are non-transferable: and this is 
what defines the professionalism of a particular community. Should others acquire 
them, the profession loses its value (1982:66). 
 
This self-valorization is expressed in discourse within and about professions. Nearly 
all the interviewees asserted that PR is becoming more professional and they also 
defined themselves as PR professionals and talked about their professional status 
and professional experience. Within public relations, this discourse helps protect the 
status of individual practitioners, distinguishing them from those who are less 
expert, less experienced, or less knowledgeable.   There is a distinction made 
between those who are proper professionals and those who are merely dabbling in 
PR as an afterthought or addition to a different role.  As Johnson describes, the 
claims for professionalism are themselves the major conditions for 
professionalization. The discourse and language of professionalism act as a point of 
similarity between members of the same profession, while preserving their individual 
and collective distinction from others. 
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Johnson suggests that in setting standards for themselves, workers are taking over 
the historical role of the state in defining both professional work and professionalism 
by authorising licenses for certain types of work and setting standards of practice 
and regulation. Yet Evetts (2011) suggests that this is changing as professionals now 
work for employing organisations and professionalism is, for the most part, 
constructed and imposed from above, by employers and managers. Johnson calls 
this ‘corporate patronage’ (1982:66), where the professional shares the values and, 
to some extent, the status of their employer-patron, who makes judgement on and 
evaluates performance and success. Thus, the professional takes on the social 
origins and characteristics of those who use their services and defers primarily to 
their employer rather than their ‘professional’ community. As the interviews show, 
practitioners may choose to align themselves with their employers, but within the PR 
field there is a drive to support, or even supplant, the standards of employer 
organisations, with standards set across the industry, including the ‘gold standard’ of 
chartered status.  
 
The public relations industry has a ‘professional’ body, The Chartered Institute of 
Public Relations (CIPR)158, which promotes formal educational structures and career 
paths for PR practitioners. It has a code of conduct and qualifications for members 
and provides training for members and non-member practitioners. The CIPR has just 
over 10,000 members (CIPR 2013)159, while its own research suggests that there are 
nearly 50,000 PR practitioners in the UK (Centre for Economics and Business 
Research, 2005). In 2005 the institute achieved a royal charter, enabling its 
members to apply for individual chartered status.  
 
According to the CIPR, anyone with Chartered status is a senior public relations 
professional whose experience, knowledge and insight has been tested by the 
professional body for PR practitioners in the UK. The test involves a three stage 
assessment process, involving an academic thesis, demonstration of practical 
experience and an interview (CIPR: Chartered Status FAQs, no date).  The CIPR 








claims that chartered status represents an increased professionalism within PR. A 
member of staff told me: ‘It [chartered status] was part of the CIPR’s new aspiration 
to present the PR profession more professionally – for it to aspire to be a profession 
really, rather than a craft or a … you know….a sort of… I suppose, you know, from 
time to time the PR profession has aspired to have that kind of professional status, 
but it actually needs some symbols and some evidence base to show that and I think 
that chartered practitioner was very much part of that.’   This response suggests an 
historic ambiguity about public relations’ status as a profession, along with a desire 
to redress this.  However, in order achieve professional status, an evidence base 
needs to be created.  The Chartered Practitioner scheme attempts to utilize the 
experience of senior practitioners to fulfil this.  This tautological approach is mirrored 
by research by Grunig (1990:135) in which she measures public relations 
practitioners’ professionalism.  However, in this approach professionalism is gauged 
partly by practitioners’ participation in their professional body – a self-serving activity 
which does not reflect on practice or status outside of the profession. 
 
Despite this, only a small number of senior practitioners have applied for, and 
achieved, the award160, suggesting that attempts to drive professionalism by 
introducing a hierarchy of accreditation are not important to practitioners within the 
industry161.While the industry is dominated by graduates with degrees covering a 
range of subjects, few have a public relations degree or PR related qualification. This 
was supported by the interviews among PR practitioners, where, of those who took 
part, although all were graduates, only two had a public relations or related 
qualification. According to the CIPR, the need for qualifications is increasingly 
recognised by practitioners162 and several interviewees named this as a symptom of 
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 An interview with the CIPR revealed that the number of chartered practitioners was ‘about 40’. 
161
 The CIPR provide a range of qualifications for practitioners at different stages of their career. While a less 
experienced practitioner can register for ‘accredited’ status, only the most senior can apply for an individual 
charter. This career path is actively being reviewed. A member of staff explained: ‘It isn’t a kind of, necessarily a 
seamless transition from accredited practitioner to chartered practitioner, so perhaps that’s one of the things we 
might look at because they’re very different processes.’  
162
 Speaking on behalf of the CIPR, a spokeswoman said that: ‘In the last 18 months, two years, we’ve actually 
seen an increase in applications, in enrolments for professional qualifications, which in a still difficult economic 
context is quite heartening and encouraging.’  She speculated that the difficult economic climate might be one 
reason for this as practitioners looked to qualifications as a means of gaining competitive advantage for jobs.  
The CIPR Annual Report 2012 reveals that student membership was up by 259% in that year, compared with the 
previous twelve months (CIPR 2012). 
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professionalism, with one citing the ‘enormous array of events, lectures, books, 
measurements, professional qualifications.’  Despite this acknowledgement of the 
existence of professional qualifications, take up appears to be comparatively low.  
This is likely to be because other attributes unrelated to academic achievement, such 
as high levels of social and cultural capital, such as that utilised through high value 
informal networks, are more relevant to success. 
 
Johnson rejects efforts to find out what the special attributes of a profession are, 
arguing that there is no single ideal profession against which others can be judged 
and that assumed professional attributes differ widely across occupations163. 
Instead, he suggests it is more useful to examine the circumstances in which people 
in an occupation attempt to turn it into a profession and themselves into 
professional people. Johnson suggests that this is about group mobility and the 
sources of power that are available to occupational groups. This seems particularly 
apposite for PR as an occupation, where the professional body is seeking to acquire 
more professional status and recognition among its members.  While the interviews 
with practitioners echo this yearning for professional recognition, they also reveal a 
reluctance to take part in the more structured activities promoted by the professional 
body.   
 
This short summary of some of the main themes around the nature of 
professionalism raises some pertinent questions for this research. While nearly all 
interviewees spoke of increased professionalism within PR, this is not strongly 
supported according to the characteristics of professionalism described above. For 
most of interviewees, the idea of ‘professionalism’ in PR did not mean achieving a 
particular accreditation, but meant being more business-like and working more 
closely with other business functions.  Interviewees also expressed a desire for the 
contribution that public relations makes to be more widely recognised and 
understood within their organisations. As one interviewee explained: ‘I think 
business has demanded that communications gets more professional. I think... I 
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 Johnson lists some of these attributes, including skill based on theoretical knowledge, provision of training and 
education, testing the competence of members and adherence to professional code of conduct (Johnson, 1982). 
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think as you move to take a seat at the board table or to align yourself with strategic 
goals you have to be more professional, more considered and more robust. Robust 
around things like measurement and return on investment, because business is 
driving that, the industry has had to respond.... you hear less of the ‘PR girl’ and it’s 
becoming a real profession.’ This suggestion, that PR professionalism is linked to an 
understanding of business and is being driven more by demands of employers than 
by the industry itself, is supported by the low take up of chartered status164 and 
comparatively low membership of the professional body.  
 
The low numbers of practitioners participating in setting standards and control for 
the industry suggests that public relations’ self-determination of professionalism is 
weak. There is no industry-wide agreement about who may legitimately act as a PR 
professional, and no proactive regulation of professional behaviour. In contrast to 
the protection and distinction of expertise that Johnson refers to, the PR 
practitioners I spoke to suggested that their skills were transferable. One 
interviewee explained: ‘I think that what communications people do, what they bring 
to the party that is extra, is time and resources to do their job. This is their job. So 
while other people are doing what their jobs are, although they could be good 
communicators, they haven’t got time to do it.’ Not only does this casual dismissal of 
PR skills counter any suggestion that PR is a profession with a unique set of skills, it 
also suggests that PR people are given what others are not: time and resources to 
do a job. This conforms with Evett’s argument and Johnson’s model of patronage: 
the conditions needed to do PR are conferred by the employer, rather than pre-
existing within a separate professional community.  
 
As is described below, practitioners are adept at creating a mystique around their 
work by, on the one hand, claiming that there are no specialist skills required to 
succeed in PR, while on the other, remaining vague and elusive as to the details 
about how they operate. This lack of clarity about what PR is or how it works 
counters the emergence of professionalism, suggesting that there is no elite or 
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 The CIPR annual report does not reveal how many chartered practitioners there were in 2013, but simply says 
that seven practitioners were awarded the accreditation (CIPR 2013). 
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highly skilled group of practitioners – anyone with time and common sense can 
undertake the tasks. This mystification is part of the logic of public relations practice. 
The introduction of professional standards would help to make this logic more visible 
but, at the same time, could potentially also diminish it by attempting to standardise 
something which is currently given credence as a result of its ambiguity and the 
difficulties in defining it.  
 
Professionalism and field theory  
While sociological approaches to the study of professionalism concur that to be a 
professional worker means to be appropriately educated and well behaved, Bourdieu 
goes further, suggesting that the professional worker behaves according to the logic 
of the professional field in which he or she occupies a position (Warde 2004:15). A 
profession’s self-defining emphasis on qualifications, codes of practice and other 
standards strengthen the capital within the profession and make it legitimate. As 
Noordegraaf and Schinkel explain (2011), professional capital must be acquired in 
order to become professional, but this is a competitive struggle: if professionalism 
were open to everyone, it would lose its value. It is the distribution of economic, 
cultural and social capital that determine who is able to acquire professional capital 
and how it is done.  
 
Thus, they suggest, professionalism is a form of symbolic capital which contributes 
to the autonomy of the field. The self-defining nature of professionalism creates a 
shared recognition and legitimacy of the capital; workers whose behaviour conforms 
with the logic of the field will gather more of it. The more capital a worker 
possesses, the greater their influence within the field: it is this conflict and struggle 
for capital that is intrinsic to all fields. 
 
Bourdieu illustrates this approach in his study of the juridicial field (Bourdieu, 1987) 
which outlines the protocols, assumptions and behaviours professionals in the field 
used to define their own activity for themselves and for others outside the field. 
Within the legal field there is a clear history, strong traditions, distinctive language 
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and patterns of relationships which help deliver autonomy to the field, reinforcing 
the position of those within it, and keeping others out. These things give agents 
within the field a secure identity, a status, and above all a body of powers (or 
competences) that are socially recognized and therefore productive.  
 
Like other fields, it is a site of struggle; Bourdieu describes it as the site of a 
competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law (1987:817). The practical 
meaning of the law is really only determined in the confrontation between judges, 
lawyers and solicitors: each motivated by different interests. The logic of the 
juridicial field is determined by two factors: first, the specific power relations which 
give it its structure and which order the competitive struggles which occur within it, 
and, on the other hand, by the way it functions – the written and unwritten rules 
which constrain and determine the actions of agents within the field and which 
determine what it means to be ‘juridicial’. For Bourdieu, one of these is the use of 
juridicial language which is a mixture of specialist, technical and common language. 
The distinctive nature of juridicial language, he argues, creates a rhetoric of 
impersonality and neutrality that characterises the operation of the field.  
Bourdieu gives the example of the judgment of a court (1987:838), which 
establishes the facts and truth and which makes decisions on conflict or matters that 
have not been decided elsewhere. The judgement, he explains, is a performance, 
representing authorized, public and official speech: spoken in the name of and to 
everyone. Thus, he concludes, a judge succeeds in creating a situation in which no 
one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.  
 
Bourdieu’s description of the juridicial field provides an opening to a similar analysis 
of PR. While the juridicial field is the site of a competition for monopoly of the right 
to determine the law, the definitions of PR described above suggest that the PR field 
could be the site of competition for reputation. Yet the weakness of PR’s self-
determination of professionalism, together with the views expressed through 
interviews, suggest that standards of professionalism within the industry are being 
driven by employer organisations rather than collectively by practitioners 
themselves. If this is the case, it is employers’ recognition of the value and 
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importance of PR – and their requirements for greater accountability and 
measurement of performance - that is leading to greater demands of practitioners. 
As the interviews suggest, this is supported by an increasing and reciprocal 
expectation among PR practitioners that they will be influential in an organisation’s 
decision making and represented on its Boards.  
 
This is a comparatively recent development: almost thirty years ago, Broom and 
Dozier (1985) identified a separation between PR and the dominant coalition of 
executives who were influential within any given organisation. The isolation of PR 
from decision makers, they argued, limited its practice to the role of explaining and 
justifying others’ decisions. This conclusion was echoed by Grunig’s review of 
research (1990) which concluded that CEOs considered PR as ‘marginal at best’, 
seeing the function as a myopic, necessary evil (1990:122). While her study found a 
perception of a widespread understanding of public relations and little opposition to 
it from senior management, this does not equate to value.  
 
The value of PR  
Grunig’s research (1988, 1990) attempts to define the different elements that 
contribute to the value organisations place on the public relations department or 
function. Although this research would contend that her conclusions are now out of 
date, her analysis of the different criteria that contribute to value in PR still 
resonates today. For Grunig (1990), there are five broad categories of PR’s value: its 
position in the organisational hierarchy; the authority of PR practitioners; the 
autonomy given to the PR department; the involvement of top management in 
public relations and the education, specialised training and professional involvement 
(for example, with professional bodies) of individual practitioners. The first and last 
of these two criteria are discussed elsewhere in this chapter; concepts of autonomy 
and authority within PR are discussed below. These issues relate to the power 




Grunig (1990) assesses levels of power and autonomy by asking practitioners about 
the ways in which these are demonstrated in their work. Authority includes the 
power to hire staff, to set up media interviews or approve expenditure, while 
autonomy is measured in part by the extent of the ‘clearance process’ within an 
organisation – this means approval for the content of news releases and other 
written articles.  
 
Most participants in Grunig’s research indicated that they experienced a limited 
degree of authority and autonomy and gave explanations for this including sexism, 
newness to the office, being in a regional office rather than headquarters or 
restrictive government policy. None of these issues was raised by interviewees, and 
the most constraining factor in Grunig’s work – a lack of education in PR on the part 
of the dominant coalition of senior managers – seems to have been circumvented in 
today’s organisational structures. This research has not made the same quantitative 
evaluation as Grunig, but while interviewees may still be subject to formal approval 
processes, few referenced these in detail. Instead, they associated their authority 
with the relationships they had, and their membership of the ‘dominant coalition’ 
(1990:117).  While CEOs and other organisational leaders may not understand PR, 
all the interviewees claimed a widespread acceptance of the need for it and its 
centrality to their organisation’s operation.  As one senior practitioner inside 
government explained: ‘If you think about what government does, it thinks about, 
consults on, creates, persuades on, articulates and ultimately, disseminates policy.  
Policy is an intangible and it is brought to life through communication.  So most of 
the people who are here [within the government department], most of the good 
ones, are themselves good communicators’. Communications, or public relations, is 
at the heart of what government does, not only in terms of communicating finished 
policy but in the development of it.  The same interviewee went on to describe the 
communications’ function which he leads as the ‘DNA’ of the government 
department in question. 
 
Grunig asserted that the characteristics of PR practitioners themselves were a 
significant factor in their own failure to influence, citing lack of broad business 
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expertise, passivity, naiveté about organisational politics and inadequate education, 
experience or organisational status: ‘For whatever reason, public relations 
professionals rarely enjoy an influential position within their organisation. As a result, 
one can only hypothesize about the effects of a powerful public relations 
department’ (Grunig 1990:148).  In comparison with the present day, exclusion from 
the Board room was given as an example of PR’s irrelevance, while Grunig noted 
that the effect of this would be to inhibit the professional development of individual 
practitioners and of the entire field of public relations.  
 
The speed in which the PR industry has changed in recent years is illustrated by 
Hon’s research (1997), published seven years after Grunig’s. Based on interviews 
with both PR practitioners, CEOs and other managers, Hon identifies different 
attributes of PR effectiveness and, already, a broader understanding of business is 
evident. Hon’s list of attributes includes managing risks, building relationships, 
achieving goals and affect legislation, as well as more functional attributes, such as 
fostering media relations, increasing understanding and disseminating the right 
messages. Whereas relationship building is absent from Grunig’s review of existing 
literature, Hon identifies this as one of the major dependent variables for public 
relations effectiveness. The other is earning respect. These two, Hon suggests, 
contribute to reputation, the overarching measure of PR effectiveness.  
 
This discussion suggests that PR is struggling to emerge as a profession in its own 
right. The interviewees unanimously supported this struggle, identifying themselves 
as professionals who made a valuable contribution to their employer organisations. 
Yet the evidence for self-determination is weak, and here PR practitioners seem to 
rely on the patronage and judgement of their employer organisations to define their 
status. Only a minority of practitioners conform to the standards developed by their 
peers, via the CIPR’s educational qualification and other accreditations.  
 
PR has changed and is changing fast. While the industry in the UK may have 
originally emerged from the political field, the range of sectors in which practitioners 
operate has spread significantly to include charities, retail, utilities, manufacturing, 
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finance and the public sector. This is backed up by figures which show the reach of 
the industry: in 2005, the UK PR industry employed 48,000 practitioners, with a 
£6.5billion turnover (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 2005: 35). Six 
years later, in 2011, a different survey estimated the value of the industry in the UK 
to be £7.5 billion, and that 61,600 people were employed in public relations (Public 
Relations Consultants Association, 2011). While practitioners view the industry as 
still very young165, there is no doubt that the PR industry is growing. As one 
interviewee described: ‘When I first turned up at [names county council] in 2001 it 
was just the county press officer. There used to be a county press officer. Now that 
team is 20 and it’s one of the smaller ones. There are just so many more people in 
PR.’  Few other organisational functions or departments would have grown to twenty 
times their original size in less than two decades, particularly in organisations funded 
by the public purse. 
 
As a profession, or a field, PR is not comparable with law or medicine or 
accountancy but its changing value to business is clearly not a series of isolated 
events. I would contend that it is emerging as an autonomous field: a separate 
social universe, with its own laws of functioning, independent of those of politics and 
the economy (Bourdieu, 1993:162). Bourdieu describes a field as a ‘social universe’ 
and PR is clearly that.  Definitions of public relations place relationships at its 
essence and all of the interviewees spoke about the importance of communication 
skills and relationships for their work166. The centrality of relationships to PR practice 
means that field theory is a useful way to analyse the way in which power is 
symbolised and operationalised within PR167. The importance of relationships means 
there is potential for high levels of social capital168 among practitioners: in other 
                                            
165 In the CEBR report, the President of the CIPR, himself the Chief Executive of a PR consultancy, describes 
PR as a ‘maturing, confident, growing profession’, while other practitioners write that the opinion is still divided 
about whether or not it is a serious career (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 2005, pp. 4-7).  
166 These relationships varied from relationships with senior management (Chair or Chief Executive), to 
journalists, different public groups and colleagues throughout their organisation. 
167 This approach has been tested and validated by Anheier et al in a study of the social network of writers in the 
German city of Cologne which confirmed that writers’ position within the social hierarchy was determined by the 
volume and composition of the relationships available to them (Anheier, Gerhards, & Romo 1995).  
168 Bourdieu defines the concept of social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu:1986) . 
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words, the opportunity to accrue benefits through networks and relationships169. 
However, although as a practice, public relations meets the criteria set out for a 
field, the practitioners who took part in this fieldwork looked to their employer or 
sponsor organisation’s field first and foremost.  As is evidenced by the low take up of 
professional qualifications and Chartered status, public relations practitioners do not 
seek to enhance their position with the PR field, but within the field in which they 
are currently operating.  When asked about their career history, none of the 
practitioners questioned made reference to competition for jobs within the PR field.  
Instead, they presented their careers as seamless transitions from one role to 
another; any notion of a struggle with and between other agents in the same arena 
was notable by its absence.  Some practitioners spend their career within a 
particular field (for example, several interviewees had spent a large part of their 
career working within the political field), while others move between fields, utilizing 
their social and cultural capital to do so. What was clear from the interviews was 
that it is the sponsor organisation’s field which benefits from and acts as a source of 
capital for the practitioner rather than the public relations field. 
 
Public relations and social capital  
In an ethnographic study of PR practitioners within a particular organisation, 
Edwards identifies high levels of social capital among the practitioners she observed. 
She describes a reliance on strong internal and external networks in order to gather 
information that can be subsequently used to apply influence. While some of the 
interviewees for this research acknowledged this reliance on others in their 
organisation for information gathering170, others were dismissive of its significance 
and talked with more emphasis about how they can use that information and 
networks to exert influence over others171.  For example, one interviewee recalled 
                                            
169 In her ethnographic case study of the Corporate Affairs team of a large passenger transport company in the 
north of England, Edwards (2008) concludes that the most fundamental requirement for corporate affairs to 
conduct its job effectively was access to extensive networks. 
170
 For example, one interviewee talked about her reliance on colleagues to provide her with information that she 
could use in constructing press releases about her organisation.  
171
 Several interviewees talked about using their network to find new jobs. One spoke of being ‘poached’ from 
one role and being offered another through his network.  Another interviewee who had a particular PR 
specialism, talked of having ‘made a bit of a name for myself, I had a bit of a reputation.’ 
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how he helped a membership organisation respond to inaccuracies broadcast about 
it in a BBC TV programme. The organisation had failed to respond to the 
programme’s producers when they had made contact in advance of broadcast.  He 
explained: ‘Their own internal processes were poor, because they had been 
approached by the TV company but they hadn’t really… but the TV company’s 
approach hadn’t gone to the right person, or that person hadn’t really understood 
the severity of or seriousness of the issue and hadn’t taken action at the right time. 
If their own internal systems had been better, they would have had months to 
assemble a case and make a proper case to the broadcaster.’  This answer implies 
that a ‘proper’ response to the broadcaster could have been assembled had the 
organisation’s own processes been slicker, allowing it the time to respond.  The 
interviewee is not concerned that the organisation may not have had the relevant 
information to hand because this data could have been assembled or created.  
Rather, he is more concerned about the failure to manage relationships with the 
media appropriately. 
 
These responses begin to elicit a sense of the different styles of working that public 
relations practitioners have, compared with others in their organisation.  For 
practitioners, the continuing challenge is to influence others to their way of thinking 
and operating.  This sense of influence and authority is fundamental to success for 
practitioners; they cannot operate alone, but need others to support and reinforce 
their professional behaviour.   By utilising their social capital, they can claim access 
to resources possessed by their associates. Talking about how he sought to 
influence others, one interviewee explained: ‘I think that in this profession you can 
make the case quite strongly and there are other ways to get your way, in terms of 
the internal organisation....you can use various other people... you pre-brief other 
people, your contacts internally, and ensure you’re all singing from the same hymn 
sheet.’ The use of contacts reinforces a circle of influence for the practitioner; not 
only is he responsible for what is said, but he also decides who gets to say it.  
One interviewee gave a revealing description of how his social capital enabled him to 
acquire a single piece of information which he used to both influence and access the 




resources of an economically powerful network. Having found out over a drink with 
a government adviser that the Prime Minister was planning to announce a change of 
policy affecting the industry in which he worked, he texted his Chief Executive that 
same evening and brought together a network of senior business leaders who, 
within a period of about four months, committed £200 million to funding an 
alternative course of action. While his organisation had not provided any of the 
funding, the interviewee described how he positioned himself at the heart of this 
activity: ‘I guess I was coming up with ideas and I was also the strategist. But also I 
was doing a lot of work on documentation, documents, proposals, liaising with the 
different stakeholders wherever they were and keeping all the balls in the air.’ His 
personal social capital was enhanced by this activity, as the government accepted 
the proposed alternative, and his network then extended to include civil servants, 
politicians and PR agencies.  
 
As a researcher using snowball sampling, my contact with the interviewees was 
made possible as a result of their, and my, professional networks and is likely to 
have contributed to the social capital held by both sides. As described in an earlier 
chapter, many of the contacts were made using the LinkedIn networking site, and 
have resulted in ‘LinkedIn’ connections being made either before or after the 
interview. The practitioners interviewed were prepared to invest their time in taking 
part in the interview and, despite their busy schedules, all the interviewees assumed 
I would want to meet within a week of my first request172 and suggested times and 
dates to meet that accommodated this. Several of them asked about my professional 
standing and how my research would enhance it. Others referred to my professional 
role, having researched my background in advance of the interview, or expressed 
the view that I would know about their background as the result of similar research.  
More than one interviewee expressed pleasure at the prospect of contributing to, 
and possibly being quoted in, original academic research.  
 
One of the most striking elements arising from the fieldwork is the social capital that 
practitioners gain from their access to some of the most senior people within their 
                                            
172 This was not a priority for me, and I made no reference to time frames in my request for interviews. 
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organisations. The practitioners who took part had between six months and thirty 
years’ experience in PR, and every single one had a network that extended directly 
to the most senior management of the organisation they worked for, irrespective of 
their own role in the organisational hierarchy. Talking about the influence she had 
early on her career, one now senior practitioner said: ‘...you know, it always struck 
me, you know as flying without a safety harness sometimes, because of that 
disparity of seniority. So if you’re good, and you’re making the right calls, then yes, 
it can be hugely influential, but at that level of experience - I look back now and 
think oh gosh, did I do that, did I have that level of access?’  Social capital, then, 
belies seniority of position within an organisation; instead it is something that PR 
practitioners have access to, and learn to utilize, very early in their careers.  
 
This is reinforced by an annual ‘29 under 29’ feature in the PR industry’s trade 
magazine, PR Week – a list of practitioners under the age of 30 who the magazine 
deems to show particular promise (PR Week 2011). There are no published criteria 
for determining their inclusion, but their accomplishments extend beyond business 
acumen, or success in media relations, to include skills and characteristics which 
illustrate the high levels of social and cultural capital successful PR practitioners must 
possess. In 2011, the list included a 24-year old, who had set up her own PR agency 
and is a violinist, a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, speaks fluent German and 
Spanish and has run two marathons. Another practitioner featured has just three 
years’ experience and ‘is a comms counsel to senior government officials and 
ministers’ while a third aged 28, ‘in little more than a year in the job, has established 
herself as a trusted adviser to senior leaders and the global comms function [in her 
employer, a multi-national organisation].’ In common with the evidence from my 
interviews, the success and potential of these young practitioners is judged, at least 
partly, on the basis of their relationships with senior politicians and business 
executives.  
 
For practitioners lower down the hierarchy, working as press officers, their 
relationship with senior management is often functional, rather than strategic and 
comes from being able to determine what the organisational leader says, or even 
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speaking for them. Describing his conversations with journalists, one junior 
practitioner, working outside of government said: ‘It is very much up to me what I 
say and how I phrase it. When one thinks about authority and power... I don’t really 
have the authority but I have quite a lot of power to choose to say whatever I want 
really, or put whatever kind of spin or angle on it.’   This distinction between 
authority and power reflects the different kinds of status that public relations 
practitioners can possess.  While they may not have the authority that stems from a 
senior position in the organisational hierarchy, their power stems from their 
networks both within their organisations and among journalists and the exclusive 
access they have.  Access to senior management confers status on the press officer 
that can be used to influence others: another junior practitioner working outside 
government described how he persuaded a national newspaper journalist to come 
and conduct an interview with his chief executive despite not having a particular 
story to offer. He put together a briefing for his chief executive which he used as a 
basis for a conversation with the journalist : ‘We just wanted a meeting with a 
journalist and whatever comes out of that is a bonus, but actually it was about 
increasing and improving the profile of our chief exec... and I spoke to [the 
journalist] and he said: ‘Well if I come in and see you what will you talk about’ and I 
was like ‘Well you might be interested in this, this and this’, and then it just grew 
organically from there.’  The press officer’s casual description of the conversation 
belies the fact that he is constructing and directing a media event. The organisation 
has no particular news to present, simply a desire to increase the profile of the chief 
executive. Despite this, the press officer works to generate interest from a national 
newspaper journalist by constructing news which both influences what the journalist 
eventually writes about and shapes the message that comes from his organisation. 
The press officer’s role is to be a bridge between his organisation and the journalistic 
field; in doing so he negotiates between the two, recognising and responding to the 
demands of each. The end result benefited all parties: the journalist was credited 
with the publication of a two page feature while the chief executive welcomed the 




The press officer’s role as bridge gives them a type of power which is unrivalled 
within their sponsor organisation; the power to determine how the organisation 
presents itself and how it is represented through the news media.  With journalists 
increasingly seeking news from existing digital or other news sources (Klinenberg 
2005), interviewees were aware that journalists are dependent on them as sources 
of material.  This dual dependence – from both the journalist and their sponsor 
organisation - places public relations practitioners in pole position to influence both 
what their sponsor organisation says publicly and what it is written about it.  As one 
senior interviewee operating within government explained: ‘And you know now, the 
number of times I send out press releases these days and the whole damn thing is 
reprinted …these days if you send out a long press release the whole damn thing 
will be reproduced, and in quite significant journals… And so there’s a complexity in 
that change in that quite often journalists will come to you; particularly when they’re 
doing the sensitive issues and they will not have a clue at all, and so you are starting 
right at the base level… It can be quite difficult if somebody comes at you from a 
particular angle because actually you need to educate them from the base line and 
they need a lot of support in delivering the story.’ Here, the journalist is not just 
dependent on the press officer because of limited access to economic or other 
resources in terms of news gathering, but also because of their own lack of cultural 
capital or knowledge and experience in particular subjects.  The practitioner can 
compensate for this by providing information which becomes news and which is 
framed by the interviewee as providing support to the journalist in doing their role.  
In this, public relations logic begins to take shape, as the practitioner chooses how 
to represent their organisation and their words are reprinted without significant 
editorial challenge. 
 
At a more senior level, practitioners increasingly expect their network to extend to 
Board level within organisations. As one senior interviewee inside government put it: 
‘I mean look at the old board level diagram. PR used to be a line that was going off 
from marketing, it wasn’t even on the page, and now I think there’s usually a direct 
line from the Board with many PR directors at Board level.’ Such a senior position 
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gives practitioners the status to influence and direct important organisational 
decisions.  
 
My interviews suggest that PR practitioners clearly enjoy and, to a large degree, 
expect to have a high level of social capital within their field.  This social capital is 
prevalent within their organisation and beyond, in particular to the journalistic field. 
There is a clear valorisation present within the relationships and networks that 
deliver this capital: as the PR practitioner confers status on the leaders of the 
organisation through their work, so the leaders rely on, and confer authority on the 
PR practitioners. Often this leads to a close working relationship between leader and 
PR practitioner173. When asked how he influenced strategic decisions within his 
organisation, on senior interviewee working outside government explained: ‘I guess 
it was in [chief executive’s] office. Then [decisions] would go to Board level – to the 
Council and Executive, but it was my direct relationship with [chief executive]. I was 
trusted.’ Here, the social capital is conferred on the practitioner by his admittance to 
the room where decisions are made; this generates trust, which in its turn reinforces 
social capital as decisions are referred up the organisational hierarchy to the Chair 
and Board.  
 
What is less clear from interviews is what it is that enables this social capital to be 
acquired. The practitioners I spoke to were vague about where the authority comes 
from which enables them to exert such influence. While all acknowledged the 
influence that PR people carried, their explanations about how that authority was 
conferred were varied, ranging from claims that the authority was given in response 
to public relations’ increasing effectiveness, to an acknowledgement that it was 
important to be in the Chief Executive’s office when key decisions were made. If 
there is no obvious means by which this authority is conferred, neither does it come 
from having a distinct or high-value skill set. Although, as is described below, public 
relations practitioners generally possess high levels of cultural capital, my 
interviewees were, on the whole, modest about the skills needed to do their roles. 
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They claimed that a good PR professional requires little more than good verbal and 
written communication skills, the ability to spell, common sense, and a connection 
with the truth174. Having such a generalised set of skills did not seem to have 
disadvantaged the people I spoke to: all my interviewees described their transitions 
from one role to another as effortless, giving no indication of struggle or anxiety. 
They described careers in which they had had a variety of opportunities, providing 
different types of fulfilment175. As is described below, their backgrounds and 
qualifications may have contributed to this, along with their social capital, but this 
was generally not acknowledged.  
 
Mystification of practice  
Deliberate or not, this reluctance to elaborate on the nature of their individual 
contribution suggests a certain mystification to PR practice which makes it hard to 
pin down. This may be because of the weak participation in industry standards 
outlined above or because each practitioner is largely dependent on their employer’s 
evaluation of their success. Mystification hides the absence of common standards for 
both the individual practitioner and the industry as a whole. Talking about how he 
produced written briefing materials which would be shared with journalists one 
junior interviewee, working outside government in the financial sector, said: ‘All I got 
from everywhere I looked was middle class feeling the squeeze, banks putting the 
squeeze on middle classes, banks putting the squeeze on small businesses, banks, 
middle classes, small businesses, banks, middle classes, small businesses, squeeze, 
squeeze, squeeze, squeeze, squeeze, recession, squeeze, recession, squeeze, 
recession, squeeze. So I took all those words and reworded them in terms of the 
order that I wanted, and there you go – done.’ This process, he said, had generated 
stories for his client in the national newspapers, but from the description quoted 
above it is hard to work out how. While this process was effective in securing press 
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 One interviewee was clear that PR did not need particular skills: ‘One of the things that one of my early 
bosses said to me, was that you need two things to be good at PR – you need 50% common sense and 50% 
creativity. And I thought that that was a very good mantra, and obviously I’ve remembered it because I‘ve just 
shared it with you.’ 
175 The fulfilment is not always financial. One interviewee described himself as ‘getting bored’ in one role, while 
other interviewees talked about the appeal of increased seniority and influence, meaning influence within their 
organisations as well as the influence to drive societal or cultural change. 
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coverage, the description of it given in the interview does not suggest the process 
was particularly rigorous.  
 
The press officer described above who secured an interview for his chief executive 
provided a similarly abstruse explanation for how he achieved this. The journalist 
asked what would be talked about if he came in for the interview. The press officer 
replied: ‘...and I was like ‘Well you might be interested in this, this and this’, and 
then it just grew organically from there’. This casual summation of what eventually 
went on to become a two page national newspaper feature belies any sense of 
effort, planning or expertise on the press officer’s part. It is presented as a casual, 
almost offhand exchange in which the press officer presents subject areas in such a 
way as to pique the journalist’s interest. He did not describe in any detail the topics 
he used to tempt the journalist to agree to conduct the interview and the researcher 
is left none the wiser as to how such a scoop had been achieved.  In fact, the 
description of what took place is so vague that it is not even possible to ascertain 
whether this is the same type of practice described in other interviews. Unlike the 
unwritten rules of the juridicial field, the mystification within public relations is not 
structured and there is nothing to suggest that different practitioners follow the 
same pattern of mystification in their work.  Instead, it is presented as an ambiguity 
of practice, and this is reflected in the equivocation that interviewees employed 
when describing what they do.  This mystification serves to enhance perceptions of 
the practitioner’s power: they are not prepared to reveal the tactics they use to exert 
influence over the media.  The symbolic status given to the media (cf Couldry 2003; 
2004) enhances the PR practitioner’s status here and those around them are left 
guessing and perhaps with some admiration at the PR practitioner’s ability to take 
control of the news media. 
 
This is PR logic at work: the press officer presents a narrative about his organisation 
in such a way that it tempts the journalist to leave the journalistic field and enter the 
field occupied by the organisation concerned176. The resulting press coverage 
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 In this instance, the journalist literally entered the field occupied by the organisation concerned as the 
interview took place in the Chief Executive’s office. 
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confers authority on the press officer’s representation of events, reinforcing the 
narrative he has presented as true. At the same time, he has briefed his Chief 
Executive about what to say and how to say it during the interview, ensuring that 
the PR logic takes effect within both his sponsor organisation and the media 
institution which publishes the interview.  But while the logic is evident in the impact 
that the press officer’s activity has – resulting in the two page feature – there is no 
clear indication of the process by which the logic works.  The practice that this 
mystification shields is tied up with the practitioner’s social capital, because it is 
utilized through the relationships they have as they work to convince both their 
internal organisational sponsors and journalists of the merit of what they are trying 
to achieve. 
 
Within the interviews there was some implication that what lies behind the mystique 
is not always the type of activity that a practitioner would want to see exposed. One 
practitioner working outside government explained that his role was to stop his chief 
executive from having to get his hands dirty, while another also working outside of 
government said: ‘I think it was always relished that there was a grey area – you 
know, like In The Thick Of It 177– the dark arts, you can push boundaries, influence 
change. I think there’s an appreciation now that you can only do that for so long 
now or you get found out so aren’t you better placed to set up structures...’ The 
mystification may subvert or at least in part be a substitute for structures and 
standards, but public relations practitioners are alert to the fact that they may soon 
be found out.  
 
The interviewees were candid about the existence of such mystification, even if they 
were reluctant to dwell on it. One interviewee described it as creativity, Edwards 
(2008) calls it ‘instinct’. Another interviewee called it a ‘Spidey sense’ developed after 
a decade in the business, while a third referred to it as ‘thinking outside the box’. 
This mystification may be intended to shield practitioners from scrutiny of the lack of 
widely adopted professional standards within public relations, but Edwards observes 
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 A BBC television comedy series that satirises the inner workings of the British government where the lead 
character is a media strategist, known for his Machiavellian ways of working 
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that it both forms the basis of PR practitioners’ claim to influence and power and 
enhances the industry’s reputation for competence. As one of my interviewees, a 
junior practitioner operating outside government observed, laughing: ‘I have had to 
manage expectations, and I think that there are people who imagine I can do things 
that I can’t do.’  As such, mystification becomes a common pattern of behaviour and 
absence of certainty about PR practitioners’ role makes their success, failure or 
behaviour, equally difficult to judge. 
 
The interviews provide some clues that disrupting the status quo and creating new 
norms is part of this mystification. As one senior practitioner, operating within 
government, explained: ‘Well, it’s an influencing tool. I mean, communications is an 
influencer. So you can interrupt the way that people are thinking are about 
something. You can interrupt people’s plans for things, by talking about something 
new or something different or something changed.’  This capacity to interrupt or 
intervene is part of the transformation process that PR can enact.  Another 
interviewee explained how his role was a creative one helping to shift not just 
perception but also reality. Speaking about his current role, he said: ‘It turned out to 
be a similar job [to my previous role] in the end... it turned into thinking outside the 
box, not doing what people expected, thinking of a more positive alternative that’s 
more attractive to people and persuasive than what otherwise might have been.’  
This creativity belies the clearly established and shared standards of behaviour 
Bourdieu identifies in the juridicial field; it suggests that an element of what makes 
PR valuable is its unpredictability and ability to divert from what is expected. Thus 
the mystification becomes a form of logic for the field, a way of operating that 
shields practitioners from external scrutiny and creates a style of working that is only 
understood by those within the field. This is a logic that comes from human agency 
– from the instinct or creativity of the practitioner - rather than from external 
structures. Without widespread professional structures and standards existing as 
barriers to entry to the field, mystification is perpetuated by those within the field as 




A more tangible source of influence for PR practitioners is their ability to forge 
effective networks and relationships and this was named by interviewees as a key 
asset. The way that this ability is used to influence is evident throughout the 
interviews: it leads to the adoption of particular types of discourse by journalists and 
others and drives the way in which issues are presented in the public sphere178. As 
the examples detailed in this chapter illustrate, the ability to influence can be 
deployed in situations as varied as a phone call to a journalist encouraging him to do 
an interview, or a speech to a formal meeting persuading decision makers to change 
an organisation’s name, or corralling senior figures in industry to donate hundreds of 
millions of pounds to support a cause that will, in its turn, influence government 
policy.   This influence is sourced partly from the nature of their networks which 
place them as key advisers to organisational leaders, and partly from the cultural 
capital embodied within them as individuals. It is the combination of social and 
cultural capital that practitioners possess which creates a distinctiveness to their 
role, emphasized by their access to senior management.  
 
The cultural capital practitioners possess serves to confer distinction and prestige,179 
and the authority it confers both enhances and is enhanced by their interactions with 
journalists who are as eager to report on the activities and views of senior 
executives as those senior executives are for positive press coverage. As an 
organisation’s main contact with the media, PR practitioners act as an effective 
gateway for reputation, fostering a reliance on their skills and networks by 
journalists and senior managers alike. One interviewee, a senior practitioner 
operating outside government, illustrated this point: ‘One of the very interesting little 
nuggets that I discovered about Alistair Campbell was that he was absolutely 
charming to deal with, a delight. He’s got this reputation as being a bull terrier, but 
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 This power is highlighted by Bourdieu (1991) who regards language as one of the main tools through which 
symbolic power is perpetuated. Bourdieu (1998) characterizes certain professionals – journalists, politicians, 
public relations practitioners – for whom language is at the heart of their work, as symbolic producers, 
transforming or disguising interests into disinterested meanings and legitimizing arbitrary power relations. Like 
Edwards (2008), Motion and Weaver (2005) also interpret the way in which PR exercises this power: through 
creating misrepresentation in communications that masks the real organisational interest in the activity. By 
persuading audiences of a particular point of view, practitioners work to maintain or improve the position of their 
employing organisations in society.  
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 Bourdieu (1986:47) explains that cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state (in the long 
lasting dispositions of mind and body), in the objectified state (form of cultural goods – pictures, books, 
dictionaries) and in the institutionalised state, a form of objectification which must be set apart.  
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in order to have a successful career he has to be able to get on with people. He has 
to know, how do I manage this person in order to get what I want? And that’s a key 
skill.’   This quote suggests that a degree of mystification is also embedded in 
practitioners’ relationships, where the practitioner’s personality is shielded behind a 
protective screen of toughness and/or charm.  But other senior practitioners in 
government were more direct about the qualities they valued in their public relations 
staff.  They identified qualities such as courage, judgement and good grace as being 
necessary for success in public relations.  These attributes are part of the cultural 
capital that a practitioner possesses; they are not something which can easily be 
learned but rather pre-existing capabilities which the practitioner brings to the role. 
 
Such cultural capital embodied within practitioners derives from their background 
and education. It is illustrated by the higher than average levels of education and 
income PR practitioners enjoy (Centre for Economics and Business Research 2005; 
COMRES, December 2012) and perhaps particularly their facility with words and 
language180. The public relations industry is largely a graduate one; over three 
quarters of practitioners have an undergraduate degree and just over half (51%) 
claim to speak a foreign language. While it is predominantly a role occupied by 
women (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 2005; COMRES 2012), men 
are more likely to hold senior positions. It is overwhelmingly white (Centre for 
Economics and Business Research, 2005; Edwards 2010) with a clear bias towards 
London and the South East — with a quarter of all public relations workers living in 
London, and in excess of a further quarter (27%) live either in the rest of South East 
or East England — in commuting range of the capital (Centre for Economics and 
Business Research, 2005)181. 
 
In their study of German writers, Anheier et al (1995) concluded that cultural capital 
was the determinant of dominance within the writers’ social network, determining 
                                            
180 Recent discussions by senior practitioners for the industry body suggested that the current emphasis on 
writing skills is as much of a disadvantage as the industry’s lack of diversity. Describing a ‘worst case scenario’ 
for PR in 2020, practitioners wrote: ‘It is white, mono-cultural and ageist, and dominated by the use of writing 
skills’ (White, 2011) . 
181 The Chartered Institute of Public Relations reports that two thirds of its members are based outside London 
although it is not clear how many of its members live within commuting range.  
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who was seen as elite and who was seen as peripheral. While the PR field is 
different from the field which writers inhabit, this conclusion is supported by 
Edwards who notes that the weekly trade magazine for PR, PR Week, runs regular 
profiles on practitioners which consistently associate practitioners’ success with their 
personal style, creativity, or background (2010).  
 
This focus on cultural capital is supported by my own experience of meeting 
interviewees. Without exception, they were polished performers, socially confident 
and happy to talk on tape and at length about their work and role. I met with them 
in places of their suggestion – often West End bars or coffee shops within walking 
distance of their place of work182.  Without exception these were boutique style, 
independent coffee shops or patisseries, or expensive and fashionable bars, where 
my interviewees were evidently used to spending time and where they chatted with 
familiarity to the serving staff.  While I approached each interview expecting to buy 
refreshments for my interviewee, more often than not they offered to foot the bill. 
During one interview, which took place late one afternoon in the interviewee’s office, 
one of her colleagues brought in a glass of champagne for each of us183. Only one of 
my interviewees – one of the oldest among them - wore a full suit and tie; the 
others were dressed more informally.  While none of them wore jeans and all 
appeared smartly and fashionably attired, even those who worked in the formal 
setting of central government were casually dressed in comparison with other 
professional roles. 
 
The high level of cultural capital interviewees possessed was evident as the 
interviews began. When asked about how they began their PR career, most of them 
began by describing their education – all were graduates and several had post-
graduate qualifications. They spoke confidently about subjects which appeared to be 
outside their direct sphere of expertise; they demonstrated an ability and willingness 
to take part in debate, even if they knew little about the subject.  For example, even 
                                            
182 In two instances the meeting took place in venues that were restricted to members only, where the 
interviewee was a member and signed me in as a guest.  
183 It was explained that the champagne was from an employee’s leaving do in the same offices. Yet reviewing 
the tape afterwards, it is striking how the incident did not distract the interviewee from her flow. She merely 
thanked her colleague for the drink and continued, as if nothing unusual had happened.  
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those with no evident direct connection with Islam spoke with some degree of 
knowledge about the current debates surrounding Islam and media, presenting an 
informed approach to current affairs.  Two interviewees, on hearing a summary of 
the research presented at the beginning of the interview, spontaneously began to 
opine about Islam without a single question being asked.  This was despite the fact 
that, to my knowledge, they had no specialist interest or expertise in Islam and this 
was not what I wanted to ask them about. 
 
Edwards (2008) suggests that the cultural capital PR people possess entitles them to 
create discourses that generate consensus about reality, simultaneously 
misrepresenting the real interests that underlie that reality so that those who are 
subject to it are not aware of them. All my interviewees spoke about creating 
narratives or messages that presented a particular picture of reality – from one man 
who outlined the events leading to the creation of a discourse that encouraging 
physical exercise was better than banning advertising for unhealthy foods, to 
another who spoke about the power of PR in changing culture, for example in 
persuading people to stop smoking or changing perception of ethnic minorities 
through press reporting.  As he explained: ‘You are creating culture in PR. In a very 
little way, but in an important way. You are always dealing with the stories people 
tell about themselves, with the lies they tell.’184 This suggests that the role of PR is 
to recast stories which other people tell and using them individually and collectively 
to create a broader societal narrative.  
 
Public relations activity produces press releases and other documentation which both 
legitimise these narratives and justify their existence; without such tools the 
discourses would be merely ephemeral and fleeting.  Press releases are one of the 
the main mechanisms by which information is passed to journalists, often published 
on organisational websites.  They carry the authority of being an official source of 
news, while at the same time, presenting the organisation’s information in 
conformity with the logic of the media.  These documents are themselves forms of 
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 Social capital, as well as cultural, is important in the construction of messages, as these are usually produced 




cultural capital and, as my interviews revealed, PR practitioners use the skills 
embodied within the cultural capital they themselves carry to produce them. As one 
junior interviewee, operating outside government, explained how he drafts press 
releases: ‘I guess writing it...knowing that it is going to be for different audiences, 
and trying to make it as appealing as possible in terms of language used. It’s looking 
and thinking about The Mail and The Sun and the Telegraph and thinking about how 
it can play there, thinking about how it can appeal to the masses.’ The use of the 
term ‘the masses’ suggests that the practitioner sees himself as separate from this 
group but able to understand their needs, although a special effort is needed to 
ensure that particular language appeals to them.  
 
Public relations habitus 
The interviews conducted for the fieldwork provide a flavour of the habitus – or 
structuring structures (Bourdieu 2007:170) – of the public relations field.  
Interviewees were asked to describe ‘how they got into PR’ and most took the 
opportunity to describe high levels of education, with all participants having at least 
an undergraduate degree.  While other studies show that such high levels of 
education are common among all practitioners (CEBR 2005), the interviews reveal 
that professional networks take priority and provide a structure within which activity 
takes place.  Thus, practitioners are able to progress within the field as a result of 
who they know, as well as how they manage relationships with those more senior to 
them and agents outside the field, including in the journalistic field.   This means 
that to succeed agents within the field need to be sociable with strong interpersonal 
skills, able to get on with and communicate with people within and external to their 
sponsor organisations.  Interviewees demonstrated how they regularly blurred the 
lines between social and professional contact, for example by meeting peers from 
outside the field for drinks in the evening to exchange information185.    
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 This blurring between professional and personal was also illustrated by the fact that most interviewees were 
happy to take time out of their working day to meet me. 
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Public relations practitioners adopt the habitus of the political field: this was perhaps 
more evident among the practitioners operating within the political field than among 
those working in other fields (such as financial public relations, or transport186). The 
exchange of information and knowledge is important within the political field; this is 
a key resource which public relations practitioners trade and rely on. Practitioners 
are keen to be seen to be knowledgeable and informed about a range of subjects 
and take time to keep up with current affairs.  There is a visibility to public relations 
practice; for practitioners being known and visible within their sponsor organisation’s 
field is critical and they rely on this visibility to help maintain and enhance their 
social capital.  Practitioners demonstrated curiosity and were continually on the 
lookout for new opportunities. The practitioners I spoke with were all well versed in 
using technology to keep up to date and in touch with a range of professional and 
social networks.  
 
Those interviewed for the research displayed a sense of social confidence and self-
assurance in the way they spoke and presented themselves.  This was evident in 
their choice of venues for the interview, their style of clothes and their easy 
negotiation of the social etiquette of the encounter in which they offered to pay for 
the refreshments.  All began the meetings with relaxed small talk which focused on 
what we had in common – be it professional acquaintances or shared professional 
interests.  Despite this confidence, career ambition did not appear to be a unifying 
factor among interviewees.  Few described a drive to get to the top, and many 
referred to the way in which their professional role had been undervalued by 
organisations in the past.  Similarly, none disclosed that they were motivated in their 
job by economic considerations – either personal or on behalf of their 
organisations187.  Instead, the capacity to influence -  both internally and more 
widely with journalists and other groups – seemed to drive satisfaction and 
enjoyment. This is supported by Grunig’s observation (1990) that power, or the 
                                            
186
 It should be noted that those working in the political field had, on average, spent more of their career in that 
single field that practitioners working in other fields.  Those outside the political field were more likely to have 
moved between and across fields in the course of their career, for example from transport to education or 
finance. 
187
 This may be skewed by the high proportion of interviewees from inside government where public relations 
would not be expected to contribute to the bottom line in the same way that it would in a commercial organisation. 
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perception of power, is a key driver in PR practitioners’ job satisfaction.  Those 
practitioners interviewed clearly valued the opportunity to engage with the most 
senior people in their organisations, and to hold relationships (for example with 
journalists) that no-one else in their organisation did.  This suggests that there is a 
perceived exclusivity, or uniqueness, within the public relations field which 
practitioners enjoy and are keen to protect. 
 
The mystification of practice is also part of the habitus of the field; acting as a shield 
against those seeking to challenge the practitioners’ sources of power and serving to 
reinforce their authority within their sponsor organisation.  Practitioners were 
reluctant to identify the particular characteristics they brought to their role, 
dismissing these as little more than common sense or having the time to do things 
that other people do not have time for.  This could be false modesty, as the 
practitioner is aware that no-one else has access to the same networks and 
relationships as they do, but at the same time there is the possibility of an 
underlying realisation that the skills they bring are relational rather than based on 
technical skill or specialist knowledge. The mystification of practice is itself a 
structure beyond the nature of PR practice; this is harder to define because of the 
dismissive and blasé manner in which practitioners articulate what they do. These 
two structures – social networks and mystification – make it harder for new entrants 
to challenge the dominance of those already in the field.  For a new entrant, 
uncovering how public relations really works will be a challenge that can only be 
addressed through experience.  Practitioners spoke of the time it had taken them to 
reach the centre of the field, building up networks and relationships as they went.  
The nature of the field means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at the 
centre quickly, irrespective of economic capital that is available. 
 
Public relations in the political field  
As is discussed above, high levels of social and cultural capital were revealed as 
common across all PR practitioner interviewees, irrespective of the field occupied by 
their sponsor organisation. This suggests that capital is intrinsic to the role itself and 
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the skills and experience the practitioner brings to the role, rather than the 
organisation worked for. The nature of the research means that interviews focused 
in particular on PR practice within the political field and eleven interviewees had 
worked in this environment, either for a political party or in a government 
department.  Five of the eleven had very senior experience of public relations in the 
political field – for example, they had worked or were working as a Director of 
Communications for a central government department. This job role meant that they 
were regarded as the most senior PR practitioner within their organisation and that 
they interacted on a daily basis with the Secretary of State. One of the five had 
worked at 10 Downing Street in a communications role. The results of these five 
interviews help to establish how PR operates at the heart of the political field.  
 
The interviews revealed a striking consistency in the way individuals were positioned 
within the political field. All had begun their career in communications working for 
political organisations, and during the course of their careers they had moved closer 
into the heart of the political field. The interviewees were at the centre of the 
political field not only because of where they worked, but also as a result of their 
senior positions, which gave them access to Ministers and, as one interviewee 
described it, ‘leverage’. Their level of familiarity with senior politicians was evident; 
they all described the difficulties and opportunities of working directly with 
government ministers and spoke of them with familiarity, with some referring to 
Secretaries of State by their first names.  
 
While being at the centre of the field gives these government communicators access 
to the most powerful decision makers, it also highlights a greater tension in 
relationships than was revealed by other interviews. This tension is partly because of 
the neutrality of their position as civil servants but also as a result of their role as 
communications practitioners. Two interviewees talked about giving advice to 
government ministers that might not be listened to, while others emphasised the 
responsibility of government communicators to be the voice of integrity within the 
organisation. This was described as being the ‘conscience’ of the organisation: 
organisations had to be prepared to be honest about their weaknesses if 
 185 
 
communications was to succeed. This tension puts demands on senior PR 
practitioners to be credible so that they are taken seriously by government ministers 
or senior civil servants. The need to maintain credibility while at the centre is an 
urgent one, not necessarily because of competition from other government 
communicators, but because of the tension in the relationship with politicians.  
 
These interviewees were more specific about what qualities were needed to succeed 
at the centre of the political field. They talked about intangible qualities such as 
courage, judgement and good grace which are separate from technical 
communications skills. While these qualities are not unique to the political field, 
interviewees emphasised them as particularly important when building and 
maintaining relationships with those at the centre of the political field.  These skills 
are acquired through experience and a willingness to learn from mistakes, 
suggesting that reaching the centre of the field is dependent on both length of 
career and hard bitten experience, rather than communications skills.  When talking 
about their experience, few interviewees referred to the type of learning that comes 
from making mistakes.  Instead, they described the knowledge they had acquired 
during the course of their careers in the context of understanding people and 
relationships.  Career milestones were not described in the context of vocational 
qualifications, or promotions to different job titles.  Instead, interviewees described 
career shifts in the context of going to work for someone new, often someone 
prominent in the public sphere, such as a government minister.   
 
The interviewee who had worked at No.10 Downing Street providing a revealing 
example of the authority that working there provided: ‘So a lot of what No.10 does 
is trying to unravel what’s been said by other people as truths, which are not. So a 
lot of what we are doing is trying to unravel this, to explain what is actually 
government policy and not what’s been perceived by others, or misunderstood. So a 
lot of it is trying to put right what people think we’re trying to achieve.’ ‘Truth’ is 
held at the very centre of the field – at the Prime Minister’s office and the authority 
of the government communicators working there is such that they are able to ‘put 
right’ the untruths communicated by others.  The ‘truth’, as defined by PR 
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practitioners at No.10, then gets cascaded through departmental press officers out 
to the news media. 
 
This interviewee went on to describe the challenges for press officers working in 
central government departments drafting press materials which were changed and 
added to by numerous officials without public relations experience. The job at No.10 
was to ‘cut through the crap and say I don’t understand that and I can’t have three 
paragraphs to answer a single point. This is what the line will be.’ The authority held 
through working at 10 Downing Street could be shared with junior press officers in 
departments and could also extend beyond public relations practitioners to influence 
other officials: ‘They’re not stupid, they know that what they’ve dished out - because 
they don’t have leverage - is basically not fit for purpose. So if No.10 can help by 
saying, you know that it’s rubbish, this is what we’re going to say, go back and tell 
your officials that this is what No.10 say.’ In this way, the centre of the field confers 
its authority on the rest of the field and the communicator at No.10 is able to 
delegate authority to colleagues in other departments.  The impact of this delegated 
authority empowers the press officer or public relations practitioner, to challenge 
officials in their own organisation who may be more senior in the organisational 
hierarchy than they are. 
 
Another interviewee referred to improving ‘comms literacy’ among colleagues in 
other areas, describing the challenge of announcing civil servant bonuses to the 
media: ‘And what I mean by that [comms literacy] is being able to spot that bonuses 
is going to be a big issue, and maybe we should think about planning ahead, rather 
than wanting to contact the press office the day before because they see comms as 
an add-on, rather than intrinsic to the issues that they’re dealing with.’ This 
interviewee went on to say that the ideal from their perspective would be for 
communications to be a deciding factor in how bonuses were managed within the 
organisation. This ideal reflects the potential for PR logic; where the public relations 
practitioner’s preferred way of working shapes how the organisation operates.  As 
the interviewee stated, public relations becomes intrinsic to decision making, rather 
than an add-on. 
 187 
 
Interviewees at the centre of the political field described the environment in which 
they worked as very highly structured, with a clear hierarchy of relationships 
established within and between departments188. Each of them ascribed a similar 
purpose for the work of government communications: that of providing information 
which is of value to citizens. The role of communications is as a ‘translator’ – 
providing clear and ‘plain English’ explanations of government policy for the public. 
As one interviewee explained: ‘Now the people who are working on policy, often 
they don’t speak the same language that you and I might speak, so the role of 
professional communicators is to help policy officials speak to members of the 
public, different stakeholders, in language that they understand.’ This description of 
the role of communicators suggests that without their work the political field would 
struggle to be understood, because it speaks a language that other fields cannot 
understand. Being able to translate this language enhances the cultural capital of 
government communicators and reinforces their position in both the political field 
and other fields. This engagement is important, but according to my interviewees it 
is achieved remotely, or by using third parties. For example, two interviewees spoke 
about the importance of using research agencies to find out what the public was 
thinking, while another talked of conducting public consultations. None of the 
interviewees talked about direct engagement with the public by them or their staff. 
The government communicators are positioned at the centre of the political field and 
their role is to help the political field communicate with other fields, but they do this 
by staying within the ‘bubble’ rather than by venturing outside it. The centre of the 
political field has geographical boundaries, described as the Westminster ‘village’ or 
‘bubble’. One interviewee described it: ‘The village is the bit that way towards 
[Westminster] Abbey and it goes down White[hall]…’  By describing it as the ‘village’ 
the interviewee reinforces his or her own and others’ social capital.  Like a country 
village, Westminster is a small, strongly inter-connected community where everyone 
knows each other. Although small geographically and in numbers of people, the 
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 The communications function has a clear position within departments, and relationships between PR 
practitioners and politicians and permanent secretaries operate according to a defined Civil Service Code and 
more recently, agreed definitions of what communications is and how it operates. For all five practitioners, such 
structured frameworks were necessary for success: ensuring consistency and providing clear boundaries within 




community is an elite space.  Only those who are part of it understand the rules and 
how the community operates. By setting boundaries around the village – both 
geographic and in terms of rules of behaviour – the village remains exclusive, 
making it harder for others outside to breach its borders. 
 
The public relations practitioners interviewed identified themselves as part of that 
elite community, although it is primarily a political community rather than a public 
relations one.  By naming Westminster as their personal sphere of operation, they 
associated themselves with the symbolic power that Westminster represents: the 
power represented by the Palace of Westminster – Parliament - to determine 
legislation and make decisions affecting people’s lives.  By describing the centre of 
power as a village, they are asserting their place within it.  While this claim to 
symbolic power was most evident within this particular interview, assimilation into 
the political field was evident throughout the interviews, particularly with the most 
senior practitioners within government.  They saw themselves positioned at the 
heart of the village, or the political field, and were deeply embedded in its structures 
and ways of operating.   Interviewees spoke about the social rules within the village, 
which are very well established: ‘And in the village, the only papers that matter are 
The Times, The Telegraph, The FT and, if you’re very lucky, The Guardian. Nobody 
reads The Mail.’ The interviewee is so confident of his own network and the 
behaviour of others within the village that he can state with certainty which 
newspapers they read. The role of government communicators is to persuade those 
within the village of the benefit of communicating with people outside its boundaries 
and to do that communication for them using channels of communication – such as 
The Daily Mail – that people within the village don’t access.  
 
Within the ‘village’ there is a high level of social capital, expressed through active 
professional networks189. This importance of knowing the rules is enhanced by the 
entry requirements into the field which are primarily based on social capital. 
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 One interviewee asked me who else I was talking to (this information was not disclosed), while another spoke 
about their recent regular get together with other Directors of Communications in government departments. 
Although my interviews were secured through snowball sampling, four of five people whose interviews were 
arranged this way knew of me, and I knew of them, although we had never actually met. 
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Interviewees described the need for chemistry (one called it a ‘chemical fit’) when 
recruiting and the need for new recruits to be someone that government ministers 
would get on with. As one interviewee explained: ‘For example, if we are hiring ,as 
we will be hiring shortly, a Secretary of State’s press officer, that person has to know 
the media and be able to deal with a situation in the moment and all of that, but the 
key question is actually, will this person get on with [the Secretary of State]?190’  A 
second interviewee expressed similar sentiments and acknowledged that such 
criteria for recruitment may conflict with organisational HR policies. Despite this, the 
dominance of social capital means that finding the right chemistry is the most 
important criteria for recruiting.  
 
The existence of PR logic was as evident in the interviewees with senior political 
practitioners as with the wider cohort of public relations practitioners. The nearer the 
centre of the field, the more authority is conferred on the practitioner. At the heart 
of the political field, 10 Downing Street, PR logic serves to determine what is ‘truth 
and untruth’ within government and to influence the actions and responses of 
officials across departments. One interviewee talked about the development of a 
single ‘core narrative’ for government which included official messages about what 
the government is working towards. For the interviewee, authority coming from the 
centre is welcome, helping government departments to communicate a more 
consistent message and operate more effectively together.  
 
The influence that these senior practitioners described exemplifies PR logic – their 
practice affects the organisations they represent and, in the case of 10 Downing 
Street, has an impact across government. However one aspect of PR logic was less 
evident within this cohort than with others and this was its relationship to media 
logic. References to the media were less explicit than in other interviews and 
interviewees referred as often to the driving influence of ‘strategy’ or ‘stakeholders’ 
as to the media. Nevertheless, the connection between PR logic and media logic was 
present and interviewees described themselves as a translator, helping the 
organisations they worked for to adapt to media logic and providing the media with 
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 Here, the interviewee referred to the Secretary of State by their first name. 
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information and resources not easily available to it by other means. The media have 
a primary role in disseminating the information which PR practitioners generate in 
order to reach different audiences, including the public.  
 
The interviews revealed how PR logic contributes to the process of mediatisation by 
enabling the centre of the political field to accommodate the logic of the media while 
maintaining its existing geographical and other structures. To do this, the PR 
practitioner does not replicate media logic, but substitutes for it191, through a 
process of translation and information provision. Importantly, it is the role of human 
agents which is central here; interviewees did not refer to technology or other 
structures in this context.  
 
PR logic demands the continual exchange of power with journalists on behalf of the 
organisation. The PR practitioner controls the journalist’s access to information and 
has the power to present information in a certain way, while the journalist’s power is 
vested in their ability to write and publish copy which carries the authority of news. 
PR logic also impacts on the sponsor organisation: the role of the PR agent is to 
leave the ‘bubble’ (either literally or metaphorically) or to ensure that someone else 
does so192 in order to engage with other fields, including the journalistic field.  In 
achieving this, practitioners are aided by high levels of social and cultural capital, 
which confer on them the authority to speak on behalf of their organisation and to 
interpret the information they receive.  The consequences of these external 
encounters are reported back to the sponsor organisation and may result in its 
changing its way of working; it may become more accessible to citizens, or adapt to 
media logic.   
 
The fieldwork described in this chapter was designed to answer research questions 
relating to the role of public relations, the power and capital that PR practitioners 
possess and the relationships they utilize as a demonstration of that power. The 
results of the fieldwork have demonstrated the high levels of social and cultural 
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 For example, by engaging with the Daily Mail – a newspaper which is not read within the bubble. 
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 Some interviewees described how they relied on external research agencies to provide them with information 
about what different audiences were thinking. 
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capital, and the power that practitioners possess.  Practitioners bring a confidence 
and assurance to their role, borne out of a high level of education and a keen 
interest and curiosity in the world around them.  This enables them to exert their 
relationship-building skills, and the scope of their professional networks extends both 
to the very heart of the political field and to the very top ranks of the organisations 
they work for.  Even those practitioners not situated at the very centre of the field 
are well positioned in comparison with other agents as a result of their access to the 
most senior decision makers in their sponsor organisations.   
 
At the same time, the nature of their role provides them with unrivalled opportunity 
to speak on behalf of government ministers or senior executives, often putting 
words into their mouths.  Public relations practitioners’ confidence and self-
assurance means that they are better at articulating the organisation’s points of view 
than the chief executive may be, and part of their role is to control and script his or 
her media exposure.  Public relations practitioners position themselves as their 
organisation’s best player in the game between politics and the media.  Without the 
benefit of their direction – and the logic that shapes their influence – their 
organisation would flounder on the playing field.  The mystification of practice which 
practitioners readily demonstrate means that this positioning may go unchallenged 
or unchecked; it results in the practitioner having the power to symbolize and 
articulate what an organisation stands for. This power can also be exerted over 
others outside the sponsor organisation, including the journalistic field.  Here, public 
relations practitioners act as a gateway, controlling access to information and 
sources and communicating data in a way that conforms with the logic of the media.  
The public relations practitioner sits at the hub of a multiplicity of relationships, 
translating, persuading and corralling others to act in certain ways.  
  
The interviews with PR practitioners, particularly those operating within the political 
field, provide little doubt of the significance that they attribute to their role.  
According to the narratives that they themselves have developed, they successfully 
exert power and control over the news media and within their organisations.  This, 
they suggest, largely works to everyone’s benefit and reinforces the need for their 
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endeavours.  The fieldwork conducted with individuals responsible for public 




Chapter 5: Islam, public relations and the political field 
This chapter returns to the question of representation for Muslims and their faith in 
the UK news media.  In contrast to the literature review in Chapter 1, which explores 
current scholarship about the media representation of Islam, this chapter focuses on 
the interaction between Muslim groups and public relations practice within the UK 
political field.  In so doing, it seeks to address the research questions which explore 
how Islam, and those engaged in public relations on behalf of Islam or Muslim 
groups, are located within the political field and the sources and levels of capital do 
they have access to.  As well as seeking to derive information from representatives’ 
position within the political field, the fieldwork seeks to ask directly to what extent 
practitioners acting on behalf of Islam or Muslim groups use public relations in order 
to compete or change their position within the political field. 
 
It is important to note from the start that this chapter is not intended to be a 
comparison between the activity of those undertaking public relations for Muslim 
groups and other public relations practitioners operating in the political field.  Such a 
comparison would provide little value or insight because the roles have different 
purposes, contextual frameworks and intent.  The public relations practitioners 
whose interviews are described in the preceding chapter are in paid employment, 
working for government or other political organisations as part of a broader PR 
career. While they may have had a series of different roles within the political field, 
those that were civil servants expressed no political affiliation or preference while 
undertaking their role. In contrast, those working for Muslim groups were not all in 
paid employment and for some, PR was not the primary purpose of their role.  
Unlike the government practitioners, most did not identify themselves as PR 
professionals but instead saw their work as contributing to the broader purpose of 
their organisation or group.  These significant differences would render any 
comparison of practice largely futile.   
 
Instead, this thesis posits that public relations practice can help to position agents, 
and the groups they represent, in positions of power and influence within and 
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between fields, including the political and journalistic fields.  Previous chapters have 
highlighted how public relations practitioners achieve this and the access they have 
to social and cultural capital which supports them in doing so.  This chapter explores 
the extent to which those representing Islam as a religion, or specific Muslim groups, 
have adopted similar techniques and practices in order to respond to what is a 
contentious representation of their faith and religious practice in the media.  As we 
shall see, while Muslim groups and organisations are drawn into the political field, 
the techniques and tactics of PR are not widely adopted in order to influence or 
change their positioning within it. As the fieldwork described here shows, the agents 
interviewed (most of whom are paid representatives of Muslim groups) are not using 
public relations techniques, or PR logic, in order to engage with the political field 
and, in some cases, do not acknowledge a need for it. In fact, some interviewees 
explicitly rejected the need for public relations practice in this context. 
  
The fieldwork sample 
The sample of people who took part in interviews is referred to as those 
representing Muslim groups, or undertaking public relations on behalf of Muslim 
groups operating in the UK political field – admittedly a somewhat clumsy collective 
phrasing193.  Most of the people interviewed did not define their role as doing public 
relations, nor was this their job title.  None had a big team or department behind 
them, and several worked alone in their particular role.  However, they 
acknowledged that their responsibilities included representing the particular group 
they worked for, or their faith more broadly, to different audiences, including the 
government, other politicians and the media.  For the purposes of this research, this 
refers to individual agents in paid full time or part time employment for groups 
which seek to advocate, represent, or progress the interests of the Muslim 
community/communities or the Muslim faith within the UK and, in some instances, 
internationally.  These groups include think tanks, broadcasters, commercial 
businesses, academic organisations and membership bodies. There is one exception 
                                            
193
 The difficulty in finding a suitable collective term for this sample reflects the lack of coherence in the use of 
public relations practice by Muslim groups and organisations.   
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to this categorisation among the cohort of interviewees - a media professional who 
does not work for an organisation with Muslim interests, but who self-identifies as a 
Muslim194.   
 
In total, 30 organisations or media and public relations professionals working on 
behalf of Muslim groups were approached for interviews, initially by email and, in 
some instances, with follow-up phone calls.  Thirteen individuals responded 
expressing interest in taking part and the remainder did not respond at all.  No-one 
sent a response declining to take part.  Of the thirteen who responded, interviews 
were secured with ten of them – eight men and two women.  Of the ten 
interviewees, eight were individuals in paid employment for groups which operated 
within or on behalf of the Muslim community or communities, all with a role of 
advocacy, representation or public relations. The remaining two interviewees were 
Muslims who worked in broadcasting: one of whom worked for a Muslim broadcast 
channel. As with the cohort of public relations practitioners, snowball sampling was 
attempted but was unsuccessful in generating responses.   
 
The response rate can be attributed to a number of factors.  First, approaches were 
often made cold, without any prior contact or introduction195.  A summary of the 
research was made available to all potential interviewees, but those who did respond 
were often unclear about the subject matter of the interview.  Among those who did 
reply, a common response was that there are many researchers looking at Islam and 
media and the area is currently over-researched196.  This made it difficult to secure 
any kind of interview and to achieve a consistency among interviewees in terms of 
job title or responsibility197. Finally, one interviewee suggested that Muslim 
organisations, such as those approached, are typically underfunded and under-
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 All the interviewees were given a commitment to anonymity. The comparatively small number of organisations 
from which interviewees could be drawn presents a risk of identification of individuals in the analysis and 
discussion of interviews.  As a result, some of the descriptions of interviewees have been left deliberately vague. 
195
 Where introductions were made using snowball sampling, it did not increase the response rate. 
196
 One interviewee referred to organisations having a waiting list of PhD students who had made interview 
requests. 
197
 As the results of the interviews demonstrate, this was not just a sampling problem, but stems from the 
different approaches and perspectives taken by individuals and organisations. 
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resourced, raising the possibility that organisations did not have the capacity or 
resources to respond to numerous requests from researchers. 
 
Despite the difficulties in generating a consistent cohort of interviewees to 
participate, all the interviewees except one had direct experience of working within 
the political field, either as an adviser to government, working with politicians, or in 
seeking to influence the political or media agenda.  Eight worked for organisations or 
groups that had a charitable, educational or commercial role in representing or 
advocating on behalf of the Muslim community in the UK.  Of these at least two 
groups had received funding from either the current or previous government. The 
remaining two interviewees, who worked in media, both identified themselves as 
Muslim.  One was a presenter on a Muslim TV channel.  Job titles of those 
interviewed varied and have not been disclosed to help maintain anonymity, but 
most interviewees were responsible for media relations, policy or public relations 
within their organisation, or engaged with media as a broadcaster (either in front of 
or behind the camera).  Without exception, all interviewees were very familiar with 
the interactions between Islam and the political field and in particular, in relation to 
the challenges and activities relating to counter-terrorism. 
 
Typically, it took four or five weeks to secure interviews, most of which took place in 
the interviewee’s work environment: usually offices within the greater London area. 
 Two interviewees expressed initial reluctance to share their office location for 
security reasons; this was only supplied after several exchanges of information about 
the study and the researcher.  Two interviews took place in coffee shops local to 
their place of work, at the interviewees’ suggestion.  These were cafés chosen for 
the convenience of their location – one was the café of a high street department 
store, the other was a ‘greasy spoon’ style café next to a central London tube 
station.  One interviewee suggested meeting outside a well-known London mosque 
and the interview was conducted in a branch of a high street sandwich shop chain.  
As with the public relations practitioners, the interviews followed a semi-structured 
pattern of questioning which began by asking interviewees about their experience of 
public relations.  The structure then continued to ask interviewees about how 
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negative media narratives about Muslims and Islam could be changed and their 
experience of undertaking such work. 
 
Islam within the UK political field 
Many of the interviewees had direct experience of working in the political field 
through their involvement in counter-terrorism work following the events of 11 
September 2001 and 7 July 2005.  The events of these dates and, more recently the 
murder of Fusilier Drummer Lee Rigby in South London in May 2013, provided a 
common frame of reference that all interviewees referred to.  Some worked for 
groups that had been set up following the events of 11 September 2001 and as 
such, the purpose of their group was to respond to the consequences of those 
events.  While the perspective of interviewees varied, all approached the discussion 
through the lens of the prevention of terrorism (known in government as the 
Prevent programme) and the response of the Muslim community or communities to 
various central or local government initiatives.  This was the case even where the 
interviewee’s expertise was not directly connected with the Prevent programme; 
inevitably they approached a discussion of their specialist area through a Prevent 
lens198. 
 
This common experience of the political field among interviewees merits further 
discussion.  While issues relating to security and counter-terrorism were familiar to 
all interviewees, their experiences and approaches differed, as did their positioning 
within the political field.  For some, their experience of security and counter-
terrorism was secondary to, but related to, issues such as Islamophobia, immigration 
or equality.  Others had played a more central role in advising government ministers 
on policy or engagement with Muslim communities, as part of the government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy. Before elucidating further on the outcome of the 
interviews, this chapter explores the interaction between Islam and the political field 
                                            
198
 For example, one interviewee had a lot of experience in the area of equality and diversity, particularly with 
regards to the Muslim community.  Throughout the interview this interviewee used Prevent as a frame of 
reference for talking about equality, comparing and contrasting the approaches to the two. 
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with reference to the Prevent programme - the common frame of reference for all 
interviews.  This is not a study of Prevent per se, but exploring it provides two 
benefits for this study in particular.  First, it provides useful a indicator of how Islam 
has been brought into the political field within the UK.  Second, a study of Prevent 
provides explicit links between Islam, politics and the dominant media narrative 
about Islam, as well as public relations (for a discussion of how public relations 
activity can be used as one of the responses to terrorism, see National Co-ordinator 
for Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands 2010; Home Affairs Committee 2009; 
Rogers 2008; Armstrong et al 2008). While it is important to emphasise that this 
study does not seek to compare the public relations efforts of different agents within 
the political field with regards to Prevent, it is a common factor for agents within the 
field. 
 
The Prevent Programme and the UK political field 
The Prevent programme (commonly referred to as just Prevent) is one part of the 
UK government’s broader counter-terrorism strategy, currently led by the Home 
Office.  Launched from within the UK political field199, and aimed at audiences 
ranging from school teachers and imams to the police and the security services, the 
Prevent programme cuts across a range of different fields, agents and relationships, 
including religion, politics, education and culture. Like other aspects of the UK’s 
counter-terrorism strategy, it is supported by Parliamentary legislation200.    
The UK’s first counter-terrorism strategy – known as Contest – was developed by the 
government following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. 
 Completed in 2003, the first Contest strategy was a restricted document that was 
not available publicly.  It was not until after the London bombings of 7 July 2005 
that more information about the government’s response to the terror threat was 
made public.  
 
                                            
199
 The current Prevent programme was launched by Home Secretary Theresa May in July 2011. 
200
 Since 2000, the UK has enacted five main pieces of legislation to deal with terrorism. 
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From the beginning, Contest had four strands of work relating to counter-terrorism: 
Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Pursue.  Although little information is in the public 
domain about the 2003 strategy, in its inquiry into Contest in 2009, the Home Affairs 
Committee observed that when Contest was first published, Prevent was the least 
developed strand (Home Affairs Committee, 2009).  Instead, the strategy’s focus 
was on protecting the public from the immediate threat to life, rather than 
understanding the factors driving radicalisation.   
 
Two significant events changed this.  Following the London bombings of 7 July 2005 
and the airline plot of August 2006, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism 
(OSCT) was formed in March 2007.  Under the control of the Home Secretary, OSCT 
was created to provide advice to ministers and develop policy and security measures 
to combat the threat of terrorism.  The aim was to stop radicalisation, reduce 
support for terrorism and violent extremism and discourage people from becoming 
terrorists. 
 
Following the formation of OSCT, a new Contest strategy was published on 24 March 
2009. Unlike its predecessor, it was placed in the public domain and, according to 
OSCT, was deliberately conceived as a different kind of document, intending to take 
account of the evolution of the threat and developing understanding of the factors 
driving it.  The refreshed strategy states that, following 11 September 2001, the 
government realised that legislation alone was not enough to find practical ways to 
prevent an attack, to understand why people become involved in terrorism or to 
work out how the UK can best protect its infrastructure or to understand how the 
government can assist the general public and the business community in being more 
resilient to the threat of terrorism.  This shift in thinking by the government led to 
Prevent becoming the most important strand of Contest (Home Affairs Committee, 
2009).  
 
The expansion of the Prevent strand of the counter-terrorism strategy began 
following the attacks on the London transport network in July 2005, when the then 
government convened seven working groups under the sponsorship of the 
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Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).  A year later, in 2006, 
DCLG formally took over responsibility for the Prevent Extremism Campaign.  The 
department’s first Prevent report, Winning Hearts and Minds, published in April 
2007, stated that a security response was not enough to counter the terror threat. 
 Instead, the report argued, winning hearts and minds was crucial, as was 
preventing individuals being attracted to violent extremism.  The report emphasises 
the importance of ‘shared and non-negotiable values’.  With an action plan targeted 
at work with Muslim communities, the report says that the government will support 
individuals and organisations that uphold those values and will respond robustly 
when those values are transgressed (2007:4). This was followed by the launch of 
the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund the same year and a £6m fund to 
support around 70 local authorities in challenging violent extremism. 
 
The financial resource and political focus made available to the Muslim community as 
a result of the emerging Prevent strategy has been described as a ‘watershed’ for 
Muslim representation (O'Toole, Nisson DeHanas, Modood, Meer, & Jones, 2013).  
The groups convened by DCLG following the attacks on London of 7 July 2005 were 
comprised of a ‘diverse range of people’ from the Muslim community, with different 
skills and knowledge.  The groups’ aim was to identify a small number of proposals 
for community and government led actions that would help prevent extremism and 
improve partnership working between the Government and Muslim communities 
(Islam et al., 2005: 98). The report of the groups’ recommendations, welcomed by 
the Government when it was published in October 2005, acknowledges that the 
discussions were almost entirely focused on Muslim communities.   Many of the 
recommendations highlight the need to improve the perceptions and understanding 
of Islam within the UK, including ‘building a national campaign which increases the 
visibility of Muslim women’ and ‘designing a publication that highlights and promotes 
good practice from among mosques, Islamic centres and imams in the UK.’ (Islam et 
al, 2005:9).  The recommendations do not differ significantly from those outlined by 





Challenging the extremist ideology coming from Al Qaeda and supporting 
mainstream voices was the first objective of the 2009 Prevent Strategy (HM 
Government, 2009: 81). This is described as developing a ‘counter-narrative’ - 
developing the arguments to discredit Al Qaeda’s narrative and disseminating those 
arguments among those likely to be receptive to Al Qaeda’s messages. 
 Responsibility for this sits with the Research, Information and Communications 
Unit201, a department within the Home Office. 
 
The Research Information and Communications Unit was established in June 2007 
as part of OSCT, with approximately 35 staff specialising in audience insight and 
communications, marketing, digital media, anthropology and pan-Arab media from 
across government and the private sector.  Divided into two sections – External 
Delivery and Audience Research and Knowledge – RICU is funded by the Home 
Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government.   RICU describes its role as: 
‘…supporting  policy makers and communications professionals by developing a 
better understanding of our target audiences and a clearer understanding of terrorist 
propaganda and dissemination.  We provide guidance on effective communications, 
particularly on audiences, messages and delivery channels.’ (Research, Information 
and Communications Unit, 2008).    
 
RICU’s Communications Guide suggests that narratives can be used as an 
opportunity to ‘bust myths’202.  The Ministerial foreword to the guide begins: ‘We 
know that violent extremists use a powerful narrative, mixing historical fact with 
                                            
201  The Director of OSCT, Charles Farr – a civil servant - summed up the government’s perspective when, in 
his evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, he explained:  ‘The only other thing I would add is that when [Home 
Secretary John] Reid and the Prime Minister [Tony Blair] reported ... they also argued that another area we had 
not got right in this country was counter-terrorism related communications. They meant by that I think two 
different things: one, outward-facing official communications, what we said both about the threat and about our 
response, but secondly, and I think very importantly, they also meant that we were not challenging the messaging 
that was coming to us from Al-Qaeda, the propaganda that was coming to us from Al-Qaeda, directed on the 
Internet’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2009, p. Ev21).  
202 The Prevent strategy itself acknowledges that this work can rarely be done directly by government.  Instead, 
the onus is on local communities, organisations and institutions to identify ‘credible mainstream voices’ which can 
refute the 'extremist narrative' through community voices and expose 'false theological and historical arguments'. 
 This activity will provide support to British Muslim identity, undermine the myths and half-truths being peddled by 




half-truth and conspiracy theory when targeting British Muslims... But there is 
another story to tell: about Muslim men and women who are proud to be British, 
who share the aspirations and concerns of many others in this country, and who are 
part of that overwhelming majority of people who reject the terrorist narrative and 
abhor terrorism as a criminal act.’ (Research, Information and Communications Unit, 
2010). The guidance goes on to explain that RICU is at the centre of the 
Government’s efforts to ‘communicate it’s (sic) counter-terrorism strategy and to use 
messaging to disrupt the Al-Qaida narrative.’ (2010:8).  The existence of RICU and 
the materials which it produces situates public relations at the centre of the 
government’s counter-terrorism activity.  Aimed directly at public relations 
professionals, their materials are intended to support a unified and consistent 
approach to talking about Islam and its response to terror which conforms with 
government approaches to security. 
 
A new approach: the 2011 Prevent Strategy 
The previous government’s approach to Prevent was reviewed by the Coalition 
Government in November 2010.  Announcing the review and a public consultation 
via a press release (Home Office, 2010), the Home Office said that the review would 
make Prevent more effective and would separate counter-terrorism work from 
integration work.  The review was overseen by Lord Carlile of Berriew whose report 
was published alongside the new strategy and the report of the public consultation. 
It is possible to track the progress and outcome of that review through the 
subsequent public relations activity that followed. This comprises a framework of 
carefully constructed messages which join together to create a particular narrative 
about Prevent. This framework is discussed in some detail here because, although 
several interviewees referred to the events which took place around the review of 
Prevent, none of them was able to identify the public relations activity that helped 
shape the narrative. 
 
In February 2011, while the Prevent review was still underway, Prime Minister David 
Cameron delivered a speech which gave a clear indication of the political direction 
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the review would take (Cameron, 2011).  The press release for the speech said that 
segregation and separatism were key issues behind Islamic extremism and this 
extremist ideology should be confronted in all its forms.  To do this, the press 
release continued, we need a ‘shared sense of national identity’ (Number10.gov.uk, 
2011). The speech itself contained the following paragraph that was widely 
reported: ‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged 
different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream.  We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want 
to belong.  We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways 
that run completely counter to our values’ (Cameron, 2011). This final reference to 
segregated communities opposing British values received widespread media 
coverage and the speech was interpreted as an attack on multi-culturalism (Doward, 
The Observer 2011; Wright and Taylor, The Independent 2011; Watson, O’Neill and 
Bird, The Times 2011). 
 
Unsurprisingly, considering the findings of much of the literature about Islam and 
media discussed in Chapter 1, responses to the consultation raised a range of 
concerns about communications issues and representation, including the need to 
reduce negative stereotyping of Muslims and to set norms among the public through 
messaging activity in education and the media.  Other responses called for the 
strategy to tackle propaganda by using communications to directly challenge views, 
point out flaws publicly, provide guidance on how to challenge it and help build 
public solidarity against terrorist organisations and activity. Journalists were 
identified as a group the government should be working closely with in delivering 
Prevent work (HM Government, 2011: 22).    
 
Described in the accompanying press release as ‘radical’, the new Prevent strategy 
was launched in June 2011 with a fresh emphasis on preventing radicalisation and 
extremism and the importance of British values and identity.  The press release 
stated that the new Prevent programme will: ‘deal with all forms of terrorism and 
target not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism ... [and] challenge 
the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it.’ (Home Office: 
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2011). Within the new strategy, ‘extremism’ is defined as ‘vocal or active opposition 
to fundamental British values’ and a clear link is made between radicalisation and 
ideology which sanctions the use of violence.  It says: ‘Work to deal with 
radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and 
support for our core values.’  Radicalisation is clearly located within the context of 
Islam: ‘So we believe that radicalisation – in this country – is being driven by: an 
ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of 
the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its 
defence...The [Prevent] strategy is based on this assessment.’ (HM Government, 
2011: 18). 
 
Public relations activity in support of the launch of the Prevent 
Programme 
The revised Prevent strategy was launched on 7 June 2011 with a statement in 
Parliament by Home Secretary Theresa May (Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 2011) and a press release issued by the Home Office (Home Office, 
2011) accompanied by the full strategy (HM Government, 2011). A Freedom of 
Information Act request from this researcher asking the Home Office for details of 
the communications plan detailing the public relations activity in support of the 
launch was rejected on three separate occasions.  The first reason given was that 
the request was too extensive; the second that the information requested was 
relevant to the formation or development of government policy and was therefore 
exempt under the Freedom of Information Act,203 and the third reason given, on 
appeal, was that the information requested was no longer held by the department.  
The second reason given for refusing to supply the requested information – namely 
that the communications plan for the launch of the 2011 Prevent strategy relates to 
the formation or development of government policy -  is particularly interesting, 
suggesting that communications plans are synonymous with government policy.  
This could imply a PR logic that goes right to the heart of government decision 
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 Information determined by the relevant department to be related to the formation or development of 
government policy is exempt under section 35 of the Freedom of Information Act.   
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making.  However, as this is just one of three different reasons given as to why the 
information requested could not be supplied, it should not be taken too seriously. As 
a result, all the analysis here comes from material placed in the public domain at the 
time of the launch – either via the Home Office website or printed in newspapers. 
 
The launch of the new strategy was heavily trailed in advance in the media204, and 
Home Secretary Theresa May gave an advance interview to the Daily Telegraph 
(Gardham, 2011).  In the interview, Theresa May explicitly linked the Prevent 
Strategy with the Prime Minister’s speech to the Munich Security Conference four 
months earlier, saying: ‘There's an ideology out there that we need to challenge and 
when we first came in as a government one of the things we were very clear about 
here at the Home Office was we needed to look at extremism, not just violent 
extremism.’ She continued to repeat the messages of the Munich speech, saying that 
the Government would cut funding to any Islamic group that espoused extremist 
views, and alluding to the ‘key British values’ to which those seeking support must 
subscribe. The interview concludes by quoting Theresa May as saying: ‘Sending clear 
messages about our values is part of the information we want to put out.’205  The 
Home Secretary also introduced a new perspective on Prevent, when she said that 
universities were not taking the issue of radicalisation seriously enough and that it 
was ‘too easy for Muslim extremists to form groups on campuses without anyone 
knowing’.  This particular perspective was echoed in the other pre-publication 
reporting of the strategy. 
 
The way in which the pre-publication coverage was achieved is worth further 
exploration.  While there is no material publicly available to show what information 
was shared with the media in advance, or how this was done, the pre-publication 
reporting focuses almost exclusively on two themes: the Government’s criticism of 
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 Other supporting documents made available at the same time included Lord Carlile’s report (Lord Carlile of 
Berriew, May 2011), a summary of responses to the consultation (HM Goverment, 2011), an equality impact 
assessment, and summary versions of the Prevent strategy in Arabic and Urdu.  With the exception of Lord 
Carlile’s work, none of these latter documents were referenced in the press release, or in the Home Secretary’s 
statement to Parliament or in any of the press reporting. 
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 The link between British values and work to counter extremism has continued to be a theme in the 
government’s communications.  In June 2014, following the Birmingham ‘Trojan Horse’ affair, the Prime Minister 
David Cameron wrote an article for the Mail on Sunday in which he said that British values should be promoted to 
every child in every school in the country (Cameron, British values aren't optional..., 2014). 
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universities for failing to tackle radicalisation on campus, and the strategy’s 
requirement for NHS staff to be trained to identify patients at risk of radicalisation. 
The consistency with which these two themes appear in pre-publication press 
reporting suggests that public relations activity is responsible for the stories rather 
than the stories being the result of an unplanned or unauthorised leak. In its piece 
headed ‘40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror’, the Daily Mail 
stated that it had seen a ‘soon to be published Whitehall report’ (Daily Mail 6 June 
2011), while The Independent predicted that: ‘A crackdown on Islamist extremists, 
centring on a ban on hardline groups at universities, is set to be approved this week 
by David Cameron’ (The Independent 6 June 2011).  The Daily Express declared 
that: ‘NHS staff to be trained to spot Islamic fanatics’ (The Daily Express 6 June 
2011) while The Daily Telegraph, The Independent and The Guardian focused on 
the same story, albeit with slightly more moderate language.  Additionally, The 
Times and The Telegraph ran pre-publication stories stating that the ‘Anti-terror 
budget has been wasted overseas’ (The Times, 7 June 2011) reporting the new 
strategy’s assertion that ‘millions’ had been wasted by the previous government on 
flawed Prevent activity abroad.   
 
On the day the strategy was launched, Home Secretary Theresa May made a 
statement to Parliament at 5.08 pm and a press release was issued to the media and 
made available, together with the strategy itself and supporting documents, on the 
Home Office website206.  Under the heading: ‘Radical new Prevent strategy 
launched’, the press release began with a statement echoing the Prime Minister’s 
Munich speech, saying that the Prevent programme would target non-violent as well 
as violent extremism and would ensure government funding and support cannot 
reach organisations with extremist views who do not support mainstream British 
values.  These messages are repeated in a quote in the press release attributed to 
Home Secretary, Theresa May.  The release states that the strategy will support 
particular institutions where there is risk of radicalisation, including universities and 
prisons.  It goes on to specify particular activity focused on the internet, schools, 
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 The release of the strategy was supported by PR material, including You Tube videos and blogs. 
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universities and prisons and concludes with a quote from Lord Carlile, in which he 
endorses the new strategy.  
 
Once again, the strategy received wide coverage in the broadsheet media and some 
of the tabloids. The news reports were led mainly by the messages in the 522 word 
press release, although the full strategy (of over 100 pages) was made available to 
the media at the same time (and, as described above, may even have been given to 
them in advance).  
 
The message about the strategy’s adherence to British values was widely picked up 
in the national media with The Times, The Telegraph, The Guardian and The 
Observer all running headlines that linked prevention of extremism with British 
values. These were not the only headlines reporting on the launch of the new 
strategy but the use of public relations to establish a link between the Prevent 
strategy and the promotion of British values emerges loud and clear.  Not all the 
newspaper reports were supportive of the strategy, but the accompanying PR 
activity – including the press release, the speech and the introductory text within the 
strategy - constructs a framework in which it is reported.  The Prevent agenda is 
complex and multi-dimensional yet within the PR material for the launch of the 
strategy, just four or five messages were chosen to frame the narrative.  One of the 
main messages, situated high up in the press release was that public money would 
not reach organisations with extremist views and who do not support ‘mainstream 
British values’.  The press release goes on to emphasise the breadth of Prevent work 
– including schools, universities and prisons within its remit - and includes a quote 
from the Home Secretary which reiterates the scope of Prevent work and the 
message about cutting off financial support for those who do not subscribe to 
society’s ‘core values’ (Home Office 2011). Although these messages were not 
dissimilar to the ones that were reported by the newspapers a couple of days before, 
they proved effective in directing media coverage and were repeated widely in the 
national newspapers, including The Times, the Daily Telegraph, The Independent, 
The Daily Express and The Mirror.  The final four messages within the press release 
(including reference to the Prevent budget and a supportive quote from Lord Carlile) 
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received no coverage at all.  A detailed breakdown of how some of the key 
messages in the press release for the launch of the new Prevent programme on 7 
June 2011 were reflected in related media coverage is included at Annex 1. 
The launch of the most recent Prevent strategy was clearly stage-managed using 
public relations techniques that originated from within the political field, with the 
Home Secretary to the fore.  These techniques resulted in carefully worded press 
releases and other materials, setting out language and messages that were repeated 
again and again.  Some of these messages – such as those promoting British values 
– have already been identified as prevalent in media coverage of Islam and Muslims 
within the UK.  The use of these messages for the launch of Prevent provides them 
with political legitimacy, as they are sourced from the very centre of the political 
field.  Including these messages in media coverage is not merely the result of 
journalistic subjectivity, but the result of a targeted campaign to influence the 
media.  For those undertaking public relations for Muslim groups, the challenge of 
how to respond remains.  Yet as the discussion of the fieldwork below will show, 
while all interviewees were familiar with these messages, none of them identified the 
public relations practice as the source of them. 
 
Fieldwork among representatives of Muslim groups 
The fieldwork among representatives of Muslim groups was aimed at probing their 
experience of public relations and their response to the dominant media narrative, in 
particular with regards to issues surrounding Prevent.  The questions began by 
asking interviewees about their experience of public relations.  Following early 
interviews, where this question led to confusion about what public relations is, the 
question changed to one about dominant media narratives and work that could be 




With one exception, all interviewees positioned themselves directly within the 
political field through their description of the work that they undertook207.  One 
interviewee had worked directly with RICU, advising on communications to Muslim 
communities, while another had been recruited to advise Ministers and civil servants 
on different aspects of Prevent.  When I arrived for the interview with a third, my 
interviewee apologised for having to cut our time short because they were up 
against a deadline to influence the government’s expected announcement on press 
regulation.  Another interviewee had recently been asked to join a cross-government 
working group advising on issues relating to the Muslim community, while a fifth 
described meetings with government ministers and advisers behind the scenes – 
encounters that were not publicly acknowledged by either side.  A sixth interviewee 
worked for a group that had received government funding for Prevent related work. 
 
Interviewees’ familiarity with the political field was evident as they were able to 
describe in detail their engagement with government ministers and civil servants 
through taking part in meetings or work on particular projects and initiatives.  Often, 
the level of engagement and experience of the political field that was described 
seemed quite significant, as interviewees related stories about disagreements 
between different personalities in government or errors that had been made in 
decision making or in implementation of government policy.  These anecdotes, 
sometimes retold with a degree of astonishment on the interviewee’s part, 
suggested a level of personal participation in the political field, but also a sense of 
novelty about the way in which the political field operated. In all these examples, the 
interviewee was an observer, or sometimes an unwitting victim of the mistake or 
disagreement, rather than a direct participant.    
 
Several interviewees used language typical of the political field, for example using 
phrases such as ‘targeted interventions’ or ‘community cohesion’ when referring to 
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 This level of political engagement is growing across the Muslim community, according to a report on Muslim 
participation in governance which argues that Muslim activism has successfully provided opportunities for 
Muslims to enter and engage with the political field (O'Toole, Nisson DeHanas, Modood, Meer, & Jones, 2013). 
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government activity within the Muslim community208.  This suggested that they had 
adopted some of the characteristics of the field, although this language was also 
used to frame critiques of what the government was doing. Beyond their own 
personal experience of the political field, interviewees also spoke with familiarity 
about Muslim members of Parliament and politicians and the potential for influence 
that they had.  Talking about increasing political engagement among the Muslim 
community, one interviewee explained: ‘I think it’s because there are more Muslims 
involved in government, it’s as simple as that.  I think that the process of Muslims 
getting involved – people like Saeeda Warsi [Minister of State for Faith and 
Communities]- at the highest levels of British politics is very, very welcome and I 
think it’s very encouraging and they are obviously, maybe just by being there, by 
intervening, by the fact they are there, people will take more notice of Muslims.’ 
 While this interviewee was able to name other Muslims as being at the centre of the 
political field or ‘at the highest levels of British politics’, they did not appear to 
perceive themselves within the same environment.  Others referred to political 
parties courting the ‘Muslim vote’ as a trend that was likely to continue.   
 
However, the individuals’ positions within the political field could also be seen as 
tenuous, either because of changing circumstances within the field or because of 
attacks from outside the field.  One interviewee talked about how the organisation 
they worked for had fallen out of favour with the government of the day over policy, 
thus alienating them from within the political field.  Another expressed frustration at 
the tendency of Ministers to prefer to meet with their organisation behind closed 
doors out of the public eye: ‘They’re doing it in private and they say, ‘we want to 
listen to you but we can’t tell anyone we’re talking to you because we fear that The 
Telegraph will come along and say that we’re talking to Islamist terrorists or 
something like that.’  This suggests that the dominance of the media dictates the 
nature and form of engagement: it has to be behind the scenes for fear of media 
exposure.  There is also an underlying assumption here that the media exposure 
would be negative. The interviewee acknowledged that in any political negotiations 
                                            
208
 This contrasts with the one interviewee who had no direct experience of the political field who used much 
more religious language during the interview, quoting from the Qur’an and hadith to support the points made. 
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there would always be activity that took place behind the scenes, but expressed 
frustration at being deliberately excluded from the public face of such activity.  Once 
again this suggests that positioning within the political field is precarious, reliant 
heavily on other, more established agents for the legitimacy of operating within the 
field and vulnerable to exposure and possibly exclusion. 
 
 A third interviewee’s positioning as an outsider or visitor within the political field was 
illustrated when he found out from a friend while abroad that a piece of his work on 
Prevent had appeared in a national newspaper report: ‘And when I came back I 
found out that [name of government minister] had asked… I don’t know how much 
of this we can put into your PhD or whatever… I found out that [name of 
government minister] had asked one of their policy, political advisers – ‘spads’209 – 
to work with one of their media people to put this story out because they needed to 
show Number 10 that they were doing something on the agenda.  And the point I’m 
trying to make is that just as some of us were trying to address the issue, we 
weren’t able to do it because it wouldn’t get the right headlines, or they were used 
for political purposes, out of time out of place.’ The interviewee felt overlooked, or 
ignored as his work was released to the media without his knowledge or any 
reference to him.  As the interviews with public relations practitioners show, this 
type of political manoeuvring is not unusual within the political field, but the 
anecdote also reveals that the interviewee’s intentions to address the issue at hand  
were hampered by his lack of understanding of how the political field operates.  
While the interviewee was happy to work outside of the media spotlight to get the 
job done, the demands of the political field for publicity took precedence, and to his 
cost.  The interviewee associates himself with those outside the political field who 
are trying to address issues, whereas those within the political field were merely 
chasing headlines.   
 
Being present in the political field is not always a comfortable or pleasant place to be 
and interviewees were very clear about the challenges of crossing between fields – 
                                            
209
 ‘Spad’ is a widely used abbreviation within the political field for Special Adviser – political appointees who 
work for Ministers.  Unlike civil servants, spads are employed by political parties. 
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from their religious community to the political field.  They often spoke of this in 
negative terms and from personal experience.  They recognised that their 
motivations for being in the political field were often very different to those who had 
been in the field for longer or who sought out a career within the field. Several 
interviewees referred to politicians’ motivations as ‘chasing headlines’ or seeking 
good publicity, while one contrasted his motivation on Prevent – to find the right 
solutions – with that of civil servants: ‘The people who came to Prevent, I felt, were 
people who saw Prevent as a hot topic in Whitehall and saw it as an opportunity for 
going places in their careers. You know, it was the sexy thing to do, it was the area 
that had the most resources and the most attention in Whitehall.  So if you wanted 
to build your career quite quickly, it was the train you would jump on.  [They were] 
people who were chasing the next job up, rather than focusing on addressing the 
issue and getting the right solutions.’  In this, the interviewee identifies the 
competition within the political field and the importance of utilising networks in order 
to be able to work on the most high profile and well-funded programmes.  However 
it is not something they relate to, suggesting they had a preference for sticking with 
the job in hand rather than scanning the field for the next career opportunity. 
 
Interviewees described their religious or social identity as Muslims as a factor which 
could isolate them within the field, or push them out of it.  Sometimes, this is 
because others within the field do not share this identity, or even know much about 
it.  One interviewee spoke of his discomfort working alongside special advisers on 
Prevent: ‘I think that most of the special advisers had very, very little knowledge of 
the Muslim community or Islam.  One adviser was a political appointee.  Another 
adviser was someone who was just left over from various jobs.  They didn’t know 
where to place him so they just placed him as a special adviser.’  This implies an 
insularity within the political field and, perhaps, a homogeneity among those 
participating in it.  The interviewee contrasted this experience with that of working in 
other fields, where work with non-Muslim agents had felt much more collaborative 




Interviewees expressed an awareness that certain types of Muslim were acceptable 
within the political field while others weren’t.  Talking about the challenges of 
political representation, one interviewee explained: ‘It’s not about us and them, but 
it’s more about who is the more acceptable.. it’s a question of who is… who is the 
more moderate.  It’s a question of who is the moderate Muslim vs who is the non-
moderate Muslim...  The challenge is who defines the good Muslim and the bad 
Muslim.’  As this quote suggests, participation in the political field is dependent on 
acceptability, according to subjective criteria, applied by those within the field itself.  
The good Muslim, defined not by the Muslim community, but by the political field, is 
entitled to speak for Muslims with the authority of the field, while those who are not 
deemed to be acceptable are silenced. None of the interviewees challenged the 
assumption that others within the political field had the power to define who was 
‘good’ or ‘moderate’ within their community, and neither did they suggest that 
others would be better placed to make these judgements. While this may not be 
unique to Muslims’ experience of the political field, it serves to highlight the factors 
that can drive exclusion. 
 
For another interviewee, as he moved further towards the centre of the political field 
by taking on a new job with greater political associations, he became the subject of 
negative press coverage as a result of his work.   Suddenly, he explained, he had 
become the ‘other’: ‘When I was a teenager, when I was in 6th form, I used to read 
Private Eye because they were laughing at things that I considered to be the other, 
like the Conservative Government, or whatever.  And those people who were writing 
it then, they’re still running it and now they see me as being the other.’  This 
otherness, he felt, was due to his religious Muslim identity which was discussed 
explicitly within the press articles.  The articles questioned his ability to make 
decisions which impacted upon other faiths, because he is a Muslim.  This 
interviewee’s experience of moving towards the centre of political the field was not 
characterised during the interview as one of increased access to capital, or authority.  
Instead, it was an experience which heightened his sense of difference from the 
other agents within the field.  This sense of difference was, at least in part, created 




This sense of otherness is not restricted to individuals' experience.  One interviewee 
talked about the ‘management’ or manipulation of the Muslim community through 
communication in the context of Prevent: ‘I mean I wonder a little bit about the kind 
of paternalism that the idea of RICU intimates.  I mean, you know, the sense of the 
Muslim community has to be managed a little bit, or has to hear certain things from 
government in order to... I mean it’s a little bit like being mollified or placated...’ 
While this observation relates to communications activity which is intended to reach 
across fields, it also illustrates the perceived sense of ‘otherness’ – that Muslims 
have to be treated differently from the political field.    
 
While the aims and goals of Prevent were very familiar to interviewees, and they 
were very aware of the political context from which it stemmed and the media 
headlines it generated, they professed less awareness of the type of public relations 
activity around Prevent that has been described here.  This was initially unexpected 
in the context of a topic which has generated so much press reporting and in early 
interviews it led to some confusion around terminology which had to be corrected in 
the approach to later discussions. 
 
Of the interviewees who expressed a lack of awareness of public relations, their 
response took three main forms.  First, some interviewees sought clarification about 
what public relations meant.  One response was typical: ‘What do you mean by that? 
 Public relations?  Errrr... what does public relations mean?’  While this reaction may 
not be unusual among people who are not public relations practitioners, I would 
posit that it displays a certain naivety from someone whose role is to represent their 
group to the media, particularly in the context of a discussion about Prevent, which 
is frequently reported in the media and about which all interviewees demonstrated a 
heightened level of awareness and knowledge.   
 
Another interviewee conflated public relations with advertising; talking about paid for 
advertising campaigns rather than media materials.  Only three of the ten 
interviewees talked unhesitatingly about the practice of public relations.  Of these, 
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one described it as ‘events and publications’, while a second explained:  ‘So it’s 
about talking to the wider community, telling them that one, Muslims are not the 
threat that you perceive them to be… part of the public relations aspect is finding 
out different avenues of propagating that message as such.’   Neither explicitly 
mentioned working with journalists or the media in the context of defining public 
relations.  And while this latter description would strike a chord with the public 
relations practitioners who took part in this research, the other responses to public 
relations reveal less confidence about what the practice is or what it can deliver.  
 
A second response to references to public relations was to dismiss it as irrelevant to 
Islam and narratives about Islam.  While interviewees suggested a lack of familiarity 
with public relations, the language and concepts of narrative and discourse were 
very familiar.  One interviewee spoke at length about narrative and discourse in the 
context of media narrative and framing, suggesting that certain narratives around 
security, equality or cohesion originated from within the political field.   The same 
person went on to say: ‘I’m not sure there’s much of a role for public relations.  I 
think there probably is a role for the media in terms of news reporting, but I 
wouldn’t, I would struggle to identify public relations in this debate, mostly because 
it is what might be considered high politics – security of the realm and that sort of 
thing...’210  This suggests a reluctance to engage at all with public relations within 
the political field; perhaps ironically because it is too political.  The interviewee is 
implying their preference for staying at the edge of the political field, responding to 
events that occur within it, but from the sidelines, rather than further in.  
 
In another interview, the interviewee talked in detail about the process for 
developing narratives about Islam, but was less confident about what the 
‘dissemination strategy’ for the narrative should be, saying: ‘You find your key 
ambassadors, you find your audiences that you need to tap into, this is more your 
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 This was reinforced in a second discussion, where the interviewee spoke of the risks of certain narratives 
creating stereotypes and acting as a barrier to progress: ‘…So this idea that all Sufis are cuddly, or that all 
revivalist Muslims are dangerous, or that all Islamists are bad… and dangerous. That kind of thing.  So it 
resulted, because people were out to grab headlines, or whatever their particular interest may have been, it 
meant that you never got down to developing a nuanced piece of work which would lead towards a better 




neck of the woods.’  By passing the metaphorical baton to me in my professional 
role as a PR practitioner, the interviewee distanced themselves from the process; 
acknowledging that this is something that others do.  A third interviewee revealed 
themselves to be knowledgeable about the launch of the Prevent review, but saw no 
role for public relations within it: ‘So you know, statements that the Home Secretary 
has made in announcing the Prevent review, and then the publication of that review, 
the speech by the Prime Minister in Munich in 2011, all of that I know to be reported 
in the news media, but I haven’t seen anything which identifies public relations as 
part of that exercise.’  This suggests that the speaker views public relations practice 
as being conflated with political activity: the two are one and the same and cannot 
be separated.  While the interviews with PR practitioners within the political field 
have shown that this can be the case, the interviewee does not demonstrate any 
insight into how public relations practice can influence political positioning.   The 
interviewee demonstrates an in depth knowledge of the government’s position and 
activity around Prevent, but does not identify the mechanisms by which it has been 
communicated. In a final example, when I explained that my contention is that there 
are activities, such as the work of press officers, which influence what journalists 
write about Islam, another interviewee responded by explaining that the current 
narrative about Islam is the product of historical and political events, such as the 
Crusades, the British Empire and the oil price hikes in the 1970s.  This 
acknowledgement that particular narratives exist, but dismissal of any suggestion 
that they are managed or constructed, reinforces the argument that those 
representing Muslim groups are not central to the political field, but that their 
involvement is managed by other, more powerful agents within the field. 
 
The third response recognised the role of public relations but suggested that it 
should only take place at a very basic level, because the actions of individual 
Muslims could be more important. One interviewee, who defined their role as that of 
a public relations agent explained: ‘I mean the simple question is would Islam as a 
religion be better if we had better PR?  I suppose, at the very basic level, the answer 
is yes if it was targeted at journalists and by PR I mean, just making sure journalists 
check their facts...  I think what works is the community going out and reaching out 
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and making friends with people and mosques opening their doors and helping 
society become a better place.’  Interviewees did not see PR activity, or engagement 
with the media, as an authentic or credible activity on behalf of Islam or the Muslim 
community.  The same interviewee continued: ‘People just need to be who they are 
and not necessarily go out and say they’re doing this for PR purposes because I just 
don’t think that’s – I’m saying this as a PR professional....It’s not authentic, right, 
people can see through it.’  This response suggests that activity to change or 
improve the perception of Islam is best approached in other fields, through 
engagement of individuals in local communities, rather than political activity. 
 
Another interviewee explained: ‘So my point is this, the Muslims who are doing it 
[public relations] I’ve never heard of; they’re not players.  So I don’t think we have a 
bunch of players on all sorts of levels.  One because they’re volunteers and there’s 
nothing wrong with that.  And secondly, they’re being paid to do this kind of stuff 
and if they were really, really good...they’d be doing something else.  And I mean, 
you know, if they were really good at PR, this wouldn’t be a job they’d be doing; in 
my opinion.’  This suggests a vicious circle – Muslims who are doing PR are not 
recognized, because they are not playing the game at the right level.  Those who do 
know how to play the game would not be doing it to promote Muslim groups, but 
would be operating within a different arena.   
 
When probed, this dismissal of public relations within or on behalf of the Muslim 
community, revealed a strong consensus among interviewees that Muslims lacked 
the skills or knowledge to embark on PR practice.  One interviewee spoke about how 
they were invited to give presentations about Islam as a substitute for imams from 
local mosques: ‘So perhaps they would have invited an imam in, but he might have 
talked hellfire... so, I mean I’ve heard that happened a few times ‘.  As a former 
teacher, this interviewee suggested they had the skills and understanding to be able 
to relate the tenets of the Muslim faith to their audience's needs, be they primary 
school children or television viewers.  Another interviewee described the different 
ways he sought to influence print and broadcast journalists who wrote about his 
work, but was more dismissive of other Muslims and their lack of PR nous.  Speaking 
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about how he had been approached by representatives of other faiths during his 
career, he said: ‘And, if I’m honest, in those 11 years, the one particular group of 
people that actually don’t ask for as much, and you could argue don’t have the 
media literacy skills maybe, or the ability, or the don’t have the networking, I think, 
capabilities and knowledge are the Muslims….Because they haven’t got the ability, 
the knowledge, the wherewithal, and quite frankly, the chutzpah to talk to me about 
what could be done.’  This suggests that Muslims are not able to operate effectively 
in fields other than their own because they lack the social and cultural capital to do 
so.  The quote, which is supported by other interviews, suggests not just a lack of 
capital, but a complete absence of understanding about how different fields 
operate211.   A third interviewee, responsible for leading public relations and 
communications within the organisation for which he worked described his struggle 
to build connections with the British media.  Relationships with the ethnic media 
were better, because they carried mutual understanding: ‘We do… I think… we still, 
we’re not at the stage where we have a perfect relationship with the British 
media…but I think we have a better relationship with the ethnic media.  They will 
contact us or they will run stuff if we do something on [names a subject] for 
example, they will run stuff rather than the mainstream media.’  The interviewee 
went on to describe a growing awareness of the political influences on the 
mainstream media: ‘And I found a lot of what I said was not politically… I won’t say 
not politically acceptable because … I wasn’t as critical say ...as The Guardian would 
like and so they wouldn’t run that.  You know, but others would.  So I also found 
that it’s not just the politics of the person who’s writing but the politics of the 
organisation that’s running it as well.’  The interviewee’s experience was not that his 
political views were unacceptable, but that he had not been able to navigate his way 
through the politics of media ownership and editorial to find the right newspaper, or 
other media vehicle, which would support his views by printing an article or other 
piece of coverage. 
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 However, it is not just a lack of social and cultural capital which prevents Muslims from entering other fields.  
Economic capital is also a factor.  One interviewee summed it up the reasons for the lack of public relations 
activity from within the Muslim community: ‘It’s not an easy…it’s not an easy answer, but I think the biggest, 
simplistic answer is not enough people, not enough ability, not enough money’.    
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This was reinforced by several other illustrations of how Muslim leaders or 
representatives had demonstrated a lack of understanding about UK cultural or 
media norms.212  As one interviewee explained:  ‘There’s no communication, there’s 
no ability to communicate, they [Muslims] don’t know how to communicate.  They 
feel they can’t talk to their MP.  They may not know how to use surgeries or 
whatever.  So there’s a general lack of information or education about it.’ 
 
Another interviewee recounted how after 11 September 2001 the police ‘wanted to 
set up these regular meetings with the Muslim community, so they invited these 
leaders from the Muslim community, and for about 45 minutes different leaders from 
the Muslim community went on about how the media has treated them, and how the 
BBC has treated them....all negative experiences.  And the Assistant Commissioner 
at the time who was responsible for counter-terrorism but also for dealing with the 
Muslim community, after about 45 minutes he said, look, I appreciate all of this, but 
I’m not the BBC, I’m the Met [laughs].... So, just the understanding about who to 
speak to and about what issues; wasn’t there.’  In this instance, the leaders of the 
community had not understood the differences between fields, or how to navigate 
between them.   
 
One interviewee had a more optimistic perspective.  Describing the involvement of 
his organisation in the Stop the War Coalition, in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war, he 
explained how a common cause had brought Muslims into contact with groups they 
would normally not engage with: ‘It was one of the first times the Muslim 
community was beginning to get out of the intellectual ghetto it found itself in and 
engaged at that public level, collectively...To engage with Stop the War, to engage 
with Respect, to engage with stakeholders it would never have found itself… the 
socialists, gay and lesbian alliance: I mean these were partners you would never, 
ever consider…’  This example was echoed by other interviewees who talked about 
the way in which different Muslim organisations were addressing British issues, such 
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 For example, one interviewee cited small groups of Muslims burning books during the controversy over 
Salman Rushdie's 'Satanic Verses'. This, he explained, showed a lack of understanding that art is as sacred in 
the West, as religion is in Muslim countries. ‘So once you understand that, your approach to Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses will be different. You will not be burning books, because you will understand what Hitler did, and 
what that resulted in.’  
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as homelessness or teenage pregnancy, rather than restricting their concerns to 
issues more targeted at their own community.  Another interviewee spoke of 
different attitudes within the Muslim community itself: ‘There are people who are still 
in a defensive mode, there are people who are in a ‘let’s educate the wider public 
about us’ mode, and there are people who are like in sophisticated mode, which is, 
well, the best way to educate people is to try and rebuild the narrative, not just for 
Muslims but for Britain.’  However these examples were presented as currently the 
exception, rather than the norm.  Where Muslim organisations had attempted to 
engage Muslims on ‘British issues’, response had been poor and there was no 
indication that, having reached out to other fields, individual Muslims or 
organisations were particularly comfortable in that position. 
 
The interviewees were quick to disassociate themselves from the types of people 
they described, who had no knowledge, skill or resource to navigate through 
different fields in order to change or reshape the narrative about Islam. This 
suggests that they perceived themselves to be active and potentially powerful or 
influential participants within the political field while other Muslims were not.  Their 
self-perception in this area was sometimes contradicted by other elements of the 
interview but served to make them distinct from how they perceived other Muslims 
to be.  One interviewee described the need to be a ‘player in the game’, saying: 
‘Because the difference [between me and other Muslims] is, no-one is at the level 
that I’m at.  So they don’t quite grasp what I’m on about.’  Another recounted how 
he had chosen to file away a complaint sent to their organisation by a Muslim 
member of the public about a particular painting in the National Gallery that the 
complainer found offensive: ‘We thought the best way of dealing with this was to 
keep quiet about it, because not many Muslims would find out about it anyway, 
there’s not a huge culture of going to National Gallery in the Muslim community.’ 
These statements reveal a series of judgements made by the interviewees, 
including, in the latter quote, a decision not to take action on something found 
offensive and a judgement on the cultural preferences of the Muslim community.   
Interviewees also distanced themselves, and sometimes their organisation, from 
explicitly being part of a religious field, suggesting a separation from other Muslims.  
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One interviewee challenged a reference to his employer as a Muslim organisation:  
‘...we never call ourselves a Muslim organisation, we call ourselves Muslim inspired. 
So from our perspective we’re Muslim inspired but we’re not a Muslim organisation. 
 We don’t want to paint ourselves as the bog standard Muslim organisation.’  On 
further probing, the interviewee revealed that being a Muslim organisation created 
perceptions from both the Muslim and the non-Muslim community about what the 
organisation could or should be doing.  From a Muslim community, the expectation 
was primarily religious – about provision for places of prayer, or use of certain 
language, or adherence to particular methods of religious expression such as the 
hijab.  From the non-Muslim community, the interviewee explained the expectation 
of a Muslim organisation was one of extremism, or even links with terror.  Attempts 
were being made to counter this, including a refusal to take on work addressing 
solely ‘Muslim issues’, such as the Middle East, or Islamophobia.  
 
These insights raise particular questions about interviewees' own personal 
positioning within fields.  As discussed above, while nearly all interviewees had 
experience of operating within the political field they were not fully embedded as 
part of that field; they were often seen as outsiders and reliant on the co-operation 
of other political agents to be able to participate.  The isolation that some 
interviewees experienced within the political field stemmed in part from diminished 
levels of capital in comparison to other agents within that field, and also from a lack 
of understanding about how the field operates.  Interviewees did not have easy 
access to the social capital which is so prevalent in the political field.  Identified as 
‘different’ and with different priorities and ways of operating, the networks that 
other agents in the field utilise successfully were not available, or of less relevance, 
to those working for Muslim groups.  In contrast, interviewees suggested that they 
had greater networks among the Muslim communities, but there was a divide there 
too.  The separation between interviewees and the religious field did not come from 
a lack of religious belief or conviction, but, as the quotes imply, from their perception 
that they have a greater knowledge of politics, history or media, or cultural or 
societal literacy, in comparison with the wider Muslim community.   
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The interviews revealed a sense of habitus which seemed to sit at odds with the 
dominant characteristics of the UK political field.  Interviewees appeared less 
confident and self-assured than the political field might demand.  Their focus was as 
much on the traits and experiences of Muslims outside the political field as on other 
agents within the political field.  As outlined above, one or more interviewees spoke 
disparagingly of the drive for publicity and self-promotion within the political field, 
aligning themselves with a preference to get the job done properly and find solutions 
rather than soundbites.  The interviews revealed a motivation among interviewees to 
change the current situation and often a strong personal drive to do so.  At the same 
time, they were realistic about the scale of the task, describing the outsider status 
that was prevalent within the Muslim community(ies).  This outsider status was not 
necessarily something that they as individuals appeared to relate to and in this they 
sometimes expressed confusion or bemusement at the behaviour of media or 
political agents that they came into contact with.  Interviewees expressed a strong 
sense of awareness of diversity, not only in their own community(ies) but in others 
too, and they showed a willingness to work with others to achieve joint goals.  This 
contrasted with their sense of frustration at working within the political field, where 
their collaboration was not reciprocated in the way that they might have hoped for. 
 
The interviewees each described to me their own area of specialism and (often 
academic) expertise and their networks in the political and other fields.  They 
offered critiques of government policy and described the Muslim community as still 
‘maturing’ with no unanimity of action or purpose about how to change the narrative 
about Islam in the UK today.  As one interviewee succinctly put it: ‘Ok, so there’s no 
doubt that British Muslims haven’t put their case about their religion as well as other 
religions have, in the public sphere.  So Christianity doesn’t need to do much PR, 
right, it’s the dominant religion. But I think that other dominant religions, be they 
Hindu, Jewish, whatever, have done a much better job ...  So Muslims have always 
come across as being at odds with Western civilisation but they haven’t, I mean, 
Islam isn’t incompatible but they haven’t made the link strongly enough, so maybe 
that is a PR failure... Now, I put that down as an institutional failure – first 
generation migrants built mosques but didn’t know how to send out press releases, 
 223 
 
or didn’t think open days were a great idea.’ This acknowledgement of failure to 
communicate their religion effectively was shared by other interviewees, who 
suggested that the best way to tackle it was to have a debate within the Muslim 
community itself, rather than within other fields: ‘...there’s a conversation we need 
to have with the Muslim community.  The pressure is for them to understand that 
they need to contribute, they need to engage.  For a long time, they have been very 
content with just talking to themselves and not really engaging with the wider 
society.’  If this conversation is to take place within the community it will do little to 
enhance the standing or position of Muslim groups within the UK political field.  It is 
only when the conversation begins to take place more widely, and according to the 
logic of other fields, that the position of Muslims will begin to change.   
 
Despite having stated aims of driving engagement and understanding about Islam, 
several interviewees suggested that Muslim organisations had not been the most 
effective at driving this forward.  Interviewees described a ‘disconnect’ between 
organisations and the leadership, with individuals having different aspirations and 
expectations from the organisations which sought to represent them.  Partly, this 
was because of the huge diversity of the Muslim community, but also because 
grassroots activism and the work and lifestyle of individual Muslims were seen to be 
more effective.  One interviewee explained: ‘…many Muslims of my generation have 
woken up to the fact that there is something they can do to counter these 
perceptions.  But it’s still very ad hoc.  And the question is who should do it right, 
and how they should do it, right.  It’s all such a fierce debate.  And nobody can 
speak on behalf of all Muslims, right, we’re such a varied community and I think that 
ummmm... I think what gives me inspiration is that there are many ordinary Muslims 
doing amazing things.  They’re all over the UK and they’re slowly, through their 
actions, and being who they are, they’re slowly changing perceptions.’  This type of 
response was echoed by others, who suggested that the way forward was to 
encourage civic and political participation, engagement and debate among ordinary 
Muslims.  One interviewee went further, articulating the need to develop leaders – 
‘…young leaders, men, women…  young men, young women .… you don’t have this 
in the Muslim community, it’s very, very difficult.’  While not explicit, this observation 
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seems to suggest an absence of political social capital, with little debate or 
networking taking place among those who could be positioned as new entrants to 
the political field.  Without such leaders entering the political field, it will be difficult 
for others to follow. 
 
The interviewees were clear about the scale of the challenge in front of them and 
had identified a way forward within the Muslim community itself.  But none of the 
interviewees was explicit about this solution – the development of young leaders, or 
the changing of perceptions as a result the amazing things that ordinary Muslims are 
doing – being situated within the political field.  Instead, the implication is that 
young and ordinary Muslims will affect change within their own professional or other 
fields through their everyday life and actions.  While acknowledging that individual 
Muslims should become more politically active, interviewees did not go so far as to 
suggest that they needed to develop the skills and access the types of social and 
cultural capital necessary to become powerful agents within the political field.  
The people who took part in the fieldwork did not identify public relations as a way 
forward; even going so far as to dismiss it entirely, or reduce its significance to fact 
checking for journalists.  The public relations practitioners spoken to as part of this 
research would suggest that here interviewees are missing a trick. As we have seen 
in earlier chapters, public relations practitioners demonstrate a clear sense of PR 
logic – the process by which their practice can influence the institution which 
employs them, thus helping it to transverse and engage with other fields, and in 
particular the journalistic field.  I would suggest that the absence of an 
understanding of PR, demonstrated in the interviews described above, diminishes 
the opportunity to drive change within Muslim institutions, or to cross between fields 
as a result of PR logic.  While there are other ways to build greater understanding 
and empathy between fields than through public relations alone, the overwhelming 
concern among those I spoke to, and more widely within the Muslim community, 
about media narratives around Islam and the significance of PR within the political 
field suggests that without effective PR practice and logic, this will be hard to 




The title of this thesis is ‘Playing the game’.  At the heart of this doctoral research is 
an examination of the game (or, as described by Sparrow (2006), the dance) played 
between the news media and politics, with public relations practitioners situated in 
the centre of the playing field.  It is this focus on the relationships and interactions 
between the different contributors to news coverage which distinguishes this 
research from the literature discussed in Chapter 1.  Those accounts of news media 
reporting of Islam do not take account of public relations practice, or the significance 
of interactions between different fields in shaping news coverage.  As a result, the 
literature about Islam and media has yet to present a full understanding of how and 
why particular news coverage about Islam appears.  The existing literature provides 
a useful starting point for the examination detailed here, offering clarity about the 
type of media coverage that appears and the association of Islam with broader 
political issues such as security and threat, immigration, discrimination and violence. 
Yet unlike much of the existing literature, this study does not take news coverage as 
its starting point.   More recent studies of Muslim participation in different aspects of 
society (Field 2007, Spielhaus 2010, O’Toole et al 2013) propel the understanding of 
Islam and media out of the newsroom and into a broader social context.  This study 
goes one step further, by exploring the participation of Muslim groups and 
organisations within one particular field – the political field – and the nature of the 
relationships and practices that aid or hamper that participation.  As has been 
argued, participation in public relations practice can help to shape news media 
reporting and it is from this perspective that the study approaches the 
representation of Islam in the news media.  This develops the existing literature by 
providing a fuller and more rounded understanding of the practices that sit behind 
news coverage and by demonstrating that these practices are not restricted to 
journalists alone. Instead, the research has illustrated the different players involved 
in playing the game, and the potential consequences for those who do not 
participate. 
 
The phrase ‘playing the game’ is used by Bourdieu (1994) to describe the behaviours 
demanded of actors within specific social fields: an actor needs to compete 
according to the rules of the particular field in order to succeed.  The game played 
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between media and politics is one where power is exchanged, a continuous game of 
cat and mouse, where the media seek to report that which is most novel, 
contentious or significant and the politicians seek to influence media reporting which 
will enhance their reputation with the electorate.  For the game to take place, the 
news media must play by the rules of the political field; acknowledging its symbolic 
power and authority within society.  At the same time, politicians must play by the 
rules of the news media, adapting their presentation of policy and decision-making 
to conform to the media’s criteria for compelling and commercially viable news.  
According to the theory of mediatisation, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, while both 
sides are powerful, the upper hand in the game is with the media.  The media’s 
dominance over the political field subsumes politics to its rules to a greater extent 
than politicians are reciprocally able to control the press. Yet while both sides 
publicly assert their independence and autonomy, the real secret to the game is that 
behind the scenes the two sides are interdependent.  The media rely on accurate 
briefings and reliable information sources for a steady stream of news and politicians 
are dependent on the oxygen of good publicity to maintain their visibility and 
credibility with the wider public.   In this, the media logic inherent in mediatisation is 
translated and extended into a logic contained within public relations practice.  
Media logic cannot provide a steady stream of reliable news to feed a 24/7 news 
cycle.  In this the news media are reliant on the way public relations works within 
organisations and more widely within fields, constructing and disseminating their 
own narratives to conform with the logic of the media. 
 
But not everyone involved in politics chooses to play the game.  The fieldwork 
conducted among representatives of Muslim groups operating within the political 
field demonstrates their reluctance, or their inability, to engage properly with this 
type of jousting. Despite their presence within the political field, they are primarily 
observers of rather than participants in the ruckus on the playing field.  Yet although 
they may be on the edge of play, as observers they are not invisible.  Instead, they 
are drawn ever closer onto the field of play through an increasingly embedded 
media narrative associating Islam with the politics of central government in the UK.  
It is not possible for Muslim groups and individuals in the UK to diminish the 
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dominant media narratives by ducking out of the game.  A retreat from politics in an 
attempt to be shielded by a more religious identity provides no escape.  As is 
discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1, the predominant narrative about 
Islam in the UK not only associates Islam with political priorities such as conflict, 
war, terror and immigration, but it also serves to politicise that which is more closely 
linked to Muslim’s religious identity, such as veiling.  With the game swirling around 
them, the only alternative to being overwhelmed is to begin to play. 
 
Public relations practitioners have shown themselves to be some of the most expert 
players of the game between politics and the news media.  Their presence on the 
playing field makes for a smoother and more equally matched encounter; they 
counter the dominance of the media, assert the value of the organisations they 
represent and ensure effective communication between the two.  Their role is to 
manage the relationships between the different players on the field for the ultimate 
benefit of all.  By supplying a steady stream of news and information, public 
relations practitioners help to assuage the media’s demands while helping to shape 
and build the reputation of their sponsor organisation.  PR practitioners are able to 
achieve this because their skill as expert players rests not only in their ability to 
develop tangible resources for the media to use, but also in the scope and breadth 
of their relationships across the area of play.  Their intervention makes the game 
more complex and more nuanced, but without their presence on the field, those 
relationships would fracture and the media would return to dominance.   
 
The fieldwork with representatives of Muslim groups suggests that public relations is 
not yet fully part of the game they are playing with the media.  Some groups are 
standing on the sidelines while others are pushing their way on to the pitch, but 
without the network of relationships that support effective game playing.  The 
results of interviews suggest that this is because they are not fully operating within 
the political field.  Instead, their focus is divided between the demands of the media 
and the political game and those of the communities they represent.  These 
separate interests rarely appear to coincide, operating in different social spheres, 
with diverse priorities, networks and sources of power and capital available to them. 
 228 
 
Some remain unconvinced of the merits of playing the political game at all, arguing 
that their community(ies) are better represented by individual Muslims engaging 
with other fields as part of everyday life.  But whether Muslim groups take part or 
not, the game goes on and, according to the theory of mediatisation, it is becoming 







This concluding chapter considers the success, or otherwise, of this research in 
contributing to a greater understanding of the representation of Islam in the UK 
media. It discusses how far the research questions elicited responses helpful to the 
discussion and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology used.  
The chapter goes on to set out the contribution that this study has made to existing 
research and in particular to understandings of public relations, the theory of 
mediatisation and the literature around Islam and media.  The chapter draws to a 
close with suggestions for further work in this area. 
 
The research questions 
Since its conception, the aim of this research has been to understand more about 
the response of Muslim groups in the UK to the dominant media narratives about 
their faith and communities.  The urgency and enormity of this dilemma is apparent 
from the sheer volume of literature relating to Islam and media which has emerged 
in the last two decades.  Yet despite the amount of attention devoted to it, this 
thesis contends that there is still no satisfactory approach to answering the question 
about why the prevalent media narrative about Islam is so overwhelmingly negative 
and how it can be challenged or changed.  To date, the scale and complexity of this 
task has either been underestimated, with responsibility for changing the tone of 
press coverage placed solely in the hands of journalists, or dismissed as too vast and 
too difficult and someone else’s problem.  Too often these responses to 
understanding the reasons for particular types of media coverage begin with the 
media themselves or wider cultural frames, rather than looking beyond the media 
content at the interactions and influences which help shape media narratives.  The 
presentation of recurring themes and tropes in media coverage as outlined in 
Chapter 1 provides a valuable perspective on how Islam is represented through the 
media.  The theories of media and society discussed in Chapter 2 illustrate the 
impact that such media content can have on citizens and society more widely.  But 
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studying the media in order to understand how to change what they report is akin to 
trying to deduce the process of making a cake as it comes out of the oven.  The 
questions that this thesis sets out to answer are intended to reveal the different mix 
of resources that are involved in the construction of media coverage, with a 
particular focus on one element which to date has been overlooked in discussions of 
Islam and media - the role of public relations. 
 
The research questions outlined in Chapter 3 aimed to establish the nature of public 
relations practice, and in particular within the UK political field, with an 
understanding of the nature of power and how it is utilised in PR.  These questions 
encompass a sizeable social and professional arena: the UK political field and a 
particular element of practice within it.  With a few exceptions213 the literature 
relating to this practice – public relations – has not approached it as a social field, 
instead the literature has explored public relations from a management or media 
studies perspective.  As a result, the research questions within this thesis relating to 
public relations covered a breadth of practice, beginning with attempts to define 
what public relations is, and continuing by exploring the relationships and networks 
practitioners have access to and the power and capital they hold.   
 
These research questions alone would have sufficed for a study of public relations 
per se, but the locus of this research sits somewhere different – in an attempt to 
contribute to the urgent question of why particular narratives about Islam and 
Muslims dominate in the UK media.  To achieve this, the research questions then 
honed in on the experience of representatives of Muslim groups operating in the UK 
political field, with the intention of establishing how far their experience, skills and 
resources were akin to those prevalent among PR practitioners more generally.  
Again, these questions covered a vast sphere of activity and even within the political 
field there were many different routes which could have been explored.  The results 
of early interviews revealed that wide ranging questions about the effectiveness of 
public relations on media coverage were largely redundant, leaving participants 
uncertain about the focus of the discussion.  These questions had been based on the 
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assumption that representatives of Muslim groups would be engaging in public 
relations practice at a similar level to other practitioners but this proved to be 
erroneous.  Consequently, instead of framing discussions around the practice of 
public relations among Muslim groups, the questions reverted back to a more 
generic approach, which sought to explore how Muslim groups, and their 
representatives, were positioned within the UK political field and whether or not they 
were using public relations to shape media narratives.  This focus on the positioning 
within the political field was intended to elicit an understanding of representatives’ 
participation in the behaviours of that field, their access to sources of capital within it 
and the extent to which they shared its habitus.  This insight has been used to 
assess the likelihood of Muslim groups successfully embarking on public relations 
within the political field. 
 
The intention of the research has never been to generate a comparison between the 
nature and effectiveness of public relations conducted by representatives of Muslim 
groups and the practice more widely.  Such a comparison would provide little further 
insight into the question at hand, merely highlighting the differences between two 
very different and separate groups.  Furthermore, this would have required the 
research questions to focus on the public relations field as the arena where practice 
could be compared. As the research developed it became apparent that such a 
comparison would be difficult to make as the public relations field appears largely 
uncompetitive.  While appearances may be deceptive and a struggle for position 
within the field of public relations may be taking place unseen, on the surface at 
least practitioners are more involved in a struggle within the field in which they are 
employed; for example the political field.  
 
As a result, the final research questions sought to understand the positioning of 
agents representing Muslim groups within the political field.  In doing so, the 
questions take their lead from Bourdieu’s approach to the literary field (1993) and 
Anheier et al’s adoption of this (1995) by understanding how agents are positioned 
relative to others in the field.  As Bourdieu’s analysis of the literary field reveals, not 
only does this reveal more about the distinctiveness of the agents being studied, it 
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also reveals more about how they known and perceived by others external to the 
field. 
 
The methodological approach 
This research differs from other studies which also explore the depiction of Islam in 
the UK press.  While this thesis begins with a literature review about Islam and 
media it swiftly moves on to focus on the relationships and activities that sit unseen 
behind the final published story.  This has proved to be a robust methodological 
position which frees the researcher to concentrate on studying the construction of 
Islam through social fields, rather than from the perspective of journalism studies.  
It reflects the reality of the processes of media production and avoids the trope of 
journalistic prejudice or bias.  While the discussion of the portrayal of Islam in the 
news provides a useful context for this research, this approach avoids drawing a 
binary distinction between ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ coverage and instead comes to 
more nuanced conclusions. 
 
The methodological approach to this research – using field theory to determine the 
relative positions of actors responsible for public relations within the UK political field 
– proved to be a reliable and insightful mechanism for understanding how power is 
captured and utilised.  In this the research was aided by the high levels of capital 
demonstrated by interviewees, who (particularly as demonstrated by the public 
relations practitioners) were willing and articulate participants, prepared to talk 
freely and at length about their role and practice.  The very high success rate in 
sampling was a result both of the snowball sampling method used (and the benefits 
of my own contacts and reputation within the field) and practitioners’ strong external 
focus in their role. Snowball sampling worked particularly well because of the high 
value placed on professional networks – this meant that respondents were familiar 
with an informal and speculative approach.  They proved themselves to be 
comfortable with answering questions, and on tape, with little challenge or 
questioning about the purpose of the interview, other than for personal curiosity.   
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The methodology did not prove so effective among representatives of Muslim groups 
operating in the political field.  While there are numerous groups which could take 
part, many have limited resources or rely heavily on volunteers.  This group of 
interviewees was notably more insular than the public relations practitioners and, 
without the benefit of personal or professional networks, it proved much harder to 
gain access. When respondents recommended other contacts as potential 
interviewees the contact failed, perhaps because of a lack of time and resources and 
a growing demand amongst researchers for access. Among those representatives of 
Muslim groups who did take part, awareness of public relations practice seemed 
much more limited than had been assumed and, while this was revealing in itself, it 
restricted the depth of the conversation about the potential of PR.  As a result, the 
balance of the thesis has had to shift from its original intention, which was to 
explore the mediatisation of Islam in a greater depth.  Instead, the findings offer a 
first pass in an area which merits much further study. 
 
One of the original intentions of this study was to follow the trajectory of a news 
story from its conception as a PR construct within a sponsor organisation to its final 
arrival in the journalistic field, tracking the role and intervention of different agents 
as the story developed214.  The aim of such a case study would have been to 
illustrate the interventions that public relations practitioners make in shaping and 
refining content which eventually is reported as news.  With regards to Islam and 
media in particular, the study aimed to reveal how PR practice can result in 
particular narratives or perspectives being reported in the press.  For practical 
reasons it was not possible to pursue this line of enquiry.  While individual 
practitioners were happy to be interviewed about their role, a more forensic 
examination of PR material proved harder to achieve.  As is explained on page 201, 
attempts under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain public relations materials 
produced by government for the launch of the Prevent strategy were unsuccessful 
and this, combined with the difficulties in gaining access to different Muslim groups 
and communities meant that such a case study was not possible to pursue. Instead, 
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the deconstruction of the publicly available PR material about the launch of the 
Prevent strategy in Chapter 4 attempts to highlight the same contribution that public 
relations can make to press coverage. 
 
The addition of quantitative research methods may also have added something 
further to the insight generated by this research.  While qualitative interviews 
provide a rich seam of content for analysis and discussion, the novelty of the 
research into public relations practice among Muslim groups may benefit from a 
more robust quantitative basis on which qualitative conclusions can subsequently be 
based.  Previous studies (Edwards 2008, 2009; Grunig, J 1984; 1999; Grunig L 
1990) provide this data for public relations practice and this is supported by 
information collated on behalf of the trade body.  For Muslim groups this information 
is absent and would be a useful addition in understanding aspects of social, cultural 
and economic capital that representatives have access to.  Similarly, better insight 
into the nature of the Muslim religious field would have enabled more incisive 
interpretation of the position of Muslim agents in the political field.  As the fieldwork 
showed, representatives of Muslim groups often seemed uncomfortable within the 
political field but an absence of insight into the Muslim religious field makes it 
difficult to develop this observation further. 
 
Contributions to existing scholarship 
The work to answer the research questions has made three significant contributions 
to existing scholarship.  These contributions span across studies of public relations, 
the relationship between Islam and the news media and the theory of mediatisation.  
Most importantly, the study provides a clear and common thread between all three 
of these disciplines which has not previously been established, through its 
understanding of their interaction with politics as a social field.  This common thread 
extends through the different contributions that this research makes and, by 
establishing it, the research has opened up new dimensions for understanding 
mediatisation, public relations and Islam and media, all of which have potential for 
further quantitative or qualitative study.  The implications of the research may also 
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extend to the work of practitioners themselves, as a means of identifying critical 
success factors for public relations in the UK political field. 
 
Public relations and the political field 
First, the study has established the existence of public relations as a social field and 
separately, its place as part of the UK political field.  While public relations’ 
participation in the political arena is well established (Davis 2002; Gregory 2011;) 
there has been less attention given to the nature of public relations as a field in 
itself, with its own structures, habitus and ways of operating.  The findings of the 
study build on the work that has been done by Edwards (2006, 2008, 2009) in this 
area.  While Edwards’ work to date has focused on ethnographic studies of public 
relations functions within particular organisations, this study attempts to paint a 
broader picture of public relations within the UK political sphere, with a particular 
focus on how the practice operates at the centre of that field215. In particular, the 
elite interviews with Directors of Communications for central government 
departments conducted for the purposes of this study provide an original insight into 
the use of public relations at the very centre of the political field.  This type of 
practice is often overlooked, dismissed or treated pejoratively, but this study 
demonstrates that no study of the relationship between the political field and the 
media is complete without it.  To categorise public relations practitioners under the 
catch-all of ‘government officials’ belies the relationships and power that they hold 
and can exert.   
 
Whereas much of the existing literature about the mediatisation of the political field 
has focused on Parliament or individual politicians, this study extends that 
understanding of the political field to include government departments and agencies 
and the civil servants who work in public relations roles within them.  Although 
apolitical, these PR practitioners are at the heart of the political field, with 
government ministers often dependent on them for reinforcing the characteristics of 
the field and communicating the government’s main messages externally.  Although 
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firmly situated within the Westminster ‘bubble’ or ‘village’, the role of these agents is 
to look beyond the boundaries of Westminster geography, providing information to 
citizens and acting as translator between the political field and those fields beyond it.  
While this role should not be exaggerated as politicians themselves have direct 
contact with both the media and citizens, public relations practitioners create a 
structure around which communication between the political field and citizens can 
take place, using the news media as a tool to achieve this. 
 
Public relations agents are situated throughout the political field and their position is 
contingent on who they are working for or representing.  Those who are working on 
behalf of other agents nearer to the centre of the political field are positioned 
correspondingly and the authority held at the centre of the field is conferred on to 
the public relations practitioner.  The appeal of this power is compelling.  It was 
notable in interviews that public relations practitioners referred to themselves more 
readily as participants in the political field, or any other field in which their sponsor 
organisation is situated rather than their own professional field.  The importance of 
social capital to PR practice means that the networks they form within the political or 
other fields are important conduits of power and authority.  Thus when the PR agent 
who had worked at No.10 Downing Street issued instructions to press officers in 
other government departments, she was speaking with the authority of No.10 and 
was using this authority not only to influence the press officers but, through them, 
to exert control over officials in other departments.   The field of public relations only 
appears relevant to individual practitioners in so far as it serves to enhance their 
social capital, or their position, through networks within other practitioners.  As an 
interviewer who shares a lot of the characteristics exemplified by PR practitioners, 
interviewees approached our meeting with interest in how the encounter would 
enhance their social capital – or what the interview would do for them.  This was 
backed up by the high levels of participation in the LinkedIn social network: all 





The social capital practitioners possessed came from networks within and outside 
their sponsor organisations – and these networks revolved around the practitioner’s 
role.  For example, networks were based around other professionals who could 
contribute to the practitioner’s success – either through the provision of information, 
or funding or with people in more senior positions.  Others talked about how they 
had used their network to secure jobs.  Networks outside the sponsor organisations 
included journalists and again, these were seen as useful contacts who could be 
persuaded or influenced to write positive press articles or features.  More difficult 
relationships, such as with individuals or groups critical of the sponsor organisation 
had to be minimized, with the influence of these critics diminished and, as far as 
possible, the critics themselves pushed towards the far edges of the field.   
 
This focus on the field in which their sponsor organisation was situated minimized 
the sense of competition among practitioners within the public relations field.  Even 
competition for jobs was made light of, with appearance of a seamless transition 
from role to role, sometimes relying on others within the network in order to secure 
new positions.  There was no sense of competition, either for jobs or for press 
coverage, within sponsor organisations’ fields.  Instead each practitioner seemed 
confident of their own sphere of influence and that it would remain uninterrupted by 
competitors.  PR practitioners also have a high level of cultural capital: they are 
educated, articulate and able to converse about a range of subjects.  Education is 
important to them, but having the ability to manage relationships through good 
interpersonal skills and good contacts is more important than particular educational 
credentials.  The importance of managing relationships includes the capability to 
relate to senior people – including government ministers – and being the ‘right fit’ 
was particularly important.   
 
The sense of mystification that emerged from interviews is an important contribution 
to understanding the function of public relations and how practitioners operate.  This 
obscurity of practice meant that how PR practitioners undertake their role was not 
clearly defined or articulated, despite probing.  This gives the impression of 
effortless work, not fully understood or replicable by others and something that only 
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public relations practitioners can do.  While this may be particularly difficult for me 
to pinpoint because, as a practitioner myself, I may also be likely to gloss over the 
detail, it was also evident in its absence from interviews with those representing 
Muslim groups.  In contrast, they often expressed bewilderment at how public 
relations practice worked, whereas PR practitioners dismissed the detailed processes 
of what they did as the reordering of a few words, or the tossing out of a few ideas 
to a journalist.  This sense of mystery about what PR actually is, is reinforced by 
representations of the practice in popular culture.  For example, it is never explained 
how the hapless Edina Monsoon in the TV sitcom Absolutely Fabulous is able to build 
and maintain a successful PR business, nor how the character Malcolm Tucker, a 
media strategist in the TV comedy In The Thick of It, is as Machiavellian as he is 
unstoppable and powerful.  These are characters who know how to ‘play the game’, 
but as with interviewees, the rules of the game are not explained, making it difficult 
for others to take part.  
 
One of the reasons that this mystification was so evident during the course of the 
research was the focus on public relations as a social field, and the understanding of 
the positioning of practitioners in relation to other agents.  This is a revealing insight 
into how PR works and is essential to understand the connection, and exchange of 
power and capital, that practitioners have with other agents.  There is more work to 
do here in future research, in particular understanding the relationship of 
practitioners with others outside the field, including journalists. 
 
Developing understanding of Islam and media 
The second contribution this study has made to existing research is to further the 
understanding of the relationship between Islam and media.  This understanding has 
not come from analysing press coverage, but by looking at the interaction between 
Muslim groups, the political field and the media.  By taking this perspective, the 
research begins to build connections between Islam, the political field and the news 
media which have not previously been explicitly articulated.  The thread links these 
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three together, showing how none can be fully understood in isolation from the 
others. 
 
The literature review in Chapter 1 takes an alternative perspective in comparison 
with previous studies by revealing the inherently political nature of media coverage.  
Taking this as its starting point, it moves away from the perspective of the 
newsroom to explore the understanding of the workings of media power through 
mediatisation and the implications for Islam and the way it operates in the political 
field.  While the literature review suggests that Islam in the UK may have been 
heavily mediatised - to the extent that it is subject to media power - as yet there is 
no indication of what impact this is having on Islam as a faith, or on its communities 
of believers in the UK.  The findings from fieldwork suggest that there is no unified 
response to media narratives from Muslim groups operating within the political field.  
Instead, individuals representing Muslim groups are situated at the edges of the 
political field, as observers rather than full participants.  Their positioning within the 
field seems an uncomfortable one. When they are drawn in further towards the 
centre by other agents within the field they appear disconcerted by the behaviours 
and actions they witness or which take place around them.  In this, the challenges of 
their position become apparent.  They differentiate themselves from those within the 
Muslim field but are reluctant to associate or become full participants of the political 
field.   
 
While the literature review offers some suggestion that those politicians operating at 
the centre of the political field are seeking greater interaction from individual 
Muslims or those representing Muslim groups (O’Toole et al 2013), it is also clear 
that this participation needs to take place according to the rules of the political field.  
The prevalence of messaging about the need for Muslims to conform with British 
values in the public relations material surrounding the Prevent strategy suggests that 
only ‘moderate’ Muslims would be considered to take part. However, the fieldwork 
suggests that even those Muslims who may meet this criteria appear reluctant to 
engage fully within the political field. This is likely to be because they do not share 
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access to the same levels of social and cultural capital which dominate within the 
political field.   
 
In order to challenge or change prevailing media narratives, it is necessary to adapt 
or adopt characteristics of the political field and, in doing so, to move further into 
the field itself.  Moving towards the centre of the field provides greater access to the 
different types of power which it holds, and the potential for utilising that power 
more effectively through public relations practice.  At present, representatives of 
Muslim groups appear to be positioned on the edges of the field, although the issues 
with which they are associated in the news media – for example terror and violence 
or immigration - feature strongly at the very centre of the political field.  As 
individuals, those representatives of Muslim groups demonstrated higher levels of 
the type of social or cultural capital dominant within the political field than they 
seemed to suggest were prevalent in the Muslim community more widely.  But 
despite this, they were still not fully engaged in the practices of the political field.  
This marginalization may not just be the effects of their limited understanding of 
how to play the game, but the effect of others in the political field to keep them at 
arm’s length because of the tensions that could arise should they secure a position 
closer to the centre of the political field. 
 
This partial participation of Muslim groups within the political field offers a challenge 
for other agents within that field.  The public relations materials produced for the 
Prevent programme attempts to highlight the differences between those who are 
acceptable and those who are not, but this differentiation is drawn according to 
whether or not individuals and groups subscribe to ‘core’ or ‘mainstream’ British 
values.  This message is repeated consistently in the materials around the launch of 
the Prevent strategy, and remains a feature of the government’s approach to 
counter-terrorism as it is one of the main narratives within the Prime Minister’s 
Munich speech.  This suggests that acceptability by the field – and the relationship 
between media, state and society is important here – is conditional on possession of 
a certain type of cultural capital: values that are associated with being British.  This 
message is perpetuated from the heart of the political field; and is shaped in 
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accordance with PR logic and repeated to the media.  The media’s role within the 
public sphere, and mediatisation, means it has an influence on the way society 
operates; and this is reinforced by the breadth of Prevent work to include institutions 
such as schools, prisons and universities.  Those who do not conform to mainstream 
British values are, by implication if not explicitly, designated as ‘the other’ – denied 
the economic capital that would come from funding via the public purse and 
designated as ‘extremist’.   
 
Muslim groups’ lack of engagement or adoption of public relations practice requires 
further examination.  While the small sample who took part in fieldwork cannot be 
said to be a statistically reliable representative of the Muslim field it provides an 
insight into the responses that Muslim groups perceive as being available to them.  
Attempts to engage with the media have not always been successful, although often 
engaging with the media was described as attempts to challenge writing by 
individual, named journalists.  More generally, a lack of knowledge of public relations 
practice was demonstrated through the interviews, as well as a preference for 
Muslims within other fields (rather than in the political field) taking action to 
challenge or change perceptions stemming from media narratives.  I would suggest 
that that refusal or lack of capacity to engage with PR practice does not stem from 
lack of skills or capability, but by peripheral positioning within the political field.  The 
current media narrative and its links with the political field mean this a difficult cycle 
to break into and one in which all Muslims are characterized as the same, i.e. as part 
of a single community.  Those that attempt to do so suggest that it is an 
uncomfortable experience and show reluctance to join in a framing of Muslims which 
is at odds with reality.  But Muslim participation in contemporary governance 
suggests that this is changing and offers an opportunity.   
 
Developing mediatisation theory 
The third area in which this research has contributed to the literature is its 
development of mediatisation theory.  This has taken place through a more empirical 
understanding of mediatisation and through its extension to include the concept of 
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PR logic.  Here, the common thread provides a link between public relations and 
media power and how they intersect. 
 
The interviews with practitioners outlined in this thesis, together with the growth of 
the PR industry, suggest that organisations are becoming increasingly dependent on 
PR and its logic, and the interviews also provide evidence as to how this is relevant 
within the political field. If the claims of the public relations practitioners interviewed 
within this research are true, then the process by which mediatisation takes place is 
itself mediated, through the intervention of public relations; which both constructs 
news and affects the workings of organisations to enable them to do so. This, the 
research argues, happens through a process of PR logic; a concept not previously 
discussed in mediatisation theory and developed in more detail in Chapter 2.      
It is the contention of this research that current debates about mediatisation cross 
the gap between media and society in too big a leap without examining the 
processes or transactions that allow such influence to happen.  Mediatisation is 
predominantly a structural theory which explores how media structures, such as 
technology or the structural workings of television and newspapers, impact and 
influence society. This research approaches a discussion of mediatisation from the 
perspective of the human agent, and considers how mediatisation works within a 
particular context or field.  It does this in several ways and in doing so, broadens 
understanding of the relationship between media and society, and the role of 
different agents within this and the interplay of power between them. This is an 
extension of mediatisation theory which provides more empirical research into how 
mediatisation occurs.  Furthermore, it extends understanding of the sphere of media 
influence in by exploring the process of how mediatisation happens and who is 
involved. 
 
The research identifies the potential power of public relations practice to interrupt or 
subvert existing media narratives. This power is utilized to varying degrees, 
depending on the willingness of the sponsor organisation to adapt itself to PR logic.  
This study only reveals the existence of this logic from the perspective of the 
practitioner themselves, but the sponsor organisations of those interviewed appear 
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to have demonstrated a willingness to adopt PR practices, and increasingly to 
accommodate such practices within or close to the dominant coalition that leads the 
organisation.  PR practitioners act as the organisation’s voice or official spokesperson 
– the single, authoritative source of information, often putting words directly into the 
mouths of the most senior executives.  Others described themselves as the 
conscience of the organisation – a description that suggests they see themselves as 
holders of an element of symbolic capital: that which is right, and truthful.  It is their 
high levels of conformity with the other characteristics of the field in which they 
operate – in particular cultural and social capital – that enables them to lay claim to 
this status.  
 
Through an extension of mediatisation public relations has become integrated into 
the operations of sponsor organisations and this gives a distinct form of power to 
the public relations practitioner.  While their role is to act in service to their sponsor 
– and this makes them dependent on their sponsor for delegated authority and 
resource - as the interviews have shown, practitioners can also operate according to 
their own specific logic, speaking on behalf of senior executives and perpetuating a 
mystification which makes their work hard to understand and control.   PR logic, 
which practitioners utilise, is a particular way of seeing, covering and understanding 
information and data which has the potential to become news.  In particular it PR 
logic approaches information from a relational perspective, with the purpose to use it 
to influence others within both the sponsor organisation and the journalistic field.  
PR logic sets the formal and informal rules by which PR people operate and these 
rules were evidenced through the process of the interviews and the way they were 
conducted as well as through what practitioners said.  PR logic is a substitute for 
media logic, but goes further in its use of relationships to persuade organisations to 
change their way of operating.  In this sense, PR logic is primarily a relational way of 




The circle of logic 
The concept of PR logic has been developed within this thesis and needs further, 
quantitative as well as qualitative examination.  In particular, the extent to which it 
differs from media logic needs further consideration.  Within the context of the 
political field, this research posits that PR logic is distinct from media logic and is 
held by actors who are not employed by the media.  These actors take on a 
responsibility which the media do not, which is to help their sponsor organisation 
adapt to the demands of the media, that is to act as a filter for media logic (which is 
in itself a form of filtering).  Thus PR logic and media logic combine to form a circle 
of logic within the political field through which news and information is filtered from 
state (or other sponsor organisation) to citizens.  The different stages of the circle of 
logic in relation to politics are described below: 
 
1. The circle of logic rests on the necessary connection between the news media 
and wider society, whereby the news media acts as a means of 
communication with citizens and a substitute for the ideal public sphere. 
 
2. The process of mediatisation means that social institutions, including those 
institutions within the political field, are subsumed into the logic of the media 
and, to a greater or lesser extent, become dependent on its power.   
 
3. The political field relies on the news media in order to communicate with 
citizens and to give credibility to individuals and political parties within the 
field and the policies they espouse.  To achieve this, politics must adapt to 
media logic – providing information and news in accordance with the media’s 
preferred form of both content and production.   
 
4. Public relations practitioners perform this adaptation on behalf of their 
sponsor organisation.  The PR logic that they hold enables sponsor 
organisations within the political field to adapt to the logic of the media; thus 
keeping the media’s power at bay. Public relations practitioners capture, filter 
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and manage media power and turn it to the advantage of their sponsor 
organisation.  They do this by accepting the dominance of the media, and by 
playing the game so successfully that the media are compelled, through 
convenience or newsworthiness, to engage. 
 
5. But politics is not without its own sources of power.  The media rely on 
accurate information from the very heart of the political field and also the 
political legitimacy which maintains their independence and autonomy. The 
public relations practitioner uses their logic to present this information in a 
way which benefits the sponsor organisation and conforms to the logic of the 
media.  They do this through the management of effective relationships and 
this may include restricting the media’s access to information, or directing a 
journalist’s gaze in a particular direction. PR logic is an extension of media 
logic and the filter through which institutions approach their relationships with 
the media. 
 
6. The power that the public relations practitioner holds, through PR logic, 
completes the circle.  This power extends both outwards, towards the media, 
and inwards, within the organisation.  The power is incumbent in the 
relationships that PR practitioners manage.  PR logic is utilized through 
individual agents and actors, rather than through organisational structures.  
The actions of individual public relations practitioners can enhance the power 
of the political field (or the sponsor organisation within it) by introducing new 
structures according to the nature of their practice. 
 
7. Without PR logic, it is harder for an individual or organisation to challenge or 
change media narratives and the impact that these have on society, because 
those seeking to do so are starting from a position of powerlessness. 
 
What this study has not ascertained are the implications of this circle of logic for 
organisational practice, or the extent to which it has been operationalised within the 
political field.  Interviews with public relations practitioners suggest that their sphere 
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of influence within their sponsor body is significant, but this has not been verified 
objectively.  As the interviewee who suggested that the government department she 
worked for should rethink the way it handled bonuses inferred, the adoption of PR 
logic in the handling of this announcement was an afterthought, rather than an 
intrinsic part of how bonus payments were managed.   
 
This research has particularly looked at the experiences of Muslim groups with 
regards to this circle of logic.  The literature review in chapter 1 reveals how heavily 
mediatised Islam, and Muslims within the UK are.  The media frames Islam within a 
political setting, associating it with political issues such as immigration and asylum, 
terror and war.  At the same time, religious issues such as mosque building, veiling 
or arranged marriages are politicized through the media; often with the tacit support 
of politicians. Organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain become political 
footballs and individual Muslims in the public eye are characterized as extremist or 
moderate, often dependent on their position on these political issues.  While 
politicians may be sensitive in terms of the remarks they make, the media is less 
cautious, with commentators making explicit connections between Islam and political 
agendas.  
 
Yet while media power over Islam is evident in the way the press represent Islam, 
Muslim groups in the UK have not necessarily responded in kind.  Instead of 
engaging with the media or adopting PR logic, Muslim groups have, to an extent, 
stayed away from the media game, or are choosing to operate behind the scenes.  
This creates a vicious circle.  Representatives of Muslim groups interviewed for this 
study expressed concern about the difficulties of accessing the journalistic field.  The 
barriers to such access do not come about because of a lack of newsworthiness, 
since newspapers carry stories about Islam every day.  While the messages that 
representatives of UK Muslim groups might want to convey will differ from the 
overall negative narratives so predominant in the UK media, this research suggests 
that the restrictions on access are likely to be more a result of a failure in 
relationships.   Without PR practice working within this type of circle of logic, the 




This is an area for potential further research, either within the political field or in the 
religious.  Exploring this circle of logic in more detail could help shed light on the 
value and purpose of PR, motivations for organsiational decision making, as well as 
the impact that the news media truly has.  And as already outlined above, it would 
provide further insight into the relationship between Muslim groups in the media, 
and their potential to challenge or change media narratives. 
 
The headlines cited at the very start of this thesis provide a glimpse into the 
misperceptions, misinformation and misunderstandings about Islam and Muslims 
that can prevail in the UK news media.  For those most closely affected, seeing their 
identity and religious faith misrepresented and maligned by these headlines must be 
frustrating and distressing.  The full impact of this has yet to be fully understood 
outside the Muslim community.  To date, attempts to unravel the reasons for such 
narratives have been situated firmly within the journalistic sphere.  This research has 
attempted to take a fresh perspective, by unravelling some of the processes and 
interactions which sit behind the headlines and which, in cumulative fashion, can 
serve to influence what ultimately ends up in print.  It does not pretend to offer a 
solution to a seemingly intractable problem, but hopes to offer fresh thinking and a 
fresh perspective on the challenge.  In doing so, it may, in time, bring some benefit 
to those for whom the interaction between politics, media and Islam is much more 













Annex 1: Press reporting linked to Prevent Strategy press 
release 
This table demonstrates how key messages taken from the press release about the 
Prevent Strategy (Home Office: 2011) were repeated in media coverage the 
following day.  All quotes from the press release are verbatim. Quotes from media 
coverage are summarized, unless in quotation marks.  The press release also made 
reference to the fact that the full strategy was available on the Home Office website. 
 
Verbatim excerpts from the 
press release stating what the 
new Prevent programme will 
do: 
Summary excerpts from subsequent media 
coverage 
Ensure government funding and 
support cannot reach organisations 
with extremist views who do not 
support mainstream British values 
The Express, June 8 2011: ‘Muslim groups that refuse 
to renounce extremism will be cut off from 
Government funding under a strict new counter-
terrorism policy’. 
The Independent, 8 June 2011: ‘organisations applying 
for public funds will have to prove they espouse 
"mainstream British values" before they receive 
taxpayers' money.’ 
The Times Leader, 8 June 2011: ‘Unless organisations 
share the most basic presumptions about democracy, 
free speech and the rights of all citizens, then they 
should not receive money and recognition from the 
State. Or, indeed, from institutions of higher 
education’. 
Support sectors and institutions, 
including universities and prisons, 
where there are risks of 
radicalisation; and 
 
The Mirror, 8 June 2011: ‘Home Secretary Theresa 
May wants universities, colleges and prisons to train 
staff to "recognise the signs of radicalisation"’. 
The Express, 8 June 2011: ‘This review calls for more 
focus on ungoverned areas such as the internet, 
prisons and universities but there is no plan for 
tackling extremism on campuses head-on’. 
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The Independent, 8 June 2011: ‘The Home Secretary 
Theresa May promised a drive against the spread of 
hardline ideologies in universities, prisons and 
community groups as well as fresh measures to control 
their dissemination online’. 
Be evaluated rigorously to ensure 
effectiveness and value for money 
The Times Leader, 8 June 2011: ‘We take reassurance 
from the Government's promise that, in future, we will 
know exactly how this money has been deployed and 
to what effect’.  
Quote from Home Secretary 
Theresa May: ‘Prevent is an 
integral part of our counter-
terrorism strategy and aims to stop 
people from becoming terrorists or 
supporting terrorism. 
‘Our new Prevent strategy will 
challenge extremist ideology, help 
protect institutions from 
extremists, and tackle the 
radicalisation of vulnerable people. 
And we will not fund or work with 
organisations that do not subscribe 
to the core values of our society. 
‘Above all, it will tackle the threat 
from home-grown terrorism.’ 
 
The Express, 8 June 2011: ‘Theresa May said groups 
must subscribe to ‘mainstream British values’ and 
undergo stricter value-for money controls.’ 
 
The Mirror, 8 June 2011: She added: ‘We will not fund 
or work with organisations that do not subscribe to the 
core values of our society. 
‘Above all, Prevent will tackle the threat from 
homegrown terrorism.’ 
 
Tough action to exclude foreign 
hate preachers 
The Mirror, 8 June 2011: ‘Mrs May also said there 
would be a crackdown on Muslim hate preachers and 
extremist websites’. 
Work to tackle terrorist use of the 
internet 
The Express, 8 June 2011: ‘In addition, the policy calls 
for a renewed focus on the internet and a ‘national 
blocking list’ of violent and unlawful websites. 
Computers in libraries and schools would be blocked 
from accessing them’. 
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Work with schools to ensure 
extremists are not participating in 
the education of young people 
The Independent, 8 June 2011: ‘Warning over pupils 
at risk of violent extremism’.   
The Mirror, 8 June 2011.  Headline: ‘Teachers ‘to spot 
terror’; schools will target extremists’. 
‘Teachers will be encouraged to inform on extremist 
students as part of a Government counter-terrorism 
strategy.... She also said the Government would 
increase inspections at schools to root out extremist 
teachers’. 
 
The Telegraph (website) 7 June 2011 8.43pm.  
Headline: ‘Islamic radicals are in schools, government 
report says’. 
Greater support for universities 
and colleges: training staff to 
recognise signs of radicalisation 
The Express, 8 June 2011: ‘The Government will also 
seek to encourage education and healthcare providers 
to look out for signs of radicalisation in students and 
patients’. 
 
The Express, 8 June 2011, Leader (page 12) Headline: 
‘Threat of campus extremists must never be ignored’. 
The Times Leader, 8 June 2011: ‘The coalition has 
understood what some agencies and universities 
apparently do not, that once you buy the anger-fuelled 
ideology the rest is tactics’. 
Renewed efforts in prisons to stop 
people becoming radicalised and to 
de-radicalise others 
The Telegraph (website) 8.42pm, 7 June 2011 
Headline: ‘Prisoners are not de-radicalised’. 
‘The new strategy will issue updated instructions to 
prisons on managing and reporting extremist 
behaviour, provide new training to staff and introduce 









For research conducted by Claire Forbes [email address], Tel: [number] 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my research for my doctorate thesis, which 
I am undertaking at the University of Kent.  This form gives you more information 
about my research and your involvement in it.  
 
The purpose of my research is to understand the construction of Islam in the UK 
public and political spheres. 
 
The benefits of the research will be: 
 To identify the techniques and types of resources used to influence news and 
media representation in the UK 
 To understand different responses to the current representation of Islam in 
the news and how this representation might be changed  
 
I am using one-on-one interviews to conduct my research.  Our discussion will be 
audio taped to help me accurately capture what you say. The tapes will only be 
heard by me for the purpose of this study. If you feel uncomfortable with the 
recorder, you may ask that it be turned off at any time.  
 
Your interview, together with those of other participants, will be used in my thesis, 
which will be read by my academic supervisors and examiners. While direct quotes 
from you may be used in the thesis, your name and all other identifying information 
will be kept anonymous. 
 
You also have the right to withdraw from the research at any time. If you choose to 
withdraw all information about you (including tapes) will be destroyed and omitted 
from the final thesis.  You can contact me at the e-mail address or telephone 
number listed above. 
 
By signing this consent form I certify that I, [name of participant], agree to the 









Annex 3: Summary of research and biography 
The construction of Islam in the UK public sphere 
Claire Forbes, University of Kent. Supervisor: Professor Gordon Lynch. 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the use of public relations techniques in the 
construction of Islam within the UK public sphere.   
 
Since the terrorist attacks in New York and London in 2001 and 2005, Islam and 
Islamism have dominated the news agenda.  While much of the research to date has 
focused on the media’s representation of Islam (Moore, Mason, Lewis 2008; GLA 
2007; Poole 2002), fewer studies have examined what influences the news media to 
report stories relating to Islam in a particular way.  This study views the construction 
of Islam through the lens of public relations technique and practice.  It contends 
that public relations practice exerts particular influence on the construction of Islam 
in the UK today. The study seeks to uncover the nature and method of this 
influence. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and the developing theory of mediatisation are the 
main theoretical approaches for this work.  With its dual focus on dynamics of power 
and the specifics of human agency, field theory is a useful starting point for a 
consideration of how change occurs within particular settings.  The nature of public 
relations practitioners’ interaction with the journalistic, religious and political fields 
will be instrumental to this research. 
 
Mediatisation and the notion of media logic provide an orientation frame, or lens 
through which to view how media drives change in society (Lundby 2009; Couldry 
2003).  This study seeks to establish a supporting theory of PR logic to determine 
the change that public relations practice has on the fields with which it interacts. In 
this way, field theory and mediatisation synthesise, with field theory providing an 




The research is seeking to establish: 
 How public relations is used by non-religious fields (e.g. the political field) in 
the construction and dissemination of messages about Islam 
 The processes public relations practitioners undertake to construct a ‘story’ 
(an event or narrative supported by imagery and messages) about Islam and 
the interplay of power and capital within those processes. 
 The extent to which media logic influences the construction of particular 
images of Islam by public relations practitioners  
 The impact that this public relations activity has on Islam as part of the 
religious field 
 
This research could cover many different fields, including, but not limited to, 
theology, education, feminism or literature.  In order to explore one area in depth, a 
case study on public relations activity associated with, and in response to, the UK 
government’s Prevent strategy (HM Government, 2011) is being developed.  This 
strategy, intended to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism; support 
vulnerable people and work with key sectors such as education, faith, health and 
criminal justice, was launched in June 2011.  There is a wealth public relations 
material about Prevent and responses to it available.  The PR activity behind Prevent 
encapsulates many of the dimensions significant to the way in which messages 
about Islam are constructed in the UK public sphere today.  These include strong 
political capital; an interpretation and selection of cultural capital through managed 
interaction with Muslim groups (and others) and a careful use of language, intended 
to construct particular messages that sit comfortably across both the religious and 
political fields.   
 
Claire Forbes – Biography 
Claire Forbes is a part-time PhD researcher at the University of Kent and a full time 
communications practitioner.  Claire’s research explores the construction of Islam in 
the UK public sphere.  She has an undergraduate degree in Religious Studies 
(University of Newcastle) and a Masters degree in Islamic Studies (University of 
London).   
 254 
 
Claire is a qualified Marketing and Communications Director, and has most recently 
worked as Director of Communications at the Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman – a UK Parliamentary body.  She has previously worked as Director of 
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